



UNIVERSITETET I AGDER

SPAIN AND EU FOREIGN POLICY AFTER LISBON:

Still Calling the Tune in EU Latin America policy?

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Veileder

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Masteroppgaven er gjennomført som ledd i utdanningen ved Universitetet i Agder og er godkjent som del av denne utdanningen. Denne godkjenningen innebærer ikke at universitetet inntestår for de metoder som er anvendt og de konklusjoner som er trukket.

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Foreword

The writing of this MA thesis has been a challenging, but a very interesting process due to the chosen topic. I already knew at an early stage that I wanted to write about Latin America or something related to it, and provided that I am very interested in both European and Spanish foreign policy, the topic finally landed on a combination of them.

It goes without saying that I would not have gotten through this process without the help and support extended to me by several persons. First of all I would like to express a special appreciation to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Stefan Gänzle, who has been there all along providing me with good advice and support, helping me to see clarity when chaos struck me. Thanks for your time, patience and understanding. I would also like to thank the Spanish Representation to the EU, the European External Action Service and the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who all have been the utmost helpful, kind and welcoming towards me and fundamental pieces in this work, as well as Prof. Dr. José Antonio Sanahuja for taking some of your valuable time to advise me.

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Abstract

Ever since its accession to the EU in 1986 Spain has been considered to be the main driver of the EU Latin America policy, regardless of government. This particular domain of EU foreign policy has for a long time been of relatively little interest among the other member states, which in other words left Spain as its undisputed leader, with permission from Portugal. Spain has therefore been quite successful in shaping EU Latin America policy according to its national foreign policy preferences, in particular during the 1990s when conditions such as the international context, the institutional set-up of the EU and the domestic factor were all favorable.

These conditions did not remain constant and the new millennium presented Spain with a quite modified picture. A striking modification to this picture was the Treaty of Lisbon. The introduction of 'Lisbon' meant significant changes to the institutional set-up of the EU, and possibly the removing or minimizing of what had been important channels through which Spain had projected its Latin America preferences. At the same time 'Lisbon' introduced developments set with the specific objective of strengthening EU foreign policy. Naturally, this raised questions regarding the impact this would have on Spain's further capacities to shape EU Latin America policy.

This was analyzed through the scope of Europeanization and discussed on the basis of theories that are central to European integration, such as institutionalism and intergovernmentalism. The findings in this study suggest that 'Lisbon' is potentially very positive to Spain's capacities to shape EU Latin America policy, and even of an enabling character, provided that Spain manages to adapt to the changes. The factors that are proving to be challenging for Spain are rather the international context, the high number of EU member states and challenges at the domestic level, and in particular the financial crisis.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACP	The African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States
ALA	Asia and Latin America
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
COLAC	EU Council's Working Group on Latin America and the Caribbean
COREPER	The Permanent Representatives Committee
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DG	Directorate-General
DG DEVCO	Development and Cooperation Directorate-General
EC	European Commission
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
FAC	Foreign Affairs Council
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security policy/Vice-President of the European Commission
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
TEU	Treaty on the European Union

1. Introduction

1.1. Problem field

In December 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon- often referred to as ‘Lisbon’ in short- entered into force. One of its core aims was to make Europe’s voice in the world stronger and more effective by improving both coherence of its institutions and policies. The lack of coherence in EU foreign policy had been frequently addressed at the EU level. Given that EU foreign policy has, traditionally, been a complex and sensitive arena well-guarded within the national remits of the member states, it has often been subject to national grandstanding (Dinan 2013). Aiming for a strong and coherent foreign policy, ‘Lisbon’ introduced therefore the following major changes to EU foreign policy; the permanent European Council Presidency, significant institutional modifications affecting the post of the High Representative as well as the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS). A common thought among researchers was that these changes would have major implications on the role of the member states in the shaping of EU foreign policy. Traditional ‘schools’ on European integration such as institutionalism and intergovernmentalism are split on the consequences that the Treaty of Lisbon ultimately entails. While institutionalists argue that ‘Lisbon’ is a step further in moving power in terms of EU foreign policy towards Brussels, also referred to as ‘Brusselization’(Stetter), intergovernmentalists claim that EU foreign policy still depends on the political will of the member states (Dogan 2008).

According to Wong and Hill, EU foreign policy is best understood as the “sum and interaction of the national foreign policies of the member states, EC external trade relations and development policy and the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU” (Wong and Hill 2012 p. 3). In other words, EU foreign policy is to a large extent the product of a dense interplay between the EU institutions and the member states, in which the member states without doubt play a major role in shaping according to their preferences. While some member states, especially the bigger ones, sometimes see EU foreign policy as a constraint in terms of their foreign policy preferences, others tend to see it as an opportunity (Lehne 2012).

When member states decided to pursue their national foreign interests through the EU, they could increase their influence both in the EU and the world. Projection of national foreign policy, also referred to as ‘uploading’ by researchers on Europeanization (Hill and Smith 2011), has also been a contribution to the development of a common EU foreign policy. The outcome of such a process is called Europeanization, in other words member states adapt to

Europe and at the same time respond by shaping developments at the EU level by uploading national preferences (Hill and Smith 2011). The study of Europeanization of foreign policy has become increasingly popular, and the case of Spanish foreign policy has also been well assessed in the past (Denca 2009), notably through the studies of José Ignacio Torralblanca and José Antonio Sanahuja. The ratification of 'Lisbon' opens up interesting discussions and questions with regards to Spain's current role as a shaper of EU Latin America policy.

In principle, if the changes introduced by 'Lisbon' to EU foreign policy have had an actual impact, it could imply that member states find it more challenging to shape the current EU foreign policy according to their individual preferences. Consequently, what becomes interesting is to analyze the impact of 'Lisbon' and discern whether it has triggered any implications on the projection of member states' foreign policy. More specifically, this thesis addresses these possible implications through the study of Spain and the impact of 'Lisbon' on its role as a shaper of EU Latin America policy. Ever since its accession in 1986, Spain has been an active shaper of EU Latin America policy, and provided that it will most likely still work to pursue much of its Latin America preferences through the EU, this makes Spain a relevant case through which the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on EU foreign policy can be analyzed.

1.2. Background

The role of the member states in shaping EU foreign policy has always been vital. Each of the now 28 member states has its own national preferences in terms of foreign policy, which they have often sought to pursue more effectively through the EU by uploading at least some of their national priorities. In fact, EU foreign policy is to a large extent made up of a patchwork, in which member states' preferences and policies are taped together. For instance, member states such as Belgium and France pursued some of their policy preferences towards Africa through the EU and left their mark on much of the EU policies regarding Africa (Nasra 2009), so did Britain on Asia and so on (Allen and Oliver 2004). Bearing in mind Europe's history of colonialism, maintaining a relationship with its former colonies is often something emotional, of cultural and usually economic importance. For Spain, Latin America represents this relationship, and due to its historical, cultural and, eventually, economic ties, the Spain-Latin America relationship is perhaps the most special a European nation currently maintains with its former colonies (del Arenal 1990). Not a coincidence, the point of departure of the EU's relations with Latin America can be drawn from the accession of Spain in 1986. Spain has put

a lot of efforts in approaching Europe and Latin America, and is today considered to be the main ‘author’ of the EU Latin America policy.

Today, according to statistics of development assistance and trade, Spain is the biggest donor and the second biggest investor in Latin America, only behind the United States, and this is labeled by some as ‘la Reconquista Latinoamericana’ or the second conquest of Latin America¹. For the largest and most important Spanish companies, Latin America has provided “shelter” and survival through the financial crisis. In 2011 it was stated that in an article in BBC Mundo that 8 out of 10 Spanish companies were to increase their business in the southern cone². Latin America is for these reasons of great importance for Spain, thus enjoying high priority on the Spanish foreign policy agenda.

1.3. Relevance of topic and research question

In the context of EU foreign policy, member states are usually defined as large powers and small powers (Lehne 2012). Traditionally, four variables (population, GDP, military capability and territory) have been applied to measure the size of EU member states (Thorhallsson 2006). For a small power, such as Lithuania or Denmark, uploading its foreign policy, would provide it with a formidable international presence it otherwise would not enjoy which allows for it to ‘punch above its weight’, while a large power, such as France or Germany, does normally not always have the same need. The success of EU foreign policy is, however, often regarded as dependent on the extent to which the large member states have common interests.

Spain falls into the description of a medium-size power, which makes the study of its upload capacity after ‘Lisbon’ both interesting and relevant. A simple definition of the term medium-size state would be a state that is “neither a ‘great power’ nor a ‘small state’” (Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006 p. 653). Spain can pursue some of its preferences towards Latin America outside the realm of EU foreign policy, but with a strong Latin America dimension in the EU, Spain would enjoy more power, and it is therefore thought that Spain will seek to keep uploading the vast majority of it to the EU level, as it has usually done since its accession in 1986. However, EU Latin America policy is a “policy in which few other member states share particular interest” (Interview #3). In addition, as a consequence of ‘Lisbon’, some of the channels provided by the former institutional set-up, through which Spain successfully uploaded its Latin America preferences in the past, no longer exist. With this being said, Spain should, without being a large power, have more possibilities than a small power to play

a significant role in defining EU foreign policy after 'Lisbon'. This also makes this research particularly relevant, as it has the potential to determine 'what's left' for states' diplomacy in EU foreign policy. Towards this background, the research question is the following:

- **Does the Lisbon Treaty have an impact on the way Spain shapes the EU's Latin America policy?**

The research question will be examined through the study of Spain's role as a shaper of EU Latin America policy after 'Lisbon', and the thesis is structured like thus: First, the analysis is prepared based on a framework of analysis that draws attention to intergovernmentalism and institutionalism, which makes up the theoretical basis of this thesis, and second the approach of Europeanization, which is the scope through which the analysis is conducted. The design of this thesis is of qualitative nature, in which the impact of 'Lisbon' will be measured through the operationalization of variables. The following 4 variables are central to the way member states usually pursue national foreign policy preferences at the EU level: 1) Using EU institutions, 2) Agenda-setting and coalition-building, 3) Discourse and strategy, and 4) The bureaucracy of the Spanish MFA, and consequently measured through cases relevant to the study. The findings will subsequently be discussed through theories on European integration, such as institutionalism and intergovernmentalism.

1.4. State of Research

Research on Europeanization became quite significant and enjoyed a significant increase in the late 1990s, when students of European integration became interested in the impact of European processes and institutions on member states. Although the precise meaning of Europeanization often has been unclear, it is generally understood in 3 ways:

- 1) The emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance.
- 2) The process of influence deriving from European decisions and impacting member states' policies and political and administrative structures.
- 3) Processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of rules, procedures, policy paradigms and shared beliefs and norms (Börzel and Risse 2007 p. 484-485).

The early studies on Europeanization soon received criticism stating that not enough focus had been cast on the role of member states. The top down perspective was common and saw

the member states as passive recipients of EU policies. It was, however, suggested to conceptualize Europeanization as a two-level game at the national and supranational level, in which the member states played an important role of shaping EU policies, known as the bottom-up perspective (James 2007).

While research on Spain role as shaper of EU Latin America policy after ‘Lisbon’ is scarce, there is a broad agreement in the literature that Spain has played a key role in the shaping of the EU Latin America policy since its accession and towards the 2010 Spanish Council Presidency: José Antonio Sanahuja, for example, concludes that Spain has been both an uploader and a downloader, which means that Spain has both projected its own foreign policies, and adapted to EU policies (Sanahuja, José Antonio in Ruano 2013). He states that Spain had a great deal of success as an uploader regarding Latin America during the 1990s, a policy area in which nor the EU nor its member states were interested in at the time. To this, Sanahuja adds that Spain did not have any opposition either. Accordingly, “where no former policy existed, and the intergovernmental institutional framework prevailed” (Sanahuja, José Antonio in Ruano 2013 p. 57), Spain was a successful uploader, thus making it difficult to deny that Spain had been the main uploader of the EU Latin America policy.

Furthermore, Spain has, since its accession, been considered a pro-European member state, supporting the strengthening of the CFSP, though mostly for instrumental reasons. At the institutional level, Spain has, on the one hand, defended the maintaining of unanimity procedures to define CFSP goal and strategies, thus ensuring that Spanish interests in Latin America would always be kept high in the EU. Consequently, the CFSP has allowed Spain to ‘punch above its weight’ at the global stage. This is in many ways a result of Spain pursuing the mind-set ‘adapt in order to project’. In addition, it was suggested that the testimonial role of the European Parliament gave member states a large degree of independence and autonomy of action. However on the other hand, understood that in order to increase success of Spanish strategies towards Latin America, a strengthening of the EU’s overall foreign policy capacity and improvement of consistency of CFSP actions with trade, cooperation and development in the Community pillar was required. On the other side, unrest regarding the fact that Spanish governments would be forced to negotiate several elements of its Latin America preferences under QMV, ruled. This unrest is strongly related to the Eastern enlargement. At the domestic level, Spain modernized its MFA in order to maintain its central role in the EU foreign policy-making process (Torreblanca 2001).

Research on pre-Lisbon EU foreign policy-making is also well assessed. Here, the importance of member states in EU foreign policy shaping, and the mechanisms that member states could manipulate in order to upload its priorities is frequently addressed. For a medium-size member state like Spain³, knowing how to use the channels the institutional set-up of the EU provided was essential to its role in EU Latin America policy. Much research on EU foreign policy-making focused on the role of small (er) member states, demonstrating that their roles can be significant (Nasra 2011). In other words, they are not, per definition, confined to the role of downloaders (Panke 2011). The degree of influence exercised by small (er) member states is determined by their ability to build coalitions, their negotiating skills, commitment, and especially their agenda-setting power (Björkdahl 2008). Central contributors to this topic argue that agenda-setting is one of the, if not the most, important mechanisms for national projection.

It has been widely acknowledged throughout the literature that the Council Presidency has been very important for member states', given that it facilitates member states' possibilities of putting their national foreign policy preferences at the EU's agenda during a period of 6 months. Member states' abilities to gain attention and build credibility, which are essential agenda-setting strategies, were highlighted as well (Princen 2011). For Spain, the Council Presidency was a considerable instrument when pursuing its Latin America preferences through the EU, as it provided Spain with the advantage of setting the agenda for the following 6 months. Spain held the Presidency in 1989, 1995, 2002 and 2010, and except for the first, all of them were successful with regards to Latin America. Achievements such as association and free trade agreements, summits etc. sprung out of these presidencies (Morata and Fernández). While the research point towards the importance of Spain's Council Presidencies, it also highlights Spain's negotiating skills, and its ability to present solid arguments, especially economic ones, supporting its position, which are both advantages when it comes to coalition building (Torreblanca 2001).

Grand theories of European integration, such as intergovernmentalism and institutionalism, are often assessed by the literature and applied to discuss the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on EU foreign policy in the course of research. Although much research has been done on the predicted impacts of 'Lisbon', there is a lack of research on the actual effects of the Treaty, and a shortage on member state specific research. Literature centered on the 'school' of intergovernmentalism suggested that 'Lisbon' would have an impact on EU foreign policy, although not significantly when it comes to the role of member states in the shaping of it. It is

further argued that “intergovernmental practices will still dominate in the EU system”, and that the new role of the EU bodies will depend on factors such as; “positions of member states, political will and personalities” (Tosiek 2008 p. 1 & 12). The fact that unanimity will still make up the voting method in the Council, regarding CFSP, is especially highlighted.

Furthermore, it is also predicted that despite the new powers of the High Representative (HR/VP), decision-making procedures will remain basically unchanged, and as a result of this, the HR/VP will feel constrained, given that unanimity would remain together with the member states that will continue to guard their foreign policy autonomy (Paul 2008). The EEAS, however, will affect EU policy making. The impact of the EEAS will “reverberate to the member state level”, and national adaptation will be supplemented by a process of “identity reconstruction” (Paul 2008 p. 31). The diplomats seconded by member states in the EEAS, return to the member states with greater knowledge. On the other hand, there is also research predicting that as long as CFSP is “subject to unanimity, a true CFSP will be slow to develop” (Sieberson 2009 p. 992).

In general, the literature covering the ‘school’ of intergovernmentalism suggest that the Lisbon treaty will not push CFSP in a supranational direction, arguing that, despite the announced changes, EU foreign policy still depends on the position of the member states and their political will. Another argument is that the HR/VP depends, in a great deal, on the will and acceptance of other actors, despite the fact that Lisbon has provided it with more powers as agenda-setter (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013).

Literature centered on the ‘school’ of institutionalism argues that the Lisbon treaty will give the EU a more coherent foreign policy. The new role of the HR/VP, with its new powers will help harmonizing the positions of the member states (Koehler 2010). It is further emphasized that member state governments will become more “willing to compromise and reach a common policy decision” (Archick 2014 p. 3). Together with the increase of power of the European Parliament on some foreign policy areas, such as trade and home and justice affairs, ‘Lisbon’ is be a step further in a supranational direction (Sjöstedt 2007).

One the one hand, Lisbon is seen to increase the EU’s ability to influence the member states, or move power from the capitals to Brussels, but at the same time it will transfer more power to the big member states at the expense of the small (er) member states(Sjöstedt 2007). In the European Parliament the “number of members from larger countries is greater than their countries’ share of votes in the Council” (Sjöstedt 2007 p. 9.). In other words, when power is

transferred to the European Parliament, small (er) member states' influence will find itself decreased (Nasra 2011, Klein 2012). Another example applied by the institutionalists to support this is the marginalization of the Council Presidency⁴. To summarize, the 'school' of institutionalism argues that the Lisbon Treaty is a step further in moving power of EU foreign policy towards Brussels, and that if certain conditions are met, "the high representative and his service will indeed make a difference" (Paul 2008 p. 34).

The two 'schools' present interesting arguments to be analyzed and discussed. The intentions of the Lisbon treaty seem ambiguous. The changes it introduced are, on the one hand, meant to improve coherence, thus steering EU foreign policy in a supranational direction. However, at the other hand it seems logic to argue that, despite the effects of Lisbon, EU foreign policy will still depend on the will of the member states.

1.5. Hypotheses

The research question will be exposed to the Europeanization approach and further discussed in the framework of intergovernmentalism and institutionalism. The perspectives applied in this framework of analysis complement each other as the first present a descriptive approach to the impact of 'Lisbon' on the role of Spain in the shaping of EU Latin America policy, and the other perspective provide an analytical approach which can determine the overall implications of 'Lisbon' on EU foreign policy.


The Europeanization approach consists of three perspectives that seek to explain the developments of EU foreign policy; the mechanisms of national adaptation and national projection and sideways Europeanization. National adaptation is also called the top-down/download approach, because it relates to how nations adapt and end up downloading EU policies (Hill and Smith 2011). The 'school' of national adaptation tends to "build down" the importance of the member state in policy making. According to Radaelli (Radaelli 2000), member states adapt to Europe and simultaneously seek to actively shape developments at the EU level. Here, the member states are the primary actors of change rather than passive subjects. At this level the member states seek to shape policies through interests and rational thinking (Hill and Smith 2011). Each member state seeks to Europeanize its national foreign policy preferences by projecting it onto the EU level (Radaelli and Pasquier 2006). This approach is very relevant when analyzing EU foreign policy. If a foreign policy preference of country A is successfully projected onto EU level, then the policy will be Europeanized and therefore exercised by the other member states too. Sideways Europeanization relates to

socialization and learning among actors at the EU level and argues that it increases the probability of policy convergence.

Theories on European integration, such as institutionalism and intergovernmentalism, offer different explanations to what is happening among European states, and can be applied to present different views on the impact the Lisbon treaty has on EU foreign policy. The idea is to tie the findings regarding the research question back to these two ‘schools’ on European integration. The institutionalist assumptions about European integration evoke the neo-functionalist tradition of integration theorizing, wherein ‘institutions make a difference’. Institutionalists argue that the key to understanding European integration lies in understanding the influence of European institutions. On the other hand, the intergovernmentalists attribute little influence to supranational agents or institutions and explain closer international co-operation in Europe as resulting from the converging national interests of states. Nations will never resign sovereignty, but they can pool or delegate power, if it is in the nation’s best interest. Accordingly, the two ‘schools’ have two different perceptions of the impact of the Lisbon treaty (Puchala 1999). Based on these theories, the following hypotheses are formulated:

- 1) EU foreign policy still depends on the positions of the member states and their political will. Lisbon does therefore not constrain Spain’s upload capacity. Instead, Spain adapts to it by manipulating the newly created structures of Lisbon.**
- 2) The Treaty of Lisbon strengthens the role of EU institutions. For this reason, Spain does no longer exert tangible influence and finds its upload capabilities constrained by Lisbon.**

Figure 1: Research design:



2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter reviews the analytical framework, which serves to analyze and discuss the empirical questions in chapter 4, to which three perspectives are employed. The first part sheds light on the understanding of the interplay between national foreign policy and European foreign policy, and serves as an introduction to the following parts. Here, the challenge of compatibility that sometimes can occur between national and European foreign policy is described. Attention is drawn to why member states sometimes prefer the bilateral dimension to the European one, thus explaining that although Spain has played a key role in the shaping of the EU Latin America policy, and still values it, it can also pursue its interests outside the realm of European foreign policy. The second part takes on the ‘schools’ of intergovernmentalism and institutionalisms, which present theories explaining the reasons of European integration. These ‘schools’ have contrasting views on the driving forces behind the developments of the EU and serve to discuss what consequences the Treaty of Lisbon has on Spain’s capabilities to shape the EU Latin America policy. Finally, the third part employs the Europeanization approach, which explains the complex dynamics of EU foreign policy, how it is shaped, and the role of the member states in it.

2.1. National versus European foreign policy

“The essence of foreign policy is often understood as the definition of national ends, objectives or interests, and the pursuit of those interests” (Wong 2006 p. 2)

The term ‘EU foreign policy’ is quite recent, because for a long time in the history of European integration, foreign policy was well guarded within the national remit. National foreign policies have existed side by side with the European foreign policy. However, as the national foreign policies of the member states tend to have a more narrow focus than the European one, challenges concerning compatibility on certain areas can arise. According to the ‘state-centric’ school, when national foreign policies are compatible with European foreign policies, the global influence of the member states can be multiplied in the area of interest, however when they are not compatible, EU foreign policy is often regarded as an obstacle more than anything.

For historical, cultural, linguistic and economic reasons, the Spain Latin America relations represent an important, if not the most important, dimension of Spanish foreign policy. This relationship is possibly the closest and most special relations any European state has with its former colonies (del Arenal Moyúa 2009). Not surprisingly, a neat way to understand Spanish

foreign policy goes by understanding its relations with Europe, Latin America and the Mediterranean, which in this order makes up Spain's main foreign policy priorities.

With regards to its Latin America policy preferences, Spain has pursued a 'two track strategy', meaning that it has pushed for the development of an EU policy towards Latin America by projecting its national foreign policy preferences onto the EU level, and has at the same time worked to consolidate its own bilateral policies towards the region (Ruano 2013). However, the way Spain has approached Latin America has not been constant. While Spain in the 1990s privileged the pursuit of its Latin America interests through the EU and the Iberoamerican community, it has since the mid-2000s opted more towards the bilateral approach.

In the Spanish case, the compatibility between the national foreign policies and the European has depended greatly on the international context. In the 1990s, the international context favored a regional approach towards Latin America. But today in a different international context, although Spain still works to continue developing the EU Latin America policy, it finds it more effective to pursue parts of its Latin America policy preferences through the bilateral approach, because it allows Spain to differentiate between the countries they like and do not like, and this policy is of course not always compatible with the broader aspect of the EU policy towards the region (Interview #7). The issue of coherence, which has been addressed by the Treaty of Lisbon, is a major challenge when converging national foreign policies with the European foreign policy. Spain for instance, has pushed for stronger EU trade links with Latin America, but at the same time it has been a strong advocate of protectionism in agriculture. This is a clear contradiction and one of the reasons to the problematic EU-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement negotiations.

2.2. Intergovernmentalism versus institutionalism: The never ending debate on European integration

The debates on the developments of European integration have dominated the research environment for decades. Researchers of different theoretical ‘schools’ try to explain the reasons to the ‘how’s, what’s and why’s’ of integration in Europe, and the role of the member states and institutions in this process. The ‘schools’ of institutionalism and intergovernmentalism have pervaded the debates on the EU since the beginning. They present their explanations to what is happening among European states and its people and why it is happening, and more importantly the emergence of a European common foreign policy. The implications of the Treaty of Lisbon on the EU’s foreign policy has ‘revived’ this debate, and, accordingly, these ‘schools’ present an interesting framework in which the research question of this thesis can be discussed.

2.2.1. Institutionalism

For the institutionalists ‘institutions make the difference’. Here, “the advance of European integration is both indexed by and contained within the expanding authority, competence and jurisdiction of supranational institutions” (Puchala 1999 p. 318). They recognize that European integration was initiated by agreement among the countries participating in it, but once the European institutions were established, they would take on an independent political life. “Politics at EU level is no longer seen as a series of decisions made by national governments, but as a ‘path dependent’ process with a series of unforeseen consequences” (Bulmer and Lequesne 2013 p. 10).

For institutionalists, the key to understanding how and why European integration is happening lies in understanding the influence of European institutions and the people that direct them. Institutionalists do not reject the importance of intergovernmental bargains; however they highlight how importantly the day-to-day functioning of EU institutions shapes policy outcomes for the big actors. Member states, though, are still important decision makers, but increasingly constrained by the existence, interests, actions and own developments of the common institutions they created themselves at an earlier point, in other words a consolidation of a supranational polity. Institutionalists highlight the emergence of gaps in member state control in four conditions:

- 1) The independent interests of institutions create problems for member states, because due to the nature of the European project, member states have to allow the institutions

efficient decision-making and effective enforcement. As tasks at the EU level become more complex, the institutions will need more power. The increasing influence of the Commission is a clear-cut example of the growing independence of EU institutions.

- 2) What member states consider to be autonomy simply reflect their lack of oversight. As they are often preoccupied with short-term concerns, they don't see that many of the implications of political decisions only play out in the long run.
- 3) When handling dense and complex tasks, member states are often forced to delegate decision powers to experts. This limits the ability of member states to control the development of the policy.
- 4) The policy preferences of member states are not fixed and constant. Political and institutional arrangements entered by a government at a certain point of time will continue to stand even if political configuration in the member state changes at a later point. This is also referred to as 'path dependency'; Decisions made about institutions in the past impact significantly on the outcomes of the future and are difficult to reverse. Member states' actors are not fully aware of what the consequences of the decisions they take today will be for the future.

Pierson stresses the fact that the barriers for the member states to regain control are too high. With the supranational actors having gained much power in terms of influence, it is natural that they would not accept losing power. In addition, the social adaptation of the member states increases the cost of exit from the existing arrangements (Pierson 1996). The 'school' of institutionalism has many common features with the national adaptation dimension of the Europeanization, which is also emphasizes the influence of the EU level and highlights the increasing independence of the institutions.

2.2.2. Intergovernmentalism

Intergovernmentalists attribute little influence to supranational agents and institutions and detect little genuine supranationality in the EU. They do, however, recognize and accept the historical progression of European integration, from the customs union to political union and towards Economic and Monetary Union, and they "acknowledge the contribution of international secretariats in managing cooperation among states and the role of international courts in enforcing it" (Puchala 1999 p. 319). Similarities can be drawn to the national projection dimension of the Europeanization approach, which also gives the member states increased importance in the process of European integration, and attributes attention to the

significant advantages the pooling of power at EU level can have on member states' international influence and prestige.

Andrew Moravcsik, the 'father' of the 'school' of liberal intergovernmentalism, argues that "governments negotiate at the supranational level only those issues that are favored by their domestic constituencies, since their primary interest is being re-elected" (Hill and Smith 2011 p. 33). Furthermore, Moravcsik understands European integration as "a series of rational choices made by national leaders. These choices responded to constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic constituents, the relative power of states stemming from asymmetrical interdependence, and the role of institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments" (Moravcsik 1998 p. 18). By pooling sovereignty, the role of the member states is not diminished, on the contrary it is strengthened, encouraging their adaptation to constraints imposed by the international environment. In other words, where institutionalism emphasizes the role of European institutions, intergovernmentalism emphasizes the role of the member states in European integration, and argues that the member state is not becoming a less important actor in this process. Moravcsik underlines the importance of the member states in European integration arguing that;

- The state is a rational actor in Europe
- Power in the EU is the result of bargaining amongst states
- Liberal theory is needed to explain the formation of national preferences within the state (Bulmer and Lequesne 2013 p. 8)

Where institutionalists highlight the emergence of gaps in member state control, intergovernmentalists claim that the delegation of some of their sovereignty to the EU actually strengthened them. Where institutionalists highlight the importance of the institutions, the intergovernmentalists see the EU institutions only as "agencies created by the member states with the purpose of increasing the initiative and influence of national governments, although they can also develop their own ideas and interests in relation to the states that have set them up" (Bulmer and Lequesne 2013 p. 9).

The pooling of sovereignty in some areas is in the member states' interest. Accordingly, periods of radical change in the process of European integration, such as the Single European Act, the Treaty on the EU, the Treaty of Lisbon, were allowed to happen, because the interests and goals of the member states converged at the period of time (Milward, Lynch et al. 1993).

For instance, the failure in ratifying the Constitution of Europe was seen as an example of non-convergence of the government's preferences.

2.3. Europeanization of foreign policy

Europeanization is not a theory, but rather an ongoing process and best understood as a conceptual tool that explains the complex dynamics of EU' triggered change in politics, policy and polity of (member) states. It is no longer a new concept in the European studies, but it remains ill defined, as there is much debate over the nature, causes and effects of Europeanization. Ladrech defines Europeanization as "*processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of norms, beliefs, formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms and ways of doing things*"(Radaelli and Pasquier 2006 p. 7). According to Lawton, Europeanization is identified with the emergence of EU competences and the pooling of power, and accordingly what happens once power has been transferred to Brussels (Lawton cit. in Radaelli 2000).

The early studies on Europeanization often refer to the political and policy changes caused by the impact of the EU membership on member states, which is the national adaptation dimension. In other words, this dimension explains how Europe 'hits home'. Later studies, however, have, through the national projection dimension, given increased importance to the national projection dimension, which in turn explains how member states work to project their policy preferences onto the EU level and shape the EU foreign policy (Hill and Smith 2011). Given that EU foreign policy is, to a great extent, an intergovernmental arena subject to the political will and interests of the member states, it is reasonable to give their role in EU foreign policy the increased importance they deserve. According to Ruano, a key criticism to the Europeanization approach has been the exaggerated emphasis on the 'top-down' approach that assumes that EU policies exist independently of the member states that have to adopt them (Ruano 2013 p. 14). For this reason it is important to point out that the two dimensions of Europeanization mentioned are not sets of independent approaches, but intertwined and part of a complex and dynamic process. So, perhaps the best understood and the most comprehensive explanation is the following one developed by Agnantopoulos, in which he states that Europeanization of foreign policy is:

"A complex bottom-up and top-down process in which national (foreign) policies are influenced by the formal and informal principles, norms, rules and procedures of the EU

system of (foreign policy) governance and in which domestic actors use this system in order to shape (foreign) policy outcomes”(Agnantopoulos 2010 p, 4)


Member states download EU institutions, policies and procedures at the domestic level, and they upload their national policies and preferences at the EU level. Although not included in this thesis, the cross-load dimension should be mentioned in this context that is, learning, mimicking and socializing between the several actors at the broader EU arena.

Undoubtedly, Europeanization of foreign policy is a dynamic and increasingly dense interplay between national policies through a complex process of negotiating and coordinating through EU institutions. In addition it also serves as an alternative approach to understanding member states’ foreign policy and explains the extent of influence, opportunities and constraints on member states’ choices afforded by the EU. According to Hill “it is impossible to understand what the EU does abroad without at least a cursory look at its member states’ foreign policies” (Ruano 2013 p. 16). The member states have undoubtedly left their mark; such is the case of Spain’s role in the shaping of the EU Latin America policy. Following the argument of Hill, it would be unthinkable to speak of the EU Latin America policy without mentioning Spain, a member state that most researchers, if not all, consider to be the main author of this policy.

The point of departure of Spain in the process of European integration is the first democratic government of Spain in 1976. Spain has since this sought to improve its global influence and presence, and being part of the process of European integration has therefore been a natural priority (del Arenal). When Spain accessed the European Communities in 1986, the Latin America dimension of European foreign policy was practically absent. With that said, the start of the development of the EU Latin America relations ‘accidentally’ coincided with Spain’s accession. Latin America was never a priority for EEC external relations before Spain joined. Naturally, integrating to Europe meant adapting to Europe, but Spain, however, rather than being a passive adaptor, pursued an active role in the shaping of European policies, especially in the realm of foreign policy, where Spain as a medium power had the potential to “punch above its weight” and pursue its foreign policy preferences with greater international influence. According to Torreblanca “the EU was an opportunity to enhance the capabilities and influence of a country with a broad and problematic agenda, scant resources to match goals and means, low international prestige, and a weak foreign service. The EU became an ‘amplifier’ of national interests and influence in Latin America”(Ruano 2013 p. 40)

Not only has Spain successfully projected a great deal of its Latin America preferences to the EU level, but more importantly it has made Europe aware of the existence and importance of Latin America and by this contributed to create the relations EU and Latin America enjoy today (Ruano 2013). For Spain, the goal of raising awareness is still part of Spain's day-to-day work in the EU. The above-mentioned are dimensions of the Europeanization approach, referred to as national adaptation and national projection.

Figure 2: Mechanisms of Europeanization:



2.3.1. National adaptation

The national adaptation dimension is a top-down process translating change from the EU level to the national level. It is also called downloading because the process is seen as “a clear, vertical chain of command, in which EU policy descends from Brussels into the member states”(Bulmer and Radaelli 2004 p. 9). Ladrech understands Europeanization as a reactive process, where the state adapts and makes adjustments accorded at the EU level in its domestic politics (Hill and Smith 2011). In other words, the denominator of this dimension is that the independent variable, the cause, is the EU and the dependent variable, the effect, is the member state and its institutions, politics and policies. According to Wong, in a process of national adaptation, the following national foreign policy indicators are usually seen; *a) Increasing salience of European political agenda, b) Adherence to common objectives, c) Common policy obligations taking priority over national domains reserves, d) Intenalization of EU membership and its integration, and e) Organizational and procedural changes in national bureaucracies* (Wong and Hill 2012).

This top-down process can be illustrated through the “goodness of fit”, which relates on the way EU institutions expand and thicken upon the member states. This layer puts “pressure” on domestic structures and policy areas to adapt. It is the “goodness of fit” between EU and national level that determines the extent of the adaptational pressure. In order to produce domestic effects, the EU policy must be difficult to absorb at domestic level (Ruano 2013). If a policy of Spain fits in well with EU policy, there will be no impact. At the other extreme, if Spain has a policy completely different from the EU policy, adapting to the EU would be hard, if not impossible. So, impact of top-down Europeanization will take place in cases of moderate “goodness of fit”. As the top-down process depends on the extent of the “goodness of fit”, Europeanization does not always lead to convergence. In addition, certain areas of EU foreign policy are still subject to unanimity and cooperative culture, which means that if the “fit” is completely absent between EU level and national level, there will be no convergence. Consequently, Europeanization is expected when there is significant executive autonomy and few veto points (Radaelli in Featherstone and Radaelli 2003)

In this thesis, the effects of ‘Lisbon’ on the national adaptation process are also measured. The most relevant dimensions of domestic change are the Europeanization as institutional change, such as the role of the Spanish MFA, and Europeanization as change of national discourse and strategy, in which it is seen if and to what degree ‘Lisbon’ has altered Spain’s strategy towards the EU (Börzel and Risse 2007).

2.3.2. National projection

“European integration is not just 'out there' as some kind of independent variable; it is itself to a significant degree the product of member governments' wishes. Given that the European Union has its own organizational logic, it is necessary for national political actors (...) to accommodate some of that logic if the opportunities afforded by the EU are to be exploited” (de Flers and Alecu 2009 p. 7)

While the ‘school’ of national adaptation tends to ‘build down’ the role of the member state in the making of EU policies, the national projection dimension gives the role of the member states an increased importance in the shaping of EU policies. This is a bottom-up process also called uploading, because the member states seek to promote or project their national preferences to the EU level. Radaelli points out that the member states, instead of being passive subjects, adapt to Europe and simultaneously seek to actively shape developments at the EU level. EU policies are the result of compromise and the ‘fingerprints’ of certain

member states are all over some policies, in which “national foreign policy of a member state affects, and contributes to, the development of a common European foreign policy”(Hill and Smith 2011 p. 158). According to Wong, in a process of national projection, the following national foreign policy indicators are usually seen; *a) State attempts to increase national influence in the world, b) State attempts to influence foreign policies of other member states, c) State uses the EU level as a cover/umbrella, and d) National foreign policy uses the EU level as an influence multiplier (Wong and Hill 2012).*

Having Wong’s indicators in mind, the situation for many member states is, especially for the smaller or less powerful ones, that the uploading of their national foreign policies to the EU level can increase their influence in the world, and serve as an influence multiplier, allowing them to ‘speak with a louder voice’ in the international context, a voice they would probably not possess by manipulating a bilateral approach towards other regions. Furthermore, national projection can also provide member states with the ‘shield effect’, which reduces the costs and risks of pursuing a controversial policy such as political or economic sanctions towards a third country (de Flers and Alecu 2009). If a member state pushes for its national foreign policy goals to be adopted as EU goals/policy and an adoption of those takes place, a clear example of Europeanization would take place.

National projection is often a response to national adaptation. Member states, whose policies or interests have a ‘bad fit’ with those of the EU, are more likely to try to change EU policy by uploading their preferences. The degree of success when a member states try to upload its national preferences to the EU level, depends on the degree of interest the member state has in the policy area, its coalition building capacity at the EU level and the application of the suitable strategy, especially when projecting a policy in which other member states share little or no interest. Even a smaller or less powerful member state with a good reputation that mingles well through the unwritten rules, norms and practices at the EU level and has a clear strategy, excellent negotiators and coalition building capacity, can despite its size exercise significant influence (Jakobsen 2009). The negotiating quality of the member states’ diplomats together with the ability to put the issue of interest on the EU agenda are key of a successful projection of national foreign policy preferences.

2.4. Research design

“The research design is the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study’s initial research question, and ultimately to its conclusions” (Yin 2014 p. 26).

The method applied in this paper is of a qualitative nature involving a case study of two cases relevant to the research question. According to Yin, a thesis that takes on “how and why” questions can be described as a case study (Yin 2014 p. 27).

Case studies provide in-depth understanding of a single or small number of cases. The main focus of this thesis is to determine what impact the Treaty of Lisbon has on the way that Spain can shape the EU Latin America policy. This was measured by applying the approach of Europeanization, and involved analyzing complex processes of interaction between national level and EU level, as well as the interaction between national agents and European agents at the EU level.


Consequently, in-depth case studies seemed therefore to be the best ways to measure Spain’s upload capacity under the new practices and provisions provided by ‘Lisbon’. When analyzing the cases the point was to go ‘deeper’ than the outcome and to analyze if Spain has been the cause to the changes produced at the EU level, and in this way determine to which degree Spain’s upload capacity has been constrained or enabled by the Treaty of Lisbon. This analysis would be complicated to do by choosing a quantitative design.

When selecting cases applied as examples to which Spain’s upload capacity was measured, the most important criteria was that they had to have been initiated and concluded after the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. This made the selection of cases into a quite demanding process. Bearing in mind that ‘Lisbon’ is still a very recent event in European integration history, the number of cases available, involving Spain and Latin America, was limited and finally only two interesting cases were singled out; 1) Spain’s proposal for new EU Visa arrangements for Colombia and Peru, and 2) The 2014-2020 EU budget for development assistance. In both of these cases, Spain took the initiative and worked to project its preferences to the EU level.

2.5. Operationalization of variables

In this thesis, the dependent variable was the change or impact produced on Spain's upload capacity by the independent variable, which are the practices and provisions introduced to EU foreign policy by 'Lisbon'.

Figure 3: The impact of 'Lisbon' on Spain's upload capacity



The dependent variable, here, could be called the concept on which the effects of the cause would be measured. In order to measure the impact that 'Lisbon' has on Spain's upload capacity, it was necessary to operationalize the dependent variable, which in other words means to make it measurable (Martin, Cohen et al.). In addition, to get a more complete picture, the download dimension of Europeanization is also examined. Most research on Europeanization has analyzed and discussed which mechanisms and channels that should be in the member states' possession in order to be successful when uploading its preferences to the EU level. The following variables are applied in this thesis:

National projection (uploading):

- 1) **Using EU institutions:** What room does the current institutional configuration of the EU provide Spain to shape EU Latin America policy? This variable aims to examine how arenas and actors central to the shaping of EU foreign policy, such as the EEAS, the HR/VP and the European Parliament, affect Spain's possibilities to shape EU foreign policy.
- 2) **Agenda-setting and coalition-building:** Is Spain still able to put their preferences on the EU agenda and build coalitions at the EU level that support the incorporation of its Latin America preferences into EU policy? In order to put issues on the EU agenda, member states need to gain attention (mobilizing supporters and arousing interest) and build credibility. The credibility depends on a member states' capacity-building and its claim of authority, which involves justifying why an issue should be dealt with at the EU level (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013). Furthermore, member states

understand that diplomacy in the EU is about negotiations, networking and ‘horse-trading’ and that they may influence the EU policy making through the use of coalitions (Pastore).

National adaptation (downloading):

- 1) **Discourse and strategy:** Does Spain still privilege the EU level in terms of foreign policy with regards to Latin America? Two elements determine a member states’ commitment: the salience of an issue and a state’s dependence on the EU to achieve its policy objectives. The salience of a policy is defined as ‘the extent to which an actor will put into effect its potential to influence other actors and the decision outcome. It cannot be assumed that a member state with special interest in an area pursue its objectives through the EU, as they can ultimately conduct their foreign policy outside the EU (Nasra 2011).
- 2) **The bureaucracy of the Spanish MFA:** Is the Spanish MFA undergoing any changes in order to adapt to the changes on the EU’s institutional configuration? What is the current situation?

2.6. Data collection

The data of this thesis has been collected through documentary evidence and semi-structured interviews. Document analysis is a form of qualitative research in which documents are interpreted to give meaning around a topic. The documents analyzed in this thesis are mainly primary documents, such as public records collected in the EU’s own database, but some, however, are secondary documents, such as news articles and papers collected at the internet.

In the course of this research, given that the topic is very timely and coincides with the conclusion some EU Latin America cases in which Spain has been active, 9 in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with officials from the Spanish Foreign Ministry, mainly from the Department of the EU and the Department of Latin America, officials at the Spanish Permanent Representation to the EU in Brussels, Spanish diplomats in the EEAS, in the divisions of the Americas and Mercosur, and experts on the field of study, with many years of experience from the EU institutions and as researchers. The interview process started out by conducting and recording 3 interviews by the phone, while the rest was conducted in person with the officials during a short-time visit to Brussels and Madrid. All of the

interviews carried out in Brussels and Madrid, with the exception of one, were recorded with the permission of the respondents.

The actual candidates were approached with an interview guide, in which it was made clear that the interviews would be carried out on a strictly confidential basis. For this reason, the names of the respondents are not mentioned in this thesis. The interviews consisted of questions split up in three sections; 1) Spain and Latin America, 2) Spain shaping the EU Latin America policy post-Lisbon, and 3) Specific case questions.

The interviews took app. 40 minutes. One interview was conducted in English; the remaining interviews were conducted in Spanish as interviewees felt more comfortable to converse in their mother tongue.

2.7. Methodological challenges

The first question that arose was whether the chosen research design for this thesis was appropriate or not. Is the current research design of two post-Lisbon cases adequate? It could perhaps have been better to choose one pre-Lisbon case and one post-Lisbon case and compare them. The current research design, however, is thought to be sufficient, because there is practically unanimity among the researchers about the role played by Spain in the shaping of the EU Latin America policy pre-Lisbon. In addition, Spain's success in uploading its Latin America preferences pre-Lisbon happened under different institutional settings. This was re-assured by adding pre-Lisbon perspectives in the interviews. In this way there is little necessity to 'retake' pre-Lisbon cases.

It could also have resulted positive to do a comparative analysis with Spain and other member states. The challenge with this is that there is only one other comparable member state, which is, due to its status as a medium-size member state, Poland. The problem is, however, that Poland does not have specific interests in Latin America, such as Spain.

Two well-known methodological challenges are validity and reliability. Validity addresses to what extent the data answers to the research question, and can also be referred to the 'truth' of the findings. In other words, has what was intended to be measured actually been measured? Reliability deals with the quality of the data applied in the thesis. Would other observers researching the same topic come to the same conclusions? In addition, reliability is important as it can either strengthen or weaken the validity of the study.

Reliability has been a challenge in this thesis regarding the data collected. In order to improve the reliability of the secondary documents, only news articles that have been published and replicated in multiple global newspapers have been analyzed. This means that a careful scrutiny of the news articles has been conducted and that news articles with different versions have not been analyzed in this thesis (Gaborone 2006).

Regarding the interviews, the use of semi-structured interviews was preferred as it provides more flexibility for the interviewer. In addition, they were well suited for the exploration of the perceptions and opinions of the respondents. Being more open, they left the respondents with more liberty to express themselves and to highlight areas of particular interest and expertise they thought they had (Louise Barriball and While 1994). This form of interviewing also strengthens the validity, as it left little room for personal interpretation. It also allowed for the additional questions and expansion on some topics.

Critics to the case study method, however, argument that the study of a small number of cases offers no grounds for establishing reliability or generality of findings (Conditions 2007). In other words, critics argue that the probability for other researchers to come to the same conclusions would be low.

3. THE TREATY OF LISBON: Towards a coherent EU foreign policy?

3.1. Origins

European integration has led to an increased pooling of member states' sovereignty at the EU level, thus transferring competences in several areas to supranational EU agents and institutions. In the realm of foreign policy, which traditionally has been a sensitive area for the member states, member states have retained much of their sovereignty. However, as the international context underwent drastic changes, such as the end of the Cold War, which marked the end of bi-polarity and destabilized the world order, Europe faced several challenges regarding its global role. In order to establish itself as a global power, Europe had to develop strategies in order to be able to adapt to the ever-changing international context.

Despite several positive developments, such as the CFSP in the TEU, the appointment of the High Representative in the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 and the increase of areas under which QMV would decide in 2001, the shortcomings of EU foreign policy have been witnessed on several occasions, such as the disagreement on the Iraq invasion, the poorly handled Kosovo conflict etc. In addition, it is difficult to forget when Kissinger famously asked, "who do I call when I want to call Europe?"⁵ The lack of coherence in EU foreign policy, and in the EU in general, became frequently addressed.

It is fair to say that the Treaty of Lisbon started as a constitutional project in 2001. The European Constitution would be the consolidation of the existing treaties, and be a major step in European integration. However, the rejection of the Constitution in 2005, in which 10 years of work had been invested, raised the attention to some the challenges that the EU was facing. With the "big bang" enlargement in 2004, the EU had gone from being 15 to 25 member states, which naturally raised questions regarding coherence (Blanchet 2010). The failure of the Constitutional Treaty left the aim of enhancing coherence in EU foreign policy high on the agenda. How could a union of 25 speak with one voice and move in one direction? The Treaty of Lisbon would be the solution devised long time ago, with important implications to EU foreign policy, and was signed in 2007 in Berlin, before it eventually entered into force in 2009. The overall objective of 'Lisbon' was to make the EU "stronger in the pursuit of its essential objectives and more present in the world" (Paul 2008 p. 5). According to Paul, the underperformance in EU foreign policy "cannot only be traced back to lack of political will, but also to the EU institutional set-up" (Paul 2008 p. 8). The EU has developed a foreign

policy towards more or less all parts of the world and all possible foreign policy issues. Nevertheless, this does not always lead to political dialogue and traditional contractual relations with a country or a region. This is mainly related to the discrepancy that can easily emerge between the priorities and resulting problem-solving focus of the EU and those of its 27 member states (Justaert and Nasra 2008). Therefore, with the overall objective of improving coherence, 'Lisbon' introduces features, such as new powers to the High Representative and the Presidency of the European Council, the European External Action Service and increased co-decision powers for the European Parliament, that are potentially far-reaching changes in EU foreign policy with the scope for the EU to become a more coherent actor on the international stage, or in other words increase the EU's 'actorness' at the global scene.

3.2. Implications

In short, 'Lisbon' aims at addressing and improving the coherence of EU foreign policy. EU foreign policy is multi-pillar in nature. It is not only developed through the EU's second pillar (CFSP), but also through the EU's first pillar (trade, development assistance). EU foreign policy is, in other words, made through a complex mixture of various policy-making regimes. This complexity is further increased through the complex distribution of competences, reflecting the multi-level character of EU foreign policy. Problems do not only arise in and between the EU pillars, but also from the fact that foreign policy is a shared competence between the EU and its member states (Justaert and Nasra 2008). In other words, both vertical and horizontal coherence must be ensured. First, foreign policies of the member states and the EU should be complementary, adding up to each other, and second, policies between different pillars must be coordinated (Portela and Raube 2009).

The new powers of the High Representative (HR/VP) and the permanent Presidency of the European Council are thought to have major implications on the role of the member states in the shaping of EU foreign policy, and this is thought to have major implications on the role of the Council Presidency, thus putting it in the shadow. It is important to point out that the Council Presidency was an important post for the member states, which at a six months basis could set the agenda and with this enjoy more 'visibility'. Leadership and consistency will now be assured by the HR/VP, which will also be backed up by new foreign policy 'machinery' called the European External Action Service. The HR/VP has the potential to provide EU foreign policy with more continuity and predictability than what the Council Presidency did, given that changing the EU's foreign policy agenda every six months does not

seem to be fortunate when the objective is to improve coherence and make the EU move in the same direction. In addition, 'Lisbon' also addresses the issue of legitimacy, and improves the powers of the European Parliament in certain areas of external affairs.

3.3. Key innovations

Of the key innovations introduced by 'Lisbon', 4 of them were foreign policy features: 1) the permanent Presidency of the European Council, 2) the new role of the High Representative, 3) the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and 4) the new co-decision powers of the European Parliament.

1) Permanent Presidency of the European Council:

The fact that the President of the European Council now would be elected on a permanent basis is thought to provide continuity and consistency to EU foreign policy. The President is appointed for two and a half years and replace the rotating presidency at the level of the European Council. 'Lisbon' disconnected the European Council, a former meeting point for the heads of government and the Council President, with the Council of the EU.

In this way, the European Council would no longer be subject to national grandstanding. Prior to 'Lisbon', issues that were not solved in the Council could find their way onto the agenda of the European Council. The leader of the member state in the rotating Council presidency also became President of the European Council, thus especially motivating for smaller member states, as they assumed a higher profile. With the rotating Council Presidency no longer presiding over the European Council, it is thought that the member state holding Council Presidency will have less scope to influence the EU's agenda and promote national priorities (Dinan 2013).

2) New role of the High Representative:

As addressed many times, there have been many doubts regarding third-countries/regions and who to contact when contacting the EU. This is dealt with by 'Lisbon', and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) will now be the new EU foreign minister, thus replacing the role formerly exercised by the Council Presidency. The HR/VP is appointed on a 2,5 years basis by the European Council, acting by QMV. Catherine Ashton was elected to be the first High Representative under the new configuration created by 'Lisbon'.

With the objective of steering EU foreign policy in the same direction and improving EU consistency, the HR/VP will have a ‘double-hatted’ role, thus acting as the EU’s foreign policy chief and as vice-president of the European Commission at the same time. This ‘double-hatted’ role is thought to improve consistency, effectiveness and visibility to the EU’s external action. On the one hand, given the VP role of the High Representative, the Commission can experience a bigger voice in EU foreign policy, while on the other it loses its right to submit proposals to the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) (Justaert and Nasra 2008).

Perhaps the most remarkable implication with the new powers provided to the HR/VP by ‘Lisbon’ is its role as foreign policy chief, which has direct consequences for the Council presidency. The Foreign Affairs configuration of the Council would be chaired by the HR/VP and no longer by the rotating Presidency of the Council. This means that the HR/VP will have significant powers regarding agenda-setting, coordination and consensus-building and implementation, powers that used to belong to the Council presidency. The HR/VP now also conducts political dialogue with third countries. These opportunities of taking the initiative and shaping the EU foreign policy agenda would enable the HR/VP to play a decisive role in EU external action, and with this replacing the role of the Council Presidency.

This has caused concern towards the possible implications it will have on the agenda-setting power of small (er) member states, given that the 6-month rotating Presidency granted even the smallest member states the opportunity of shaping the EU foreign policy agenda. The Council Presidency was in 1957, as a result of sensitive bargain between small and big member states, designed to ensure non-hierarchical and decentralized leadership that prevented the emergence of a single power center. It provided the office holder with important leadership functions and opportunities for shaping policy outcomes, and has for these reasons been highly valued by small member states (Klein 2012). In addition to the above mentioned, the HR/VP is backed by an administration, or diplomatic service, called the European External Action Service (EEAS), which is not only thought to improve the effectiveness (Paul 2008), but it is also considered to present several advantages for small(er) member states (Nasra 2011).

3) The European External Action Service (EEAS)

“The Union will ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and other policies”⁶.

One of the means to achieve this goal was the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which is supposed to coordinate EU, member states and their actions outside the Union and to speak and act on the behalf of the member states and the Union as a whole. The EEAS thereby introduced a new and unique opportunity for the EU institutions and the member states to influence international politics. The reasons for creating the EEAS can be found in Europe's failure to react to the Balkans crisis in the early 1990s, when the EU was lacking a political component and long-term analytical perspective⁷.

The creation of the EEAS set the stage for a new architecture of EU foreign policy-making. This is the EU's new diplomatic service, which in some ways can be compared to a foreign ministry. The EEAS assists the High Representative, the President of the European Council and the Commission with their external relations portfolios, and works together with the diplomatic services of the member states in ensuring the consistency and coordination of the Union's external action as well as by preparing policy proposals and implementing them after their approval by the Council. The EEAS also has a central role in agenda-setting. Although the EEAS is somewhat similar to a national foreign service under the leadership of a minister of foreign affairs (HR/VP), important areas such as trade, aid and climate policy still remain under the control of the Commission (EU and OSCE).

The staff of the EEAS is made up by people from the European Commission and national diplomats seconded from the national diplomatic services of the member states. Furthermore, the EEAS is divided into both geographical and thematic directorates and cooperates closely with the diplomatic services of the member states, and represent the EU around the world through 139 delegations and offices. The EU delegations are essential to the promotion of EU interests and values across the globe (Insight 2012). With the delegations, the EEAS can offer important benefits for member states not represented in some countries, and serve as information and operation hubs for national foreign ministries from smaller states⁸.

Despite the new powers of the HR/VP and the creation of the EEAS, the Commission still plays an important role in EU foreign policy. Since much of its external relations staff has been moved over to the EEAS, the coordination of the external policies still in control by the

Commission, such as trade and development, with the external dimension of internal policies, such as migration, is essential (Balfour and Raik 2013). Thus connecting the dots between external relations and foreign and security policy, the aim of the creation of the EEAS is to improve the coherence and efficacy of EU foreign policy.

4) The new powers of the European Parliament in external relations

The European Parliament (EP) is the most important EU institution in assuring legitimacy. The members of the Parliament, the MEPs, represent the people of Europe and are directly elected every 5 years. The Treaty of Lisbon has strengthened the role of the EP in EU foreign policy-making, with powers now close to those of a national parliament. Before ‘Lisbon’, the role of the EP was more consultative than anything, but with the new treaty it has become an important institution for the Council to take into account when proposing matters of foreign policy. The assent of the EP is now required for:

- Treaties that admit new states to the EU,
- Commercial agreements and,
- Other international agreements that have budgetary implications for the EU, such as international aid.

This means that the EP can veto a commercial treaty or development aid proposals. Because of the increased co-decision powers of the EP, and the risk of it rejecting international treaties, the EP is now consulted throughout the course of the negotiations (Hill and Smith 2011).

3.4. Summary

It becomes clear that ‘Lisbon’ is an exciting innovation, with the potential to improve coherence in EU foreign policy. In a Union of 28 member states, and in a policy area quite sensitive to member states’ interests, action was needed in order to avoid national grandstanding and thereby inefficiency. In order to secure both horizontal and vertical coherence, the HR/VP is given more powers and through its double-hatted role. As VP of the Commission, he/she is to assure inter-pillar coherence, while he/she through its role as foreign policy chief is to assure vertical coherence. Because of this, the role of the rotating Council Presidency is ‘minimized’, and this led to the concern of small (er) member states as they enjoyed increased focus and agenda-setting power through the Presidencies. Assisting the HR/VP in its doings, the EEAS is one of the- if not *the*- most important innovations introduced by ‘Lisbon’ (Gänzle, Trondal and Murdoch 2013). It has the potential of

coordinating EU and member states' diplomacies, however in the long-term run, given the fact that the diplomatic service has only existed for a couple of years⁹. It is also thought that the member states that put efforts into the development of this new Foreign Service will find the EEAS to be a useful 'tool' to boost continuity of the dossiers in their interest. Finally, 'Lisbon' also sheds light on the issue of legitimacy in EU foreign policy by extending the European Parliament's co-decision power in several areas, such as trade and aid, which is also thought to have an important impact on EU foreign policy-making.

'Lisbon' creates a window of opportunity to foster a more integrated EU foreign policy in which the role of the institutions and the member states is significantly reinforced. By stressing the central role of the institutions and by acknowledging the importance of the member states in the success of EU foreign policy, 'Lisbon' has the potential of deepening the process of Europeanization (Justaert and Nasra 2008).

4. ANALYSIS: SPAIN AND THE EU's LATIN AMERICA POLICY

4.1. Historical overview

In order to approach the impacts of 'Lisbon' in an orderly way and analyze the current EU foreign policy, it is necessary to make a historical consideration regarding the role of Spain in the EU Latin America policy. The fact that Latin America has always been a Spanish foreign policy priority is a neat point of departure. Depending on the extent of the 'goodness of fit' and the international context, Spain has pursued its preferences towards Latin America through the following three channels: the bilateral, the Iberoamerican Community and the EU (Interview # 7). Its accession to the European Communities in 1986 was, according to a respondent, "a factor that has strongly affected the process of the EU's rapprochement with Latin America". (Interview # 8)

Furthermore, by playing a key role in the creation and development of the EU policy towards Latin America, Spain has been able to pursue its preferences more efficiently by uploading them to the EU level. This has not only strengthened Spain's influence in Latin America, but it has also provided Spain with increased importance in the EU, where it successfully managed to convince the other member states of the importance of Latin America. Spain has, however, also ended up downloading policies less relevant for itself such as trade and visa requirements (Ruano 2013). Accordingly, changing Europeanization dynamics would be a suitable description of Spain's role in the EU Latin America policy from its accession towards the 2000s.

1986-1990: Uploading as a response to downloading

At the time of Spain's accession, Latin America was not a priority for Europe, and had been kept at a secondary level compared to the rest of the European Communities' external relations. Latin America did practically not exist for the EC at all. The years prior to Spain's accession to the EU in 1986 were characterized as a process of national adaptation and best explained by the dynamics of download Europeanization, in which an intense process of downloading European Communities' norms, institutions and practices of foreign policy took place (Ruano 2013). Becoming a member of the EU meant having to download the Common Commercial Policy, the Common Agricultural Policy and the EU's development aid preferences. Latin America was, however, not a part of any of those communitarized policies, which finally could leave Spain in a paradoxical situation conceding advantages to regions perhaps not in their interest.

Spain, however, had other plans in mind. Latin America was already put on the table during the negotiations of accession, in which Spain had made the EU well aware of the necessity of including Latin America in their external action. The strategy of the Spanish negotiators evolved around two directions. On the one hand, their interest lied in the objective of making the EU value the actual significance of Spain's accession, which would mean the introduction to a region to which the EC had dedicated little time. On the other hand, another objective was to convince the EU to let Spain assume the role of protector of Latin American interests towards Europe (del Arenal Moyúa 1990).

Spain, however, soon developed a proactive strategy based on contributing to make EU external policies consistent with Spanish foreign policy preferences, rather than passively adopting the EU's framework (Escribano and Lorca 2004). This is further explained by a respondent who emphasizes the fact that when Spain joined the EU, it did so with a 'backpack' called Latin America, which meant that it was clear that Spain could double its relative weight in Europe. Accordingly, its first major step in uploading Spanish foreign policy preferences involved achieving the inclusion of Latin America in EU development cooperation through ALA (Developing countries in Asia and Latin America) (Interview # 1).

This upload was possible due to the way Spanish diplomats skillfully framed their preferences in a Communitarian fashion, thus a consequence of Spain having successfully downloaded EC norms, institutions and practices in foreign policy. This raised Spanish awareness of the importance of socialization as a mechanism of Europeanization (Ruano 2013). Furthermore, Spain celebrated its first European Presidency in 1989, which served more than anything to show Europe that Spain was an honest broker.

1990-2000: Enhancing its role as shaper of the EU Latin America policy

This decade was denominated the 'golden age' for Spanish influence regarding EU Latin America policy. In this period, all elements favoring Spanish upload capacity were present (Interview # 7). First of all, during this decade, Spain clearly privileged the European dimension before the bilateral, second, it approached Latin America on a strictly regional basis, third, it was very active in the realm of EU foreign policy, in which it enjoyed the support of other diplomats committed to Latin America, and fourth, the international context was also favorable.

Spain was strongly in favor of the development the CFSP, as it could open up opportunities to institutionalize the EU Latin American relationship. While some member states advocated in favor of maintaining a strictly intergovernmental consensus, Spain only supported the use of QMV, fearing that the strict use of unanimity could make it unable to defend its interests in Latin America (Powell 2003). In the framework of CFSP, with the support of other member states, Spain managed to upload and institutionalize EU Latin American relations, which would finally lead to political dialogue and strategic partnership through the EU LAC summits, established in 1999.

The Spanish Presidency in 1995, which was labeled the ‘Latin American Presidency’, is remembered as the causative factor of the launching of the Association Agreements with Chile, Mexico and MERCOSUR (Closa 2002). It should also be mentioned that the upload capacity of Spanish foreign policy preferences during this decade became reinforced by the fact that Spain had people in key positions in the institutions, such as Manuel Marín¹⁰ as Vice-President of the Commission and later on Javier Solana as High Representative (Ruano 2013). By the end of the 20th century, Spain had clearly assumed the leadership role over the EU Latin America policy.

2000-2009: Selective Europeanization dynamics

The four elements that favored Spanish upload capacity during the ‘golden age’ for Spanish influence regarding EU Latin America policy were to a lesser extent present in this period. There are two factors explaining this: 1) the international context was not favorable, and 2) The Eastern enlargement from 2004, which shifted EU foreign policy priorities towards Eastern Europe. In addition, as a result of 9/11, the ‘securitization’ of EU foreign policy towards the Middle East was given high priority. The result of this was that Latin America became ‘pushed aside’ on the EU foreign policy agenda (Ruano 2013).

Although the Spanish Presidency of 2002 was considered to be a success in terms of Latin America, with the signing of the EU-Chile FTA, the adaptational pressure was increasingly becoming too high. With the shift of attention towards the East, Spain saw itself having to download policies of little relevance for them, at the expense of their Latin America preferences. As several member states reallocated their funds, EU development aid for Latin America faded. The issue regarding the enlargement of the EU did not only concern the fact that attention had shifted away from Latin America, but also the institutional challenges that appeared. With 25 member states, it would become increasingly challenging for Spain to have

its people situated in key positions within the EU institutions, in particular when compared to the opportunities presented by the former EU-15 area (Interview # 5).

Spain would to a greater extent find its foreign policy preferences less compatible with those of the EU, as Europeanization increasingly meant downloading policies often less relevant to itself. In addition, the Europeanized Spanish foreign policy would also conflict with Latin American interests, as seen through the weak role exercised by Spain in the EU-Mercosur FTA negotiations (Ruano 2013). The second factor explaining Spain's reduced upload capacity would then be of domestic reasons. The period of Zapatero (2004-2012) was, according to a respondent, characterized by a reduced political intensity because of his little interest in foreign policy (Interview # 1).

Towards the end of this decade, Spain opted for a more bilateral approach towards Latin America, as this allowed it to differentiate between the Latin American countries they liked and those they did not like. This does obviously not fit well with Spain's slightly outdated Europeanized Latin America policy. Latin America was not the same that it was during the 1990s and could therefore not be approached in the same way. It had improved significantly in economic terms and offered its own model of development. The new "progressive" governments in some Latin American countries had also left behind the strategies of regionalism driven by the trade liberalization adopted in the 1990s (Interview # 7). Nevertheless, despite the fact that Spain found itself in a weaker position, to which the financial crisis also had its saying, it did manage to upload its preferences towards Central America to the EU level.

Concluding remarks

Already at the time of its accession, Spain responded to the adaptational pressure by successfully uploading Latin America to the EU level. Spain's Latin America preferences became Europeanized in the 1990s, a decade in which Spain established itself as the leader of the EU Latin America policy. The favorable international context together with fact that the EU consisted of only 15 member states, compared to the 28 of today, reinforced Spain's upload capacity. The placement of people in strategic positions of Spanish interest was facilitated, and the time between each Presidency, which was an efficient channel through which member states could set the direction of EU foreign policy, was short. Spain is, nevertheless, still considered as the leader of EU Latin America policy. To this it should be added that at the end of the first decade of the 2000s, no member state shared any particular

interest in Latin America (Interview # 7). The following part of this analysis focuses on the impact of ‘Lisbon’ on Spain’s upload capacity and seeks to determine the role of Spain in the EU Latin America policy in present time.

4.2. Spain’s role in shaping EU Latin America policy after ‘Lisbon’

With the objective of finding out what impact the changes introduced by ‘Lisbon’ have on Spain’s role in EU Latin America policy, this part is set to determine if or to what degree ‘Lisbon’ constrains Spain’s upload capacity. In other words it will be examined if and to what degree the way Spain can develop instruments to pursue its Latin America preferences is constrained by the mode of governance at the EU level. This is measured in two parts: First, by analyzing the development of EU institutions, second by analyzing the impact of ‘Lisbon’ on Spain’s ‘power’ to set the agenda and to build coalitions at the EU level that support the incorporation of its Latin America preferences into EU policy.

The findings are based on the interviews that were collected together with documentary evidence. The analysis does not, however, solely focus on the upload dimension. In order to gain a more complete picture of the impact of ‘Lisbon’, it is also necessary to look into the download dimension of Europeanization, in which this thesis seeks to analyze how Spain adapts to the adaptational pressure created by ‘Lisbon’. Based on the findings, Spain’s upload capacity is finally discussed through the following cases: 1) EU Visa waiver for Colombians and Peruvians, and 2) 2014-2020 DCI Budgets.

4.2.1. National projection (uploading)

This part is set to employ the findings of the interviews and documents to analyze Spain’s upload capacity after ‘Lisbon’. As mentioned, this analysis first studies the impact of ‘Lisbon’ on Spain’s role in EU Latin America policy through the developments of EU institutions, which are thought to be essential to national projection. Subsequently, Spain’s ability to set the agenda and build coalitions will be examined.

4.2.1.1. Using EU institutions

This variable deals with the central and relevant institutional changes introduced by ‘Lisbon’, which are thought to be significant to Spain’s, upload capacity. Many smaller and medium-sized member states see the EEAS as a multiplier of their own influences at the global level

and generally regard it positively, and this is also the case of Spain (Wientzek 2013). Having the EU delegations placed under the HR/VP's authority results positive for Spain on the medium to long-term run. In general terms, many tasks regarding their Latin America preferences can potentially be carried out more effectively by the EEAS. The EEAS' influence and visibility, however, stand and fall with the HR/VP. This means that, in other words, the personality of the HR/VP results crucial to the effectiveness of not only the EEAS, but also EU foreign policy as a whole. To this, the new co-decision powers of the European Parliament should be added, as it has proven to be important for Spain when shaping EU Latin America policy, which the two cases that are discussed in the end of this chapter will demonstrate.

- **The EEAS:**

Spain was positive to the EEAS since the beginning. The creation of the EEAS, in which Spain played a key role, was approved under the 2010 Spanish Presidency (Interview # 5). During the time that has lapsed since the creation, defending a strong EEAS remains the official doctrine of most Spanish officials (Molina and Sorroza 2013). However, one of the respondents proved to be far more critical towards the EEAS than the others, claiming the EEAS' inability to deal with regions that are not in crisis:

"The EEAS is organized as a huge apparatus for political crisis solving. It could be great, but until the moment, I have not seen much success in crisis solving. However, with the regions of the world that are not in crisis, towards those (regions) that external relations should be formulated and managed, (the EEAS) has not been able to do so. And the typical case is Latin America, because there have been few crises, but the EU must create a relation of partnership and give it content" (Interview # 1).

As seen under the wars in Libya and Mali, the crisis management of the EEAS has in some cases worked quite slowly or not been able at all to coordinate member state positions (Wientzek 2013). This can, in part, be blamed on the member states' hesitance to put more effort and resources into the functioning of the EEAS. This was also the case of Spain. Until 2012, the Spanish government was hesitant about throwing its full weight behind the EEAS, mainly due to its 'performance-related' insecurities (Molina and Sorroza 2013). In 2012, this was to change with the new government. Spain now seemed to revive its interest in exploiting the EEAS actively and in ensuring its effective and potent deployment (Balfour and Raik 2013).

It does, however, not seem fair to say that the EEAS is unable to deal with regions in which crises is not an issue. First of all, the EEAS is still young and will probably need another few years, if not decades, to reach its full potential. One example of accomplishments that shows how the EEAS goes beyond crisis management is the EEAS' "preparations for the discussions regarding the EU's strategic partners, which in terms of the European Council were considered extremely helpful by the heads of state and government" (Wientzek 2013 p. 90). Important Latin American countries such as Brazil and Mexico are both strategic partners of the EU. An official of the Spanish MFA explains this further:

"Over time, I think it (the EEAS) will take shape and file down the dysfunctions that may exist. It is a complex function. I think that with issues regarding Latin America, the things work reasonably well from the functioning point of view. It is certain that we think that the EU should dedicate proportionally more time, resources and attention to Latin America... But I do not think that it is a problem of the functioning of the EEAS, rather a problem that has to do with the remoteness of Latin America" (Interview # 3)

The other respondents were quite positive to the EEAS. Regarding the projection of Spanish foreign policy preferences, the EEAS, compared to the rotating Council Presidency, provides the advantage of ensuring continuity as it follows the leadership of the HR/VP, which runs on a longer term. This is supported by a Spanish EEAS diplomat who speaks highly of the structure of the EEAS, and highlights the fact that the different regions are placed geographically in different departments (Interview # 6). In addition, per 2013, regardless of division, Spain is third on the list of number of staff in the EEAS, only behind France and Italy¹¹. To have Spanish diplomats situated in the Latin America division of the EEAS is, according to a respondent, not only of Spanish interest, but is also part of a strategy that the EEAS has developed:

"It is an important part of the strategy of the EU institutions that think that Spanish diplomats could manage better in these positions than others who are less concerned in Latin American questions and also could understand lesser of Latin American problems" (Interview # 9).

To this, another respondent adds the following statement:

“I have no doubt that the EEAS is part of the EU’s ‘actorness’. By placing good diplomats into the service, such as the Spanish who are well acquainted with this region, the EU Latin America relations can be improved” (Interview # 7).

An official further explains the structural advantage from the Spanish MFA:

“It (the EEAS) is a tool for the 28. It does not have to be a disadvantage, at least not when it comes to Latin America issues, (because) it greatly acknowledges that the states contribute to the agenda, dynamize the groups and their action, and I guess this happens in the different geographical areas, in which the countries eventually work and collaborate tightly with the EEAS. The countries with interest in Latin America are not the 28. So, the EEAS eventually ends up working more closely with the countries that have interest in the dossiers in question” (Interview # 3).

In other words, if Spain works to adapt well to the EEAS and remains committed to improve EU Latin America relations, the EEAS can be a powerful tool for the projection of its preferences.

Another advantage concerning the projection of Spanish preferences provided by the EEAS lies in the creation of EU delegations. The decision to re-badge the Commission’s delegations as Union delegations and to relocate them under the authority of the HR/VP as a part of the EEAS is important for Spain. Prior to ‘Lisbon’, the delegations were presided by the member state holding the rotating Council Presidency (Van Hecke and Bursens 2012). This could, at first sight, seem like a disadvantage for Spain, but in a Union of 28 member states, Spain would only be able to exercise influence through the Council Presidency every 14 years. A Spanish MFA official argues the following of the EU delegations:

“For the member states, the creation of the EU delegations in the world improves their influence, especially for the ‘medium or small’ ones. With this, the international influence of Spain is growing” (Interview # 4).

The EU delegations, as the EEAS in itself, however, goes way beyond the short 6-month reach of the rotating Council Presidency and can provide Spain with continuity to pursue its Latin America preferences on a medium to a long-term basis. It is important to recall the significance of the EU delegations, as they “play an important role in implementing policy

objectives; their analysis and reporting can influence policy-making and shaping; their ability to connect with local actors and gather in-the-field information and knowledge can make them a crucial ‘antenna’ for the EU’s global network”¹².

Currently in EU delegations situated in Latin America, 9 Heads of delegations are Spanish. In addition, the number of Spanish diplomats holding important posts in Latin America is high as well. As mentioned above, the fact that Spanish diplomats are well considered when it comes to Latin American questions normally raises the probability of Spain being well represented through the EU’s delegations in Latin America. This consideration alone makes the creation of EU delegations an advantage for uploading of Spanish Latin America preferences. Spanish diplomats have, however, recognized that there is “resistance to accept that the head of the EU delegation may blur Spain’s visibility on topics or regions considered to be crucial” (Molina and Sorroza 2013 p. 31). It would, in other words, be hard for Spanish diplomacy to accept subordination to the EEAS in Latin America.

Although the EEAS is designed to provide continuity, it remains important to recall that it assists the HR/VP, which means that its influence and visibility, to a great extent, stand and fall with the HR/VP. According to an official from the Spanish MFA, the creation of the EEAS is a breakthrough for EU foreign policy and can be very positive for the projection of Spanish Latin America preferences. This is, however, subject to the following:

“What we need to have in mind is that the EEAS follows a structure. The HR/VP has adopted a very clear agenda and Latin America is not among her priorities, that is a reality. She has travelled very little. In abstract, the EEAS is an advantage because it has all the mechanisms, tools that the member state does not have, but it is certain that the EEAS responds to a political leadership that today, depending on what happens with the new Commission and the new HR/VP, does not have Latin America among its priorities”
(Interview # 2)

- **HR/VP:**

One of the main innovations of 'Lisbon' was to transfer the responsibilities of the rotating Presidency in the area of foreign policy to the HR/VP and the EEAS. In 2009, the then Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero played a key role in the appointment of the current HR/VP Catherine Ashton (Balfour and Raik 2013). She would, together with the EEAS work towards the objective of ensuring coherence and continuity of EU foreign policy. The appointment of Ashton as HR/VP, who had almost no experience in foreign policy, was, for many, shocking¹³. She has received much criticism for having exercised weak leadership. Belgian Prime Minister Vandeputte was one of the critics stating that Ashton has failed to get the bloc of 27 member states speaking with one voice; "In the absence of a central player that reacts, makes analyses and conclusions quickly, it is the Germans today, the French tomorrow or the English who partially take up this role"¹⁴. A respondent also addresses this issue in a critical way:

"We create a new figure, the HR/VP. Very well, and who do we choose? A figure that does not put the member states in the shadow, a certain Ashton. What I find ironic is that we adopt institutional policy decisions to reinforce our condition of 'actress', to later choose weak leaders and avoid making decisions in the framework we have created" (Interview # 7).

Charles Tannock, an MEP, who states the following about Ashton, also confirms this:

*"She fits this role perfectly because she is unlikely to ever pose a threat to national sovereignty."*¹⁵

There are several examples supporting the mentioned arguments. The Foreign Affairs Committee presented a paper in which Ashton received criticism for reacting "too late" and allowing "EU member states to dictate her staffing policy"¹⁶. It is furthermore argued that Ashton herself has not done a good job when it comes to staffing. To this it should, however, be mentioned that the member states have not made it easy for her. Under her mandate, larger member states for instance, have preferred to reach their decisions unilaterally. They also intervene whenever they can with the staffing of the EEAS and usually prefer to send their own representatives when it comes to posting EU ambassadors to other countries¹⁷.

Given that the critics of the current HR/VP are many, the mentioned arguments can, on the one hand, seem fair. On the other hand, the fact that Ashton is the first HR/VP should be taken into account, having to contribute time and energy in getting the 'machinery running'

after the ratification of 'Lisbon'. Nevertheless, the position in itself, if possessed by a strong leader, should be able to challenge the leadership of the bigger member states and improve coherence and continuity of EU foreign policy¹⁸. A Spanish EEAS diplomat claims that the HR/VP limits the role of the member states, but indicates that nationality and personality are significant when it comes to the HR/VP's priorities:

"The new role of the HR/VP limits the role of a country like Spain, but also Germany. Conjectural questions apart, since Ashton leaves office this year, later a new HR/VP will come, we don't know its nationality, but it will obviously give another perspective, maybe because of its figure, its personality, the context, and perhaps because of its nationality" (Interview # 5).

An official from the Spanish MFA is reluctant to accept arguments stating that the new role of the HR/VP limits the role of Spain and argues that the personality is crucial. He does, however, also accept that nationality matters:

"Spain can keep boosting its interests. For this, the new role of the HR/VP can result positive because it has a more neutral role. Before, when the Presidency had greater power, it was for example more difficult to convince the English or the Germans than the HR/VP. So, the HR/VP is positive for the projection of national interests since it is neutral, but always depending of its personality. If the HR/VP was Spanish, even more. It would be a 'special' relationship" (Interview # 4)

Regarding the significance of nationality when it comes to the priorities of the HR/VP, another official from the Spanish MFA claims that Ashton has been too oriented towards British interests:

"On behalf of the EEAS and the HR/VP there has not been a minimum interest in Latin America. The HR/VP considers Haiti to be a priority, she has hardly travelled to Latin America, and she is not interested in the region.... I think Ashton has been very very oriented towards Anglo-Saxon interests" (Interview # 1)

The general response among the respondents indicates, however, that the new role of the HR/VP is positive for Spain, or at least that it does not 'damage' its position as shaper of EU Latin America policy. When asking a respondent directly if it would be positive for the projection of Spanish Latin America preferences if the HR/VP were Spanish, she argued the following:

“Yes, of course, but not only Spanish, also Italian, French, German, Portuguese. It depends a lot on the personality of the HR/VP. One must think that Ashton is the first; she has had on her agenda to launch the whole process... It is certain that Latin America has not been on her agenda. The Latin American agenda should not only be defended by Spain in Brussels” (Interview # 2)

As argued, the objective of Spain is not to necessarily have its stamp on all EU Latin America policy. Without the possibility to exercise leadership through the Presidency, an official from the Spanish MFA makes it clear that Spain obviously wishes to see a HR/VP capable of ensuring continuity of the Latin America policy:

“We would love for Spain not having to do nothing for Latin America and that it was the EU itself and its institutions in Brussels that did it automatically. That has not been the case of the actual HR/VP and we hope that it will be with the next HR/VP” (Interview # 3)

- European Parliament:

With the new powers of the European Parliament, the Parliament is seen to have equal footing to that of the Council, thus playing an equal part in the procedure of ‘co-decision’ in several new legislative competences within external relations including justice and home affairs, development aid and international trade¹⁹. Regarding Spanish Latin America preferences, these areas are all very central to Spain, especially the two last of them. This is acknowledged by a respondent with experience from the Council:

“Now there is co-decision procedure in various sectors, especially in trade, and before the Council hardly even read the opinion of the Parliament. When it is about money, the Parliament exercises influence” (Interview # 4).

There is now a possibility to intervene at an early stage of the process if a third of the member states should be against a legislative proposal. An official of the Spanish MFA argues strongly in favor of having the possibility to also defend issues in the EP:

“It (the EP) is a 'box of resonance' much greater than what the Council Working Groups are” (Interview #3)

According to this official, it is convenient to have fluent diplomatic relations with the Euro parliamentarians for the following reason:

“The Parliament works divided into political groups, but there are also many issues on the agenda that do not obey ideological considerations, but rather country objectives”
(Interview # 3)

Another consequence of 'Lisbon' regarding the EP is the number of seats in the Parliament allocated to the member states, in which Spain's seats increases by four, which makes it the state with the highest benefit in this regard (Corpadean 2009). Adding this to the calculation, a respondent sees it as an advantage:

“To have an important support in the Parliament, which we have, because we have some parliamentarians very well acquainted with Latin America which helps a lot in the EP”
(Interview # 1)

In other words, EU foreign policy-making now has a new player 'at the table' which potentially can serve as an important tool when dealing with issues of its competences. Spain has, however, been well aware of the importance of the EP with regards to national projection since its accession. Already few years after the accession, Spain had created an informal 'lobby' advocating for a stronger EU-Latin America agenda (Ruano 2013).

4.2.1.2. Agenda-setting and coalition-building

- Agenda-setting

With this variable, the objective is to analyze the impact of ‘Lisbon’ on Spain’s agenda-setting power. It examines to what extent Spain is capable to gain attention and build credibility in the current institutional configuration of EU foreign policy.

According to the respondents there is widespread agreement regarding Spain’s capability of putting issues on the EU’s foreign policy agenda. Some, however, give more importance to the ‘minimized’ role of the Council Presidency than others, but all of the respondents stress the fact that the EU’s foreign policy agenda now depends greatly on the HR/VP and the EEAS. This does, however, not mean that Spain is unable to put Latin America issues on the agenda, and is furthermore backed by documentary evidence.

Prior to ‘Lisbon’, member states enjoyed the ability of setting the agenda of EU foreign policy under the 6 months rotating Presidency, (Vandecasteele, Bossuyt et al. 2013). After ‘Lisbon’, the role of the Council Presidency is reduced in the realm of foreign policy, which, according to a respondent, means a significant ‘loss of weight’:

“It is true that the rotating Presidencies were big advantages. The countries gave it all during 6 months, knowing that it was 6 months and that they would later not have the same opportunity. The EEAS now carry forth what the countries earlier did during the Presidencies, so the countries have to keep a constant pace for years and years, and that can obviously not be compared to the efforts they made during a Presidency. The image was at stake, international prestige, the ability to move issues, which most interested them from a national point of view... that no longer exists” (Interview # 3)

Another respondent supports this and stresses the following:

“When the rotating Presidency existed...we put Latin America on the table or on the agenda. We boosted EU Latin America to a great extent. Now it is not like that, now we don’t control the agendas” (Interview # 2)

Spain held the Council Presidency on 4 occasions, in 1989, 1995, 2002 and in 2010, and enjoyed great success by putting Latin America on the agenda, especially during the three last Presidencies (Ruano 2013). This is, however, today with the current EU-28 played down by an expert on EU Latin America relations, who argues the following:

“With the new Presidency we would obviously lose weight when we celebrate our next Presidency, which will not happen in quite some time. I would not give it much importance” (Interview # 7)

Spain did, however, celebrate the first Presidency under the new institutional configurations introduced by ‘Lisbon’. This Presidency was, as mentioned in the first variable, qualified as a success in terms of Spanish Latin America preferences, in which Spain successfully set the agenda according to its national preferences. When asking the respondents how this was possible, one of them stated the following:

“Because the EEAS was initiating, they let us organize the Summits (EU-LAC Summit). The EEAS itself, Van Rompuy and the HR/VP, in some way, told us that during these months when we are still learning to ‘walk’ as a new system we leave in hands of the Presidency to continue with the preparation” (Interview # 2)

So, as much of the agenda had been set already before 2010, and the EU itself was occupied with adapting to the new ‘Lisbon’ configuration, Spain was allowed to continue with its agenda.

Furthermore, it is probably true that not being able to set the agenda with the new Presidency will feel like a loss, but with 28 member states, the next time Spain will hold the Council Presidency is many years from now. Without the Council Presidency, Spain has to work to gain attention by arousing interest in Latin America issues among the other member states through the mobilization of supporters and possess credibility among the other member states when it comes to Latin America, which Spain already does (Princen 2011). Lately, gaining attention has not been an easy task for Spain. Precisely because other regions in the world, especially the European neighborhood policy (ENP) that demand more interest for the moment, the EU's interest in Latin America has stagnated slightly. However, an official from the Spanish MFA insists that Spain does what it can:

“Logically, we keep boosting those dossiers we think have to advance, for example the Association Agreement with Cuba, Mercosur, Ecuador, and of course we think that the boosting of the strategic relations with Brazil and Mexico are fundamental. So, from the inside we try to attract attention to those EU policies. We try to influence them to the extent we believe they can be influenced, contribute to the progress of them” (Interview # 2).

Accordingly, there are examples of Spain putting Latin America preferences on the EU's agenda such as the Visa Waiver for Colombians and Peruvians and the 2014-2020 DCI budgets. In addition to these, which are dealt with separately from page 65, is the fact that Spain is leading the EU management to close the FTA negotiations with Mercosur is a very recent example that demonstrates how Spain is able to set the EU's agenda²⁰. Despite these examples, there is a general belief that with 28 member states, of which very few are neither interested in or aware of Latin America, it becomes challenging to arouse interest among the other member states, and this is in part due to the 'remoteness' of Latin America:

"You speak with the other member states, and it is true that many member states don't know Latin America. It is not studied in history (lessons), neither in the geography of many countries of Europe. The thing is that many countries of Europe do not know Latin America" (Interview # 6)

So, in order to make Latin America interesting for the other member states, Spain puts a lot of effort into socialization, enhancing its 'teacher' role and showing the other member states that Latin America exists. An official of the Spanish MFA stresses the importance of this and present an argument frequently applied towards the EU:

"The EU cannot pretend to be a global actor without having a solid relationship with Latin America, which is the only partner it can rely on in this world. The EU has more differences with the US than with Latin America" (Interview # 1)

Retired King Juan Carlos has also applied this type of argument on numerous occasions and recently by the new King, his son Felipe as well²¹. Another interesting example that shows how Spain works to arouse interest and maintain credibility is Spanish Secretary of State Iñigo Méndez de Vigo arguing that "Latin America is now an area of great economic development", urging the significance this can have for the European economy if "the EU draws upon their great relations"²².

- Coalition building

With this variable, the objective is to analyze the impact of 'Lisbon' on Spain's coalition building capacity. It examines to what extent Spain is capable to shape EU Latin America policy through negotiations and the building of coalitions in the current institutional configuration of EU foreign policy.

Although 'Lisbon' changes the rules of the game, it does not, according to the respondents, constrain Spain's coalition-building capacity. The majority of the respondents argue that the new powers of the European Parliament, together with the creation of the EEAS, have had a significant impact. In general terms, 'Lisbon' produces no visible changes regarding the way Spain can build coalitions, as it still depends on the negotiating skills of Spanish diplomacy. To this it should be added that 'Lisbon' has improved the consensus-culture.

"Despite the changes introduced by 'Lisbon', the work is done through dialogues, through lobbying and through an internal work in the institutions from the Latin America Group to the Council.... This treaty enhances you through all the dialogues that are set. It is a great negotiation mechanism. So, if you improve your negotiating capacity, you will do well".
(Interview # 1)

An agreed decision in the Council is the consequence of the confrontation of 28 different interests, which means that no country can afford to leave its national interests in the hands of a poor negotiator, regardless of how technically qualified he is (González Sánchez 2013). According to a recent study, "coalition strategy becomes more effective, the longer a state was already member of the EU. Thus, forming coalitions and solving problems increase the negotiation effectiveness especially, if the negotiators are from member states that have been in the EU for a longer time period", for which Spain enjoys certain advantages when entering coalitions and negotiations (Panke 2012 p. 128).

Spain still uses all the instruments that are provided through the current institutional configurations, for example by asking the Commission and the EEAS to elaborate strategies towards Latin America and by projecting discussions in COLAC, which is a working group for Latin America. The main priority is to generate a perception that Latin America is far too important to become a forgotten continent, by acting in a proactive manner in the agendas of the COLAC and frequent communication with the EEAS (Interview # 2). A respondent, who

highlights the EEAS as important for Spain's coalition-building capacity, argues the following:

“The EEAS is very grateful that the (member) states contribute to the agenda, stimulate the groups and their action, and I guess that for the countries that really work and collaborate closely with the EEAS, this will happen in the different geographical areas. The countries that are interested in Latin America are not the 28. So, the EEAS eventually works closely with the countries that have interest in the relevant dossiers” (Interview # 3)

To this, another respondent stresses the salience of convincing other member states’ of the importance of Latin America:

“The role of Spain is not so much of putting stuff on the table, but rather to convince the other member states’ that Latin America is important, consequently things will find their own way to the table. For example in the COLAC, Spain is another voice, but a respected one, because at the end Spain has more information and interest than the other member states. Then yes it is a voice listened to, listened to as an important voice. Spain has certain relevance in the group for being Spain” (Interview # 6)

Ultimately it should be mentioned that, despite the changes introduced by ‘Lisbon’, unanimity is still very present, and this makes the negotiation skills of member states’ still very important.

“It is very hard to oppose the rest of the states, it is hard to veto. There are few states that, very few times, dare to veto. Unanimity is a sign that it is a policy (EU foreign policy) in which member states still have much to say” (Interview # 6)

Nevertheless, according to a Spanish EEAS diplomat, the introduction of ‘Lisbon’ is thought to improve the consensus culture:

“Speaking of foreign policy, which is a slow process in many areas, it often fails to materialize common positions because there is no unanimity in the Council. Thus, in practical terms, the creation of ‘Lisbon’ is having an impact on the harmonization to always seek common solutions so that no country comes out with a position completely divergent from the others” (Interview # 5)

4.2.2. National adaptation (downloading)

Having analyzed the impact of ‘Lisbon’ on Spain’s projection of Latin America preferences, this part examines the download dimension of Europeanization and analyses how Spain has adapted to the changes introduced by ‘Lisbon’. This entails the analysis of changes produced at domestic level such as in the Spanish MFA. In addition it is analyzed if and how Spain’s discourse and strategy regarding the pursuit of its Latin America preferences at the EU level have been affected as a consequence of ‘Lisbon’. First, the salience of pursuing Latin America through the EU will be examined, and second, the strategies that Spain currently pursue in order to adapt to the changes introduced by ‘Lisbon’.

4.2.2.1. Discourse and strategy

According to the respondents and the documentary evidence, there is widespread agreement regarding Latin America being a Spanish foreign policy priority. This has never changed and probably never will. It was, however, some disagreement regarding if Spain still privileges the EU level when pursuing its Latin America preferences.

One of the respondents’ opinions differed significantly from those of the others. He states that Spain’s policy towards Latin America is today “essentially bilateral” (Interview # 7). He goes further and argues that a re-nationalization of Spanish Latin America policy is taking place. Spain’s strategy towards EU Latin America policy is not well articulated, and, in addition, Spain is not active in the realm of EU foreign policy. The Spanish government wants to “punish some countries and reward others” (Interview # 7). This is according to this respondent an example of differentiation taking place, which is not compatible with the EU’s wider regional approach. Furthermore, he suggests that Spain is losing interest in pursuing Latin America through the EU and brings up the term de-Europeanization

"I insist. Spain, in this moment, is pursuing a bilateral logic. An example of this is the EULAC Foundation. Spain proposes this foundation. It is a Spanish project. Spain convinces the member states, the Latin Americans, the Commission, and the foundation establishes. Even before the change of government, Spain loses interest, the foundation is not in Spain, it is in Hamburg, there is not a single Spanish working there and Spain has not even made an institutional approach, nor put any money in it" (Interview # 7)

Another example he applies in order to back his statement is how Spain dealt with the Repsol-YPF case on a bilateral level, knowing that most of its relations with Argentina were deeply Europeanized²³. Nevertheless, he stressed that Spain:

"Will never abandon the European channel, it will be modified though. Spain will keep saying that the EU has to pay more attention to Latin America in terms of development, trade. Another thing is the balance between the bilateral, Iberoamerican and the EU policy. That surely goes changing with time. What does not change is Latin America being a priority for Spain" (Interview # 7)

To this, the other respondents generally disagreed and presented good evidence that Spain still privileges the EU level when pursuing its Latin America preferences, and more importantly, its bilateral policy towards Latin America is not incompatible with the European one. Subsequently, a Spanish diplomat stated the following:

"I would say that it (Latin America) is a priority for Spain in all areas, also in the EU. It is true that this is changing and evolving with time, but there are many countries in the EU that don't have or haven't had any particular interest in Latin America, such as the Scandinavians, the Baltic States, Central Europe, countries that historically have not been aware of the reality of Latin America" (Interview # 3)

This is further explained by a Spanish diplomat in the EEAS who argued the following:

"Spain has its priorities, which are Europe, Latin America and the Mediterranean. Latin America is its (Spain) priority as a bilateral policy, but also inside the EU. That is indisputable". (Interview # 6)

Spain still considers that Latin America contributes significantly in multiplying Spanish influence in the EU institutions. According to a respondent, Spain permanently works to boost "Latin American questions inside the EU institutions" as it is "something that is important and makes Spanish foreign policy stronger in the EU". (Interview # 9)

This is firmly supported by Spain's secretary of state for Iberoamerica, who, in a speech, assures the following:

"It is fundamental for us to develop the bi-regional agenda between Europe and Latin America. It is sometimes asked if having more European presence in Latin America

deteriorates the Spanish presence. I firmly deny that. Spain is the main country interested in having more European presence in Latin America and more Latin American presence in Europe”²⁴

Furthermore, current Spanish Foreign Minister Margallo made it clear, during a speech in 2012, that “the EU will never have a credible foreign policy, nor be the global actor it aspires to be, without robust, responsible and efficient CFSP, a challenge to which Spain is completely committed”²⁵. In addition to this, there are several concrete examples showing Spanish commitment to pursue its Latin America preferences through the EU after ‘Lisbon’. The first one is the 2010 Spanish EU Presidency, which was a clear indication of Spain committing to the EU Latin America policy. According to a respondent, it was a Presidency that:

"Spain put a lot of effort into. It was not an easy Presidency, because it was a transitory, there were a lot of changes. But Spain was left with very positive sensations" (Interview # 6)

One of the respondents that were present during that Presidency recalled that “most of the success of our last Presidency was precisely the EU Latin America Summit here in Madrid (Interview # 1). As a result of Spanish efforts, the FTAs with Colombia and Peru, together with the EU Central America Association Agreement were concluded during this summit²⁶. The, perhaps, most notable achievement was the re-opening of the EU Mercosur negotiations for a FTA:

“For us, the existence of this EU Mercosur agreement is an element of basic need. We have pushed during the last years for this to become a reality”²⁷

However, what stands out in this analysis is that on one hand, the respondents argue that Spain is as committed as ever to keep boosting Latin America questions inside the EU, while they, on the other hand, are deeply concerned with Spain’s strategic approach. According to the respondents, Spain is not doing enough to adapt to the new institutional configuration of the EU. They do, however, address this problem, to a certain extent, to the crisis and the Zapatero government. The respondents argue that ‘Lisbon’ present Spain with opportunities to consolidate EU Latin America policy within the current institutional configuration, in which Spain has the potential to pursue its Latin America preferences in a stronger and more efficient way than before. Spain, however, has not done enough to adapt to ‘Lisbon’. One of the respondents states the following:

“The ratification of ‘Lisbon’ coincided with the crisis, which has had a tremendous impact on the administration which in the end is the apparatus that pushes things. Our EU secretariat has been reduced to the half, and that is a unity of inter-ministerial coordination. If you reduce coordination to the half, if you reduce people to the half, you project the half, that’s the way it is. The coordination is not only about adapting, it is about projecting. There is no awareness of the importance of ‘Lisbon’ and the requirements that should be considered in a restructuration of the Spanish administration. If Spain adapts well, this treaty can be very positive for the projection of our Latin American interests towards the EU.”(Interview # 1)

The same respondent goes further and criticizes the way that Spain has adapted to the EEAS.

“There is not even one Spanish directive in charge of the unity in control of the Americas in the EEAS. When the Commission and Relex (were in charge), the director plus three heads of unit were Spanish. Now nothing, all we have is a deputy head of unit. Spain can perfectly impact. Everything in this world is negotiable. But Spain has not done anything.” (Interview # 1)

This respondent reckons that Spain has, however, shown interest in placing its diplomats in the EU embassies in Latin America, but attributes little importance to this and stresses the need to strategically place Spanish diplomats in Brussels, for instance in the office of the HR/VP:

“We also have to have a clear policy of placing people in the EEAS, Brussels, in places strategic for us. There has been much interest in placing people in the EU embassies, there has, however, not been of the same interest to place people where the policy is decided, which is here (Brussels). We don’t have a single director in the EEAS. That is unthinkable for a country like Spain”. (Interview # 1)

A Spanish EEAS diplomat endorses concerns regarding this situation and speaks of the past when Spain had people in key positions, such as Javier Solana amongst others:

“With the creation of the EEAS, this has changed drastically. The presence in terms of Spanish nationals in positions of responsibility has diminished in a remarkable and sensitive manner. I think it is an issue that can be of concern of the Spanish administration”. (Interview # 5)

This can be blamed in part on the high number of posts achieved in the delegations. It was difficult for Spain to obtain important posts in Brussels, because many of the member states that did not achieve posts in the delegations, aimed to compensate this by working hard to place their people in Brussels. Member states like Britain, France and Sweden are examples of this²⁸. Nevertheless, the significance of being well represented through the delegations should not be minimized. Spain does, however, have a lot of people on ‘ground level’ in Brussels, such as in DG Home Affairs, DG Education and DG DEVCO, which are the 3 important channels through which much work regarding Latin America is done, but what is addressed is the need of having people ‘upstairs’.

“I would change the 8 delegations for a director here in Brussels” (Interview # 1)

Generally speaking, all EU member states know that being well represented by national diplomats in the EEAS is an advantage when it comes to national projection, no matter if ‘on the ground’ or ‘upstairs’²⁹. According to documentary evidence, Spain is doing considerable efforts to adapt to ‘Lisbon’. Two significant strategies have been elaborated; first, there is a specific unit within the Spanish MFA that informs and encourages Spanish diplomats who want to be a part of the EEAS. However, when explaining the reason to why Spain has obtained so many posts in EU delegations situated in Latin America, a Spanish EEAS diplomat explains that the Spanish MFA does not instruct the diplomats on where to apply, and stresses the following:

“It is not because the (Foreign) Ministry is after the Latin America positions; it is because Spanish diplomats are much capacitated for this geographical zone” (Interview # 6)

The second strategy elaborated by Spain involves dedicating resources to coordinate its interests through and between the people it has in Brussels:

“Spain has created a support unit, which is an informal office within the REPER, to encourage the integration of staff. There, the Spanish diplomats from the EEAS meet with those from the other institutions. This can be called a Spanish strategy to encourage Spanish presence in the institutions”. (Interview # 4)

A Spanish SNE in the Americas division in the EEAS highlights the importance of this support unit;

“Today for example, we have a little reunion with the Spanish representation here of all the national experts. So there is an attempt by Spain to come in and be part of this process of ‘Lisbon’”. (Interview # 6)

As already mentioned, Spain has more people in the EEAS than member states like Britain and Germany. Although Spain needs more people in key positions, they have, by strategically placing a high amount of diplomats in the EEAS, ‘sown seeds’ that will prove to be valuable when ‘harvested’. The diplomats in the EEAS will learn and be able to provide Spain with useful information regarding the functioning of the EEAS. To this, the strategy of creating the support unit was important. By encouraging communication between the diplomats and with the Spanish MFA, the idea is that Spain will profit from it. As one Spanish EEAS diplomat recalls:

“Spain cares a lot about Latin America and they call me a lot to ask me stuff, so we speak every week” (Interview # 6)

To this, an official from the Spanish MFA says the following:

“In some way we try to place those nationals of ours where we think they can be most useful and also where we can receive most information. It is not about giving those people instructions so that they fulfill our mandates. But we are in constant contact with them, so be in Brussels or in the delegations. There is a normal relation of companionship, so people is alert, type do you know that this is happening or why don’t you also try to convince your bosses that we are interested in this issue” (Interview # 2)

By having good communication, Spain profits from receiving inside information in advance, such as the stance of other member states’ diplomats or EU officials on certain issues, which means that Spanish diplomats are well prepared when negotiations are carried out for instance. An experienced Spanish EEAS diplomat agrees and adds to this the importance of nationality:

“Specifically in my case, if they ever need me, and if I within my duties can help them, I am at their disposal. When I have been (in delegations), and I have been almost 15 years in delegations, I have generally been in countries where there were Spanish mission and it is inevitable that you have more affinity, social and surely different, with your compatriots”. (Interview # 5)

4.2.2.2. Bureaucracies: Spanish MFA

The necessity for reforming the Spanish MFA has been addressed on several occasions. In 2002, current Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, which back then was VP, announced that a reform of the Spanish Foreign Service was needed. According to Rajoy, it had to be “adapted to Europe”³⁰. Every Foreign Minister of the democratic Spain has promised this long-time needed reform, but no one has managed to make it happen. Having faced a deep economic crisis, Spain has now ‘returned’ to the global scenery with the serious need to reform its Foreign Service. The Spanish Foreign Service has not been significantly changed or modified since the transition to democracy in 1976, and needs to be renewed in order for Spain to cope with globalization and keep playing an important role internationally. A respondent agrees to this and considers it to be necessary to adapt to ‘Lisbon’:

“My way of understanding ‘Lisbon’ is that the countries with a well-defined foreign policy with defined interest multiply their capacity to influence. Those who do not have it, disappear. In the case of Spain, we need to make an effort in identifying our foreign interests and make them more vocal” (Interview # 1)

Accordingly, in 2010, the foreign minister of the Zapatero government announced a restructuration of the Spanish MFA. This restructuration involves the “need to adapt to a better management and better projection towards a new European and Spanish reality”³¹. During an interview with a Spanish radio station, Moratinos emphasized this further by explaining that his plan is to “propose a Ministry of Foreign Affairs based on the Treaty of Lisbon and accordingly a Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the 21th century in which there will be a new Spanish and European diplomacy”³². With such a statement, several other news articles indicate that this restructuration is “inspired by the new organizational chart of the EEAS”³³.

With the change of government, the priority was to give this reform a legal status. This meant the ‘birth’ of the Law of External Action and Service of the State, which was approved by the Spanish Government in June 2014³⁴. According to Spanish Foreign Minister García-Margallo, this was a “new foreign action law which reforms Spanish external service, adapting it to the 21th century”(Menéndez 2013). It is specifically addressed that a modern state needs to have a strong, stable and trustworthy foreign policy with the ability of speaking with one voice³⁵.

It is obvious that a major motivation behind this plan is to adapt the Spanish MFA to a new global reality, but also to the “ambitious supranational process of integration” of the EU (BOE

2014 p. 26531). This is further incorporated in one of the five fundamental demands in this law:

“Third, we should strengthen our participation in the process of European integration and articulate an External Action resulting harmonic with the CFSP of the EU and the purposes of the EEAS”. (BOE 2014 p. 26532)

In order to comply with this aim, some strategies have been elaborated. First of all, as already addressed, the identification of Spain’s foreign interests is emphasized. This will be of a geographical character, similar to the EEAS, in which six geographical areas are identified in the following manner: 1) Europe, 2) Maghreb, Middle East and Africa, 3) Latin America, 4) USA and the Atlantic Area, 5) Asia and the Pacific and 6) The global area. (Molina 2014)

Second, new concepts and forms of diplomacy and representation are taken into account in order to “exploit the potential offered by the deployment of the EEAS and its delegations in the exterior” (BOE 2014 p. 26533). An example of this is the establishment of a Spanish Embassy on the premises of the EU delegation to Yemen (Balfour and Raik 2013). Furthermore, in the new law it is established that cultural and sectorial offices are to be integrated into the delegations of the EU. It is now certified that Spanish Diplomatic Missions shall cooperate with the delegations of the EU. In addition, the law enables “the creation of joint diplomatic missions in third states, especially in those where no delegation of the EU exists”, and that “officials of the Spanish External Service share common services with the delegations of the EU” (BOE 2014 p. 26553).

Another strategy pinned down in this law concerns the career development of Spanish officials to and in the EU:

“The government will promote the candidature of Spanish officials to the corresponding organs of the EU”. (BOE 2014 p. 26554)

Accordingly, the diplomatic school of Spain was included in the latest organizational chart of the Spanish MFA³⁶. The diplomatic school will cooperate with other training centers, both Spanish and foreign, with the objective of adapting and preparing as many as possible to assume posts in the EU:

“The Diplomatic School will maintain links with schools and similar institutions in other states”. (BOE 2014 p. 26556)

4.2.3. The Cases

The cases that are applied to this study serve as examples showing how ‘Lisbon’ has impacted on the way Spain shapes EU Latin America policy. As the cases will show, Spain managed to successfully upload its preferences in both of them. It appears that Spain used EU institutions wisely and that it was able to set the agenda and build coalitions based on solid arguments.

The first case is the EU Visa policy for Colombia and Peru. The EU’s demand for Visa for Colombians was voted and decided back in 2001. At the time, current Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy did, however, not vote against this. In 2013, Rajoy promised the Presidents of Colombia and Peru that Spain would ask the Commission for the removal of their countries from the list with countries whose citizens need a Visa to enter the Schengen area. This Spanish initiative has direct links to Spain’s specific interests in the Pacific Alliance³⁷.

In 2009, in order to ensure successful coordination of how Visas are granted, a common visa code was adopted. An area without internal borders cannot function efficiently and safely without a common vision on who can access the said area. This is why the EU has developed a common policy concerning the granting of short-term visa to third-country nationals (De Bondt 2014). Regarding the decision making process of Visa policies, the three institutions involved are the Commission, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament. The Commission is the only institution with the right to propose amendments to Council Regulation. In this regard, ‘Lisbon’ has not changed anything. The Council of the EU formerly adopted proposed amendments from the Commission alone by QMV voting. As a consequence of ‘Lisbon’, it now shares legislative power with the European Parliament, which has been granted co-decision powers in this area. The voting in the Council still follows the QMV rules³⁸.

The second case is the 2014-2020 Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) Budgets in which it was proposed that 19-21 middle-income countries, including several Latin American countries, were to lose the grant-based bilateral aid³⁹. With the intentions of shaping EU development aid according to Spanish preferences, Spain proposed that Colombia, Ecuador and Peru were to continue receiving aid from the EU until 2020.

The DCI is the EU’s major financial instrument for development cooperation for the period 2014-2020, covering the following three sectors:

1. **Geographic programmes:** Supporting co-operation with 47 developing countries in Latin America, Asia, the Gulf region and South Africa.
2. **Thematic programmes:** Benefitting all development countries.
3. **Programmes for the 18 ACP sugar protocol countries**

Development Cooperation is an area of shared competence between the EU and the member states. The exercise of this competence by the EU does not prevent member states from exercising their own. According to Article 188d in the Treaty of Lisbon, national development and EU policies should complement and reinforce each other (EU 2007). The Council of the EU votes proposals by QMV and has co-decision with the European Parliament.

4.2.3.1. EU Visa policy for Latin American countries

When analyzing the cases, it remains clear that Spain is still committed to the EU Latin America policy. According to a respondent, Colombians and Peruvians would never be able to travel to the EU without the need for Visa if it was not for Spain:

“We have been behind the debates and the final adaption of the abolition of Visas to Peru and Colombia, so if it is not for Spain, it (the process) does not advance” (Interview # 2)

When Rajoy, back in August 2013, promised Colombia and Peru that Spain would ask for the removal of the Visa requirements for the citizens of those countries, the Commission quickly reacted to this and explained that for this to happen, the Council would have to ask for it, and not a member state⁴⁰. As remarked by a respondent present in the Council, it proved to be complicated to get the Council along for this from the very beginning:

“(The) Starting position (was) Spain against the 27 and the Commission. This one (the case) was resolved in only 5 months. It is beyond belief. When it was proposed in the Council they looked at us like saying ‘and what is wrong with you’. Some of them even got mad” (Interview # 1)

This statement indicates that the upload of Spanish preferences in this case would require a lot of work in the institutions and with the other member states in order to build coalitions. This is confirmed by another respondent:

“It was a great diplomatic effort and is seen as a success from Spain. Spain proposed it, and through our embassies there was a convincement inside the EU to get support from other member states in order to move ahead” (Interview # 6)

In the beginning, only 6 member states (Poland, Portugal, Greece, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Estonia) supported the Spanish proposal. It was especially the Nordic states, including Germany and Austria, that were against the proposal. Nevertheless, the Spanish government was decided to obtain “sufficient votes in the Council to achieve qualified majority and win the support of the Parliament”⁴¹. The first achievement was obtaining the support of France in October 2013, followed by the support of the Committee on Civil Liberties in the Parliament who argued that Colombia and Peru met the conditions laid down in the regulation for a visa waiver⁴².

By the beginning of December it came forth after a reunion in the COREPER that 11 member states were in favor of the proposal while 11 were against it. Spanish efforts in coalition building were resulting successful as Italy, as well as 4 other member states, had aligned with Spain during the last two months. The main obstacle would prove to be Germany who argued that the “inclusion of Colombians and Peruvians in the revision, without having made sufficient risk analyses, would send the wrong signal to other countries regarding the credibility of the process of Visa liberalization in the EU”⁴³. Spain, in turn, defended its position on this matter by presenting a counter-argument to the German position that stated that Colombia and Peru “meet the requirements and are the only two Iberoamerican countries with commercial agreements with the EU that are asked for Visas”⁴⁴. Spain claimed it was discriminating towards Colombia and Peru, given that citizens of other Latin American countries with FTAs with the EU such as Chile and Mexico do not need Visa to enter the Schengen area.

During the next COREPER reunion in mid-December, Spain finally achieved qualified majority. By accepting the execution of a risk evaluation, the majority of the member states that opposed Spain’s position raised their objections⁴⁵.

In the beginning of 2014, the next step was the approval of the European Parliament, which as mentioned now has co-decision power. One of the respondents argued that the following attributes were essential to the result of the Spanish proposal:

“Hard and coordinated internal work, working with the Parliament, lobbying, managing alliances... It is fundamental to have clear and defined interests, an intelligent and strategically directed diplomatic work, and later having significant support in the Parliament, which we have because we have Parliamentarians well acquainted with Latin America”
(Interview # 1)

In February 2014, the European Parliament approved the Spanish proposal with 523 votes in favor and only 41 against. Although agreement in the Council and Parliament was a big step in the right direction, the proposal would still have to undergo a risk evaluation⁴⁶. It has been seen that the Spanish position was supported by the Parliament throughout the whole process. The respondents value the new powers of the Parliament to be very positive for a member state such as Spain:

“Without the new co-decision power of the Parliament, we would not have achieved the two things we proposed this year (Visa and DCI Budgets), and that is ‘Lisbon’. We now have more tools and potentially more power to boost our interests within the institutions” (Interview # 1)

The regulation, which finally will allow the exemption of Visa for Colombians and Peruvians, came into force in June 2014, but the already mentioned evaluation will still have to be conducted by the Commission before the Spanish proposal can be sealed⁴⁷.

4.2.3.2. 2014-2020 Negotiating the DCI Budget vis-à-vis Latin America

In 2011, the Commission sent a proposal to the European Parliament and the Council in which new aspects were proposed added to the DCI. Of the new features, the most striking one is the ‘differentiation’ aspect that establishes the eligibility criteria for grant-based bilateral aid. According to this criterion, upper-middle income countries, of which several are Latin American, are set to ‘graduate’ out of the DCI⁴⁸. This was confirmed by a respondent who adds the following:

“With the negotiation of the new financial perspectives, those that will rule the budgets until 2020, some Latin American countries were clearly affected in the global distribution of funds. In particular, with regards to the chapter of bilateral cooperation, the Andean countries. The point of departure of the EU was that those countries had already reached a rent level that would justify a reduction of funds” (Interview # 3)

For another respondent, this issue is another evidence of contradictions in Spanish foreign policy, as also seen with the case regarding the abolition of Visa requirements for Colombians and Peruvians, in which Spain’s current position on this issue is clearly conditioned by its former position (del Arenal Moyúa 2009):

“(In 2008) Spain develops a doctrine of middle-income and it is tried to situate Latin America as a middle-income region to the EU.... Result, now with the budgetary cycles, you

have the redefinition of the global development objectives. So, the EU makes a decision, it adopts the programme called 'Agenda for change', in which 11 middle-income countries of Latin America are situated. This catches Spain 'off guard'” (Interview # 7)

Accordingly, 17 member states supported the Commission's proposal or were in favor of a decrease of the budget. Spain, now, argued that there should be an increase in funds for Latin America, and expressed concern over the fact that the proposed DCI would exclude bilateral agreements with 11 countries in Latin America (Kilnes and Sherriff 2012). More specifically, Spain's position quickly developed into defending the permanence of Colombia, Ecuador and Peru as beneficiary countries of the DCI. As was the case regarding the abolition of Visa requirements for Colombians and Peruvians, defending this position would according to a respondent also prove to be demanding:

“(Spain proposed that the new DCI) do not leave out Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Initiation of negotiations, Commission against, no member state supports us” (Interview # 1)

Spain's main argument defending its position towards Colombia, Ecuador and Peru was that, although they have had a very positive economic evolution, they still face serious problems such as inequality and social exclusion. This is further emphasized by Ricardo Cortes, a Spanish Europarliamentarian, who argued that “when qualifying a country of ‘middle income’ we should not only have in mind its GDP, but also its vulnerability and inequality index”⁴⁹. Santiago Fisas, another Spanish Europarliamentarian, adds to this and states that out of the “15 most unequal countries in the world, 10 are in Latin America, where unequal distribution is a major problem”⁵⁰. Given that the European Parliament, as a consequence of ‘Lisbon’ now has co-decision power in this matter, working with the Parliament is, according to a respondent, very important:

“With Lisbon and the new powers it confers to the Parliament regarding decision making, it is important that issues of state politics can be defended through several scenarios. In this case of cooperation and maintenance of the DCI for the Andeans, the joint action of the Spanish diplomacy in the competent groups of the Council and Spanish parliamentarians in the Parliament has been decisive” (Interview # 3)

In March 2014, it was finally established that Colombia, Ecuador and Peru would receive bilateral aid until 2020. In addition, more than €2, 5 billion will be provided to support Latin

America⁵¹. According to a respondent, this successful outcome is a consequence of hard work:

“After action at many levels, with colleagues in Brussels and other agents, it has been possible to redirect the initial estimate and maintain the cooperation figures for the Andean countries. It is an example of an action that has required a lot of effort” (Interview # 3)

4.2.4.SUMMARY: THE IMPACT OF ‘LISBON’ ON THE WAY SPAIN MAY SHAPE EU LATIN AMERICA POLICY

So far, the impact of ‘Lisbon’ on Spain’s upload capacity has been analyzed through the cases and the variables introduced in chapter 2. This paragraph assesses the hypotheses that, based on the theories of institutionalism and intergovernmentalism, seek to determine whether Spain’s upload capacity is constrained or enabled as a result of ‘Lisbon’. According to the theory of institutionalism and hypothesis # 1, it was expected that ‘Lisbon’ had *strengthened EU institutions and forget loss of member state control, and that Spain, in other words, had found its upload capacity constrained*. On the other hand, the theory of intergovernmentalism and hypothesis # 2 dismissed this statement and argued that *EU foreign policy would still depend on the position of the member states and their political will* (Tosiek 2008). Hence, instead of constraining Spain’s upload capacity ‘Lisbon’ enables it. As the following discussion will show, findings drawn upon the cases and variables support hypothesis # 2. In addition, it is also demonstrated that stronger EU institutions can be positive for Spain’s upload capacity. This thesis takes into account that ‘Lisbon’ is recent, and some of the arguments are therefore suggestions based on the findings and not hard facts, which can be further developed over time.

The Treaty of Lisbon came with clear supranational purpose. This was at least, according to a respondent, the overall “objective” with this treaty (Interview # 5). For the institutionalists, the new institutional configurations were indications supporting this overall objective, thus meaning the loss of member state control. However, the findings drawn out of the analysis present various counterarguments to this. First of all, the new institutional configurations can be positive for Spain’s upload capacity. Stronger EU institutions do not necessarily constrain Spain’s upload capacity. This depends, to a certain extent, on how Spain adapt to the changes. And second, ‘Lisbon’ has its limitations, such as the “need of unanimity for adopting important decisions” of EU foreign policy (Interview # 5). This is a clear sign that shows that the member states are still unwilling to give up sovereignty in vital areas. As it will be shown, the arguments supporting hypothesis # 1 are now fewer and the findings suggest that ‘Lisbon’ can, for the following reasons, actually be positive for, or enable, Spain’s upload capacity:

- 1) According to the findings in the analysis, the HR/VP’s nationality and personality can be positive with regards to Spain’s upload capacity, given that it has the potential of providing more continuity to the agenda than the rotating Council Presidency. It is

suggested by the respondents that the perspective or agenda of the HR/VP is to a certain extent determined by these two factors. In other words, this means that if the HR/VP is Spanish, or has affinity towards Latin America, he/she would enable Spanish upload capacity. Or even by simply having some of its own in the team of the HR/VP would be positive for Spain. Nevertheless, when compared to the rotating Council Presidency, it is also more than probable that the HR/VP will exercise a more neutral role. If these conditions are met, the new powers of the HR/VP can be very positive for Spanish upload capacity, and because its agenda runs over 2,5 years, the HR/VP can potentially provide Spanish Latin America preferences with far more continuity than the short 6 month rotating Presidency. This is further supported by a respondent who states the following:

“The dossiers are tremendously complex and last much more time than a period of 6 months, so no matter how much a rotating Presidency would want to question everything that is being done about matters of defense, monetary policy, it would not be possible” (Interview # 5)

The rotating Presidency was very efficient 15 years ago, but now with 28 member states, Spain would seldom get to set the EU agenda from this position anyway. In other words, if the conditions mentioned above are met, Spain could, with the HR/VP find it easier to set or ‘steer’ the agenda towards Latin America on the long-term run, or even in the near future. A nice example of this is the recent appointment of former Italian foreign minister Federica Mogherini as the new HR/VP.

Unlike Catherine Ashton, Mogherini has affinity towards Latin America, and this comes forth in stating that the EU should “exploit the full potential” of the relations with the Latin American and Caribbean countries, countries which she considers to be “important partners”, thus “strategic for the whole (European) continent”⁵². Her interest in Latin America is further demonstrated through her mandate as Italian foreign minister as she, this year, has visited Chile and Colombia, and is scheduled to visit other three Latin American countries by the end of 2014⁵³. The findings in this thesis have, at least, demonstrated that the new powers do not constrain Spain’s upload capacity, to which the cases are solid evidence. That the current HR/VP Catharine Ashton has not paid any attention to Latin America during her mandate is evident. At the same time, this has not hindered Spain in pursuing its Latin America preferences at the EU level.

- 2) Although the EEAS is to assist the HR/VP, the President of the European Council and the Commission and follow the agenda of the HR/VP, it does not necessarily constrain Spain's upload capacity. In theory, its staff, consisting of people from the Commission and SNEs, is to be loyal to the EU, which the findings in the analysis do show. However, it also comes forth that its staff's affinity towards their countries' interests and preferences is normal. According to the respondents, contacts between Spanish diplomats and Spanish MFA are frequent and useful information is shared. The analysis also demonstrated that Spanish diplomats, because of their expertise, tend to be situated in divisions related to Latin America issues, as well as in the EU delegations situated in Latin America. Although Spain would be well earned by having some of its people placed in key positions, it is still very positive that Spain is well represented in delegations and divisions working towards Latin America, considering that the EEAS' staff assumes a key role in preparing and implementing CFSP proposals⁵⁴. This, together with the fact that Spain's voice is a respected one with regards to Latin America issues, suggests that the EEAS can be positive for Spain's upload capacity.

In addition, as mentioned by a respondent in the analysis, the EEAS tend to work more closely with member states that have interest in the dossiers in question and this, together with the other arguments pinned down here, makes the EEAS a potential 'tool' that can provide Spain's Latin America preferences with more continuity, and also provide Spain with a better basis to build coalitions, as long as Spain puts efforts into adapting to it. It should, however, be mentioned that the EEAS is still very recent, and that it would perhaps be needed more time to evaluate its actual impact on Spain's upload capacity.

- 3) Another important finding in the analysis is the fact that the respondents see the new co-decision powers of the European Parliament as very positive to Spain's upload capacity. Although the European Parliament is considered to be a supranational institution, and even more after 'Lisbon' with regards to its new powers, it has resulted, as seen in the cases, essential for Spanish Latin America preferences. This was demonstrated through the cases, which according several respondents would not have been resolved without the new co-decision powers of the EP. Although a survey states that "transnational ideological lines continue to prevail over any other possible

dimension, be they national or personal”⁵⁵, the analysis in turn demonstrates that national affinity can be significant, thus the importance of having skilled Parliamentarians seems to play in favor when Spain pursue its foreign policy preferences at the EU level.

As argued, ‘Lisbon’ strengthens the EU institutions, but not (necessarily) at the expense of Spain’s upload capacity. On the contrary, the strengthening of EU institutions can be considered positive for Spain, as it has the potential of enabling its ability to set the agenda and build coalitions, and providing more continuity to Latin America issues, which in a Union of 28 with the design of the EU 15 had become increasingly challenging. Subsequently, what becomes clear when considering the institutionalists arguments presented in chapter 2, in which it is stated that member states’ are losing control, is that EU foreign policy still depends on the positions of member states and their political will. Based on the findings in the analysis, arguments point more and more towards dismissing some of the arguments presented by Pierson in Chapter 2:

The independent interests of institutions create problems for member states, because due to the nature of the European project, member states have to allow the institutions efficient decision making and effective enforcement. As tasks at the EU level become more complex will need more power:

As a result of ‘Lisbon’, it is certain that institutions have acquired more power, but not (necessarily) at the expense of the member states. ‘Lisbon’ did not spring out of the institutions alone, but from the firm interest of the member states as well. Before ‘Lisbon’, the EU of 27 member states was “operating with rules designed for an EU of 15 member states” and to “realize its full potential”, the EU needed to modernize and reform⁵⁶. According to a respondent, the motivation behind ‘Lisbon’ was to “make the EU more supranational. All the member states accepted this, but they also introduced important safeguards such as unanimity” (Interview # 5).

The election of Catherine Ashton as the first HR/VP is also an example of safeguarding and has, for many, been a great contradiction. If your overall objective is to reinforce EU institutions, why pick a ‘weak’ leader that is unlikely to pose a threat to national sovereignty? So, a perhaps more suitable explanation here would come from the intergovernmentalists, arguing that at the time when ‘Lisbon’ was designed and planned, Spain, as a rational actor, would understand that the EU of 27 member states with rules designed for an EU of 15

member states would certainly make its objective of shifting the EU's attention towards Latin America challenging. For this reason, more power would have to be transferred to the institutions in order to improve Spain's chances to upload its preferences, and by this continue multiplying its global influence through the EU.

When handling dense and complex tasks, member states are often forced to delegate decision powers to experts. This limits the ability of member states to control the development of the policy:

It is certainly true that dense and complex tasks are delegated to experts, and evidence of this are all the DG's, Council Working Groups and of course the EEAS together with its delegations around the world. According to the findings in the analysis, some of these experts, coming from the Commission or SNEs, do have affinity towards their member states' interests. The EEAS, for instance, is an innovation that according to the analysis can favor Spain's upload capacity. Because of Spanish diplomats' expertise in Latin America, the probability of having many diplomats situated in groups working with Latin America issues is normally high, and this would actually increase Spain's control over the preparation and implementation processes on Latin America issues.

The policy preferences of member states are not fixed and constant. Political and institutional arrangements entered by a government at a certain point of time will continue to stand even if political configuration in the member state changes at a later point. This is also referred to as 'path dependency'; Decisions made about institutions in the past impact significantly on the outcomes of the future and are difficult to reverse. Member states' actors are not fully aware of what the consequences of the decisions they take today will be for the future:

It seems misleading to state that member states' actors are not aware of the consequences of their decisions. Policy preferences often vary significantly depending on the elect government and time and moment. This has been the case of Spain since its accession in 1986. There is, though, one foreign policy interest that has been constant for Spain, and that is Latin America, although the way to approach the region has varied across the different governments. Some governments have dedicated much time to foreign policy, Latin America in particular, while others, such as the Zapatero government, have not.

A good example of 'path dependency' is the Cuba case. Spain, under the Aznar government in 1996, worked towards a Common European Position towards Cuba, a position that Aznar

would probably still support today⁵⁷. In 2010, however, Spain under the Zapatero government, made efforts in changing the EU's position towards Cuba in 2010, though without success. This is a good example of 'path dependency' that shows that a decision taken by one government at one point can be difficult to change by another government at a later moment. To this, this respondent was very clear:

"If Spain in some moment would feel uncomfortable with the European policy towards Latin America, it would now have more difficulties than in the past to change it all, because a tradition has been developing, a doctrine, an institutionalism that is not changed from one day to another" (Interview # 5)

However, an example that perhaps partially dismisses the 'path dependency' argument and supports the intergovernmentalists' argument stating that EU member states still matter, is the EU Visa case towards Colombians. In 2001, when the EU requirements for Visa for Colombians were established, Spain did not protest the decision and this despite the outrageous reactions from Colombia⁵⁸. Suddenly, in 2013, Spain proposed to change this policy so that Colombians could travel to the EU without Visa, and, as seen in the analysis, Spain was successful in doing so.

Spain's upload capacity constrained or enabled by 'Lisbon'?

Based on the findings in the analysis and the arguments in this summary, hypothesis # 1 can be partially dismissed. On the one hand, it is clear that the EU institutions have been strengthened by 'Lisbon', but on the other hand, it was demonstrated through the cases that this does not constrain Spain's upload capacity. The findings point towards supporting hypothesis # 2, arguing that EU foreign policy still depends on the positions of the member states and their political will, and that Spain's upload capacity is therefore not constrained. Furthermore, the strengthening of EU institutions can actually play an important role in enabling Spain's upload capacity. The following statement summarizes Spain's upload capacity after 'Lisbon' pretty well:

"The introduction of Lisbon changed the rules of the game. But for Spain it is the same, you need to adapt and that's all" (Interview 9)

The indication spreading out of the analysis is that if Spain manages to adapt well to the changes introduced by 'Lisbon', its upload capacity is not constrained, but rather enabled by 'Lisbon'. The findings in the analysis show that Spain has elaborated two strategies; one at

domestic level which informs and encourages diplomats who wish to work in the EEAS, and a second one at the EU level which coordinates Spain's interests through and between its people in Brussels. Spain has also approved a reform of its MFA in order to adapt it to the EEAS. Very similar to the time of its accession, as explained in the historical overview, Spain understands that in order to successfully upload its foreign policy preferences, it is necessary to adapt as well. The examples of this are the two cases analyzed in this thesis. Initially, both of the policies did not fit with Spain's preferences, and Spain therefore worked to change them by uploading their Latin America policy preferences to the EU level by using all the 'tool's' that 'Lisbon' has provided, including the EEAS and especially the European Parliament. Given that Spain initially had no support, not from one single member state or the Commission, and still managed to obtain its objective, is an indication pointing towards that that EU foreign policy still depends on member states' positions and that adapting to 'Lisbon' pays off.

5. CONCLUSION

The main purpose of this thesis has been to assess the impact of ‘Lisbon’ and analyze whether it has had any implications on the projection of Spain’s foreign policy preferences this far. The point of departure was to address the most significant innovations to EU foreign policy, which were the reduced role of the rotating Council Presidency, more power to the HR/VP and the EP, and the creation of the EEAS. With the objective of defining the impact of ‘Lisbon’, two hypotheses were formulated on the basis of institutionalism and intergovernmentalism, two central theories of European integration, whereas, in a nutshell, the first would argue that EU institutions have been strengthened, and consequently Spain’s upload capacity has been constrained, and the second would state that EU foreign policy is by and large being shaped- if not determined- by member states’ preferences; from that angle, Spain’s upload capacity would not have been constrained. Through the conduct of several semi-structured interviews in Brussels and Madrid in May and June 2014, combined with the documentary evidence that was collected, the implications of ‘Lisbon’ on Spain’s upload capacity were analyzed through the approach of Europeanization. Based on the analysis, key findings were identified and drawn up against the two hypotheses.

Does the Lisbon treaty have an impact on the way Spain may shape the EU’s Latin America policy?

After having discussed the two hypotheses it remained clear that ‘Lisbon’ impacts the way Spain may shape EU Latin America policy. To what degree, referring to if it impacts in a positive or negative way is actually, to a certain degree, left in the hands of Spain. If Spain adapts well to the changes, or the new ‘rules of the game’, ‘Lisbon’ can enable or be positive for Spain’s upload capacity. Although agenda-setting is more challenging now, though it still possible, coalition-building and negotiation skills remain important in the pursuit of national foreign policy preferences at the EU level.

With regards to the implications of this treaty, ‘Lisbon’ does strengthen the EU institutions, but at the same time, EU foreign policy still depends on the positions and political will of the member states. On one side, both the new powers of the HR/VP and the EP are examples of the strengthening of EU institutions, while on the other side, the fact that unanimity will still be practiced on several issues is an example showing that member states’ still ‘matter’. As it has been demonstrated through the analysis, the strengthening of EU institutions does not necessarily constrain Spain’s upload capacity. Although the EU’s foreign policy agenda now

depends greatly on the HR/VP, given that the role formerly exercised by the rotating Council Presidency is now assumed by the HR/VP and the President of the European Council, Spain can still put Latin America on the agenda by enhancing a 'teacher' role towards the other member states, constantly creating a notion that Latin America is important. In practice, Spain has not actually lost agenda-setting power as a consequence of 'Lisbon', but rather due to the fact that with 28 member states, many years will pass between each Spanish Presidency. With such a situation, the new powers of the HR/VP can actually enable Spain's upload capacity, in particular because a 2,5 years mandate obviously provide more continuity than 6 months. This does, though, rely much on the nationality, personality and affinities of the HR/VP.

For Spain, the EEAS, with of its structure and tasks, also represents a possibility to see more continuity around the EU's Latin America policy. By being well represented, in form of Spanish diplomats, in the divisions and delegations having to do with Latin America, Spain will be able to exercise more influence when it comes to the preparation and implementation of strategies towards Latin America. Spanish diplomats enjoy, due to language and experience, certain facilities when it comes to being placed in Latin America divisions or delegations, which can be a major advantage when it comes to Spain's upload capacity. Spain should, though, make greater efforts in having its diplomats placed in key positions in Brussels that deal with Latin America issues, such as Marín and others during the 1990s.

The expansion of the EP's co-decision powers has also proved to be a positive implication for Spain's upload capacity. In both of the cases that were analyzed in this thesis, the policy proposals made by the Commission were too difficult for Spain to absorb. The support of the EP was, to a great extent, decisive for Spain when achieving to having its preferences put on the agenda. This implies that Spain, potentially, now possess three more instruments at its disposal, and consequently, if Spain adapts and handles them in a correct manner, its upload capacity is certainly not constrained, hence 'Lisbon' has a positive impact on the way Spain may shape the EU's Latin America policy. In a recent study conducted by Diana Panke, it was demonstrated that the "use of expertise-based arguing, problem solving, coalition and voicing national concerns significantly increases the negotiation effectiveness"(Panke 2012 p. 128). By following this logic, 'Lisbon' should, in principle, enable the upload capacity of all member states, regardless of their size.

Spain still calling the tune in EU Latin America policy?

When discussing Spain's role in the EU Latin America policy, it makes little sense comparing its role today with its role in the 1990s, or the often-denominated 'golden age' of Spain in EU Latin America policy. Spain's role is today less prominent, but that is, as suggested in this thesis, not a consequence of 'Lisbon'. There are, however, other factors central to this development, such as the financial crisis, Spain's external image, a Europe looking more towards the East and Latin America itself:

1. **The domestic level:** The financial crisis in Spain has undoubtedly made the pursuit of Spain's Latin America preferences at the EU level more challenging, as recalled by a respondent in the analysis, due to a tighter budget. In such a situation it, an increased focus at the domestic situation is normal. The crisis has also weakened Spain's image at the international level. Regarding this, Spain has taken action and has therefore created the 'Marca España', a policy with the objective of improving its external image⁵⁹.
2. **The European level:** Ever since the 'big bang' enlargement of 2004, the EU's focus has shifted more and more away from Latin America and towards its Eastern neighborhood, especially nowadays with the crisis in Ukraine. Spain "feels increasingly uncomfortable in a EU that neglects Latin America or is committed with policies that are opposite to its interests" (Ruano 2013 p. 52). In general, if compared to the EU-15 of the 1990s, the sheer number of EU member states today itself makes the pursuit of national foreign policy preferences more challenging for Spain (Interview # 7).
3. **Latin America:** Latin America has undergone substantial changes over the past few years, experiencing considerable economic growth allowing several countries to stand on their own feet. As a consequence of this, and adding the weakened image of Spain, Latin American countries are, to a lesser extent, dependent of using Spain as a 'platform' of access to Europe⁶⁰. The emergence of socialist 'anti-imperialism' governments (Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela etc.) is also a development that has driven the EU further away from Latin America. A very recent example that has caused upset in the EU is the decision of various Latin American governments to sell to Russia those EU products vetoed by the Russian governments in the wake of the Ukraine crisis⁶¹.

These factors together led Spain to a bilateral thinking, which allowed Spain to pursue a differentiated approach towards Latin America, thus ‘rewarding’ the Latin American governments Spain gets best along with. This was obviously not a sustainable way of going, and is especially not complementary with the EU’s regional approach, given that important policies such as trade and visa are placed at the EU level, where aid is also best dealt with. At the end of the Zapatero government (2004-12), the newly elected Rajoy government set the objective of returning to the European dimension for Spain in order to regain its weight at the EU level⁶². It comes to the understanding that the Rajoy government saw that if Spain was to keep exercising its role as the ‘natural’ leader of the EU’s Latin America policy, significant efforts would have to be made in order to adapt to the ‘new rules of the game’. A good example of this is, as mentioned, the reform of the Spanish MFA with the objective of adapting it to the EEAS.

Independent of the developments that have taken place, it is, for the following reasons, difficult to imagine a Spain that does not call the tune in EU Latin America policy. First of all, it is a policy in which few member states share considerable interest, thus there are not many competitors for the leadership role, and second, there are no member states capable of challenging Spain’s experience and/or interest in Latin America. This was stated by a respondent:

“For example in the COLAC, Spain is another voice, but a respected one, because at the end Spain has more information and interest than the other member states. Then yes it is a voice listened to, listened to as an important voice. Spain has certain relevance in the group for being Spain” (Interview # 6)

At the end of the day, if Spain adapts well to the practices and provisions introduced by ‘Lisbon’ and has a well-defined foreign policy with defined interests and objectives, there is a potential to multiply its ability to influence and play a key role in EU Latin America policy.

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Annex I: Interview Guide



**Research project on “Spain and EU Foreign Policy after ‘Lisbon’ –
Still Calling the Tune in EU Latin America Policy?”**

Interview guide

Project summary: The aim of this project is to examine the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on the way Spain influences the EU’s Latin America policy. As the Treaty of Lisbon of 2009 introduced important changes in the field of EU external relations and foreign policy, the main focus of this project – which is part of an MA-thesis conducted at the University of Agder (UiA), Kristiansand, Norway – will be to analyze if and to what degree new provisions and practices of the Treaty of Lisbon have constrained or enabled Spain’s capabilities of shaping the EU’s Latin America policy after Lisbon.

Semi-structured interviews with Spanish EU diplomats, representatives from the Spanish foreign ministry and experts on the topic are one important source of information of this project. The interviews shall not take more than 20-30 minutes and be carried out on the basis of strict confidentiality. The interviews are divided into three parts:

1. Spain and EU foreign policy regarding Latin America.

This section covers questions regarding how Spain’s role has evolved over time in terms of shaping of the EU’s Latin America policy and the conditions and mechanisms for Spain’s capacity to project its preferences to the EU level.

2. The impact of the Treaty of Lisbon regarding the way Spain shapes the EU’s Latin America policy.

This section covers the questions focusing on the effects of the changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, such as the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the transformed Council Presidency and the High Representative, and on the impact of those changes on Spain’s capabilities to shape EU Latin America Policy.

3. Case studies.

Taking into account the background of the interviewee, this section will explore the dynamics concerning Spain’s role in the following cases: the EU-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement (FTA), EU-Ecuador FTA, EU-Central America Association Agreement and the EU-Colombia/Peru FTA, including the EU’s new Visa agreements with those two countries.

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Annex II: Interview Questions

Experiencia previa:

1. ¿Cuál es su puesto actual, y cuánto tiempo lleva en él?
2. ¿Le puedo preguntar cuál es su experiencia profesional?
3. ¿Cuánto tiempo lleva tratando cuestiones relativas a América Latina y la UE?

I: España y la política latinoamericana de la UE

4. ¿En qué medida diría usted que América Latina es una prioridad para España en la UE? ¿Ha cambiado esto con el tiempo?
5. La década de los años 1990 y principios de 2000 se denominan a menudo la ‘época dorada’ de influencia española en la política latinoamericana de la UE. ¿Cómo proyectaba España exitosamente sus preferencias al ámbito de la UE durante ese tiempo? ¿Qué plataformas del ámbito de la UE manipulaba España para lograr sus metas?
6. Desde mediados de la década 2000 en adelante, parece que España ha ido perdiendo ‘terreno’ en términos de la formación de la política latinoamericana de la UE. ¿Cuáles son las razones de ello?
7. ¿Me puede dar algunos ejemplos de iniciativas o ‘proyectos’ respecto a asuntos latinoamericanos de la UE que han sido puestas en marcha por España?

II: El impacto del Tratado de Lisboa en cuánto a la manera que España da forma a la política latinoamericana de la UE

Con el papel ‘reducido’ de la Presidencia del Consejo Europeo, se piensa que el estado miembro que la preside tendría menos posibilidades de influenciar la agenda de la UE y de proyectar intereses nacionales. Además, el nuevo papel del Alto Representante le otorga poderes significativos en cuánto a la agenda de la UE, coordinación e implementación de la política Europea. ¿Está usted de acuerdo?

Teniendo en cuenta estos cambios;

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1. El objetivo del Tratado de Lisboa es mover poder desde las capitales hacia Bruselas o hacer que la política exterior de la UE sea más intergubernamental, ¿está usted de acuerdo?
 2. ¿Cómo ha reaccionado España ante los cambios producidos a la política externa de la UE por el Tratado de Lisboa?
 3. Qué ventajas/desventajas le presentan estos cambios al poder de España para dar forma a la política latinoamericana de la UE?
 4. Como resultado de la proyección de la política exterior española hacia la UE, España ha gozado de más influencia internacional. ¿Qué consecuencias presentan estos cambios para la proyección de las preferencias latinoamericanas de España?
 5. Con respecto a la manera que España daba forma a la política latinoamericana antes de ‘Lisboa’, ¿qué ha cambiado ahora? ¿Qué mecanismos de proyección ofrece el actual ámbito post-Lisboa de la política exterior de la UE a España?
 6. ¿Cómo han limitado o habilitado las disposiciones y prácticas de ‘Lisboa’ las capacidades españolas a la hora de dar forma a la política latinoamericana de la UE?

Otro cambio importante introducido por el Tratado de Lisboa ha sido el establecimiento del Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior;

7. ¿Qué ventajas/desventajas le presenta el Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior al poder de España para dar forma a la política latinoamericana de la UE?
8. ¿Cómo son los contactos entre el ministerio de asuntos exteriores y los expertos nacionales en comisión de servicios? ¿Con qué frecuencia se hablan entre ellos y en qué medida se relacionan?
9. ¿Con cuánta frecuencia habla usted con compañeros del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación (MAEC)?
10. ¿En qué se diferencia el intercambio de contacto entre el MAEC y los expertos nacionales en comisión de servicios durante el tiempo de Solana como Alto Representante, con el de ahora con Catherine Ashton?
11. España tiene una presencia importante de diplomáticos en las divisiones latinoamericanas del Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior. Por ejemplo, de los países de habla hispana en América Latina y el Caribe, cerca de la mitad de las delegaciones de la UE tiene embajadores españoles. ¿Cómo se explica esta presencia importante por parte de España? (EEAS 2014)

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12. Teniendo una presencia así de importante, ¿cómo afecta eso a la influencia española en la política latinoamericana de la UE?
 13. Tanto la UE y América Latina son fundamentales para España. Desde la década 90 en adelante, España ha perseguido una estrategia de doble vía con respecto a la UE y América Latina. Sin embargo, mientras que las relaciones entre España y América Latina entran en una nueva era, la UE ya no mira tanto hacia América Latina. Teniendo en cuenta las disposiciones y prácticas de ‘Lisboa’, ¿cómo persigue España actualmente sus preferencias latinoamericanas?

III: Estudios de casos.

1. España celebró la primera Presidencia del Consejo Europeo ‘a la Lisboa’. Sin embargo, algunos periódicos europeos la denominaron la Presidencia ‘invisible’. ¿A qué se debe eso? España jugó un papel importante en el relanzamiento de las negociaciones UE-Mercosur en 2010. Teniendo en cuenta las disposiciones y prácticas de ‘Lisboa’, en las que se le otorga un papel menos importante a la Presidencia del Consejo Europeo, entre otras cosas, ¿cómo logró España proyectar exitosamente sus preferencias latinoamericanas?
2. Según el Real Instituto Elcano, desde el exitoso relanzamiento de las negociaciones entre la UE y Mercosur, España no ha logrado impulsar el avance de las negociaciones entre la UE y Mercosur⁶². ¿A qué se debe? Al mismo tiempo, España no ha estado muy activa promocionando asociaciones estratégicas de la UE con Brasil y México. Es esto cierto, si es así, ¿a qué se debe?
3. Según el Real Instituto Elcano, España dedicará menos tiempo a las relaciones UE-América Latina, para así dar prioridad a sus vínculos bilaterales con socios políticos y económicos como México, Brasil, Chile, Colombia y Perú⁶². ¿A qué se debe esto?
4. En 2013, según la embajada española en Lima, se esperaba que España solicitara la eliminación de los requisitos de visado de la UE para los colombianos y los peruanos, algo que España logró poner en la agenda de la UE. Teniendo en cuenta las disposiciones y prácticas de ‘Lisboa’, que, en teoría, reducen el alcance de influencia

de los estados miembros en la agenda de la UE, cómo logró España ponerlo en la agenda?

5. Por qué no logró España cambiar la posición común de la UE sobre Cuba en 2010? Cómo es que la posición común de la UE sobre Cuba está de nuevo en la agenda de la UE?
6. José Manuel García-Margallo garantizó en 2012 que España apoyaría a Ecuador en la UE para que se firmara el acuerdo comercial. ¿Cómo ha procedido España en la UE para apoyar a Ecuador?
7. Considerando el papel de España en la política latinoamericana de la UE pre y post-Lisboa, diría usted que la proyección de la política exterior de los estados miembros de la UE es más complicado ahora, ¿o tal vez más fácil? Por favor explíquese.

Annex III: Interviews

Interview 1:

Q: ¿Le puedo preguntar cuál es su experiencia profesional y cuánto tiempo lleva tratando cuestiones relativas a América Latina y la UE?

A: Pues mira yo soy la delegada española en el grupo del consejo que lleva América Latina, que se llama COLAC. Yo llevo aquí desde septiembre. Antes estuve un año en Madrid ocupándome de las instituciones europeas y antes de ello estuve 4 años en Uruguay como embajadora y los 4 previos estuve de directora de cooperación con AL. Yo prácticamente mi carrera ha sido alternar la UE con AL. Hice derecho, hice un master en derecho europeo, hice las oposiciones para la diplomática española y trabajé 3 años en América Central, 3 años en la UE, 4 años en Costa Rica, 5 en temas europeos, luego fui a Dublín, estuve allí 5 años volví a Madrid estuve 4 años en temas europeos y 4 años en temas de América Latina.

Q: ¿En qué medida diría usted que América Latina es una prioridad para España en la UE? ¿Ha cambiado esto con el tiempo?

A: España, desde que ingresamos consideramos que es una prioridad en un momento de lucidez de nuestra política exterior, que cuando nosotros nos incorporamos a la UE, nos incorporamos con una mochila que se llama América Latina. Es decir que teníamos claro que España podía multiplicar su peso relativo en Europa porque detrás una cosa que se llama América Latina, que realmente reequilibraba con las grandes potencias que estaban en la UE, algo que no tenía Alemania y que si compartía con Francia y Reino Unido. Y de hecho, tanto España como Portugal, en menor medida, incorporaron su política. Lo que pasa fue que Portugal tenía algunas colonias africanas, pero ya había una política de la UE hacia África, algo que no había hacia América Latina. Realmente la política latinoamericana de la UE es casi coincidente con el tiempo del ingreso de España a la unión. ¿Al principio cuales son los objetivos de España en la UE respecto a América Latina?

Quiere que haya mayor relación política con América Latina, pero tampoco tiene muy claro como estructurarlo. Y en aquella época los acuerdos eran de primera generación con América Latina. Al tiempo de ingreso no había nada, ni un acuerdo. Entonces en lo que se centra entonces es que a partir de la cooperación, que se llamaba PVDEALA, entrase

América Latina. El ingreso de España hace que entre América Latina en esto. A partir de ahí empieza una discusión que fue uno de los ejes de nuestro trabajo dentro de la UE que fue conseguir que América Latina se acercase cada vez. Pero vamos, América Latina no existía y de repente con nosotros empezó a existir para la cooperación europea. A partir de entonces, pues yo creo que prácticamente todo el trabajo que se ha hecho con América Latina, han sido impulsos de España y presidencias españolas. Y cuando digo casi todo, por no decir todo. Lo cierto es que siempre hemos tenido hasta ahora, y marco una diferencia, creo que soy objetiva cuando hablo de ella. Tenemos un punto de inflexión que es en el año 96 cuando impulsos del presidente Aznar se promueve la posición común con Cuba. Hasta ese momento la política de España propugnaba para que la política latinoamericana de la UE de alguna manera fuese un reflejo de nuestra política con América Latina, con una política muy respetuosa, relaciones de igual a igual, un dialogo político muy intenso, unas relaciones comerciales acompañadas por desarrollo.

De repente en el año 96, con respeto a un país, se promueve una política unilateral. Yo creo que aquí hay una quiebra con la relación con la región. Cuba queda fuera, estigmatizada. Cuba entonces rechaza participar en Lome, se queda de alguna manera fuera de la arquitectura institucional. Bajo mi juicio es completamente erróneo incorporar el Caribe en la política latinoamericana de la UE, pero es un tema que tenemos que llevar y es un tema que tiene que liderar España. Hasta ahora, después de la cumbre de Madrid de 2010 hubo un impulso muy fuerte para revisar la posición común y transformarlo en una relación bilateral. Cuando en el año 96 se plantea que la política europea hacia Cuba va a ser unilateral, en el fondo te equivocas. Porque si tú haces condicionar la política europea de progresos en los derechos humanos y en la mejora de las condiciones de vida de los cubanos, pues das el 100% de las cartas a este país para graduar la relación, que es lo que han hecho, claro. La política española con Cuba podía variar según el gobierno que había. El pueblo español y en su conjunto se movilizaba normalmente en temas cubanos. Hay pocas cuestiones de la política exterior que movilizase en España, y una era Cuba.

Q: Desde mediados de la década 2000 en adelante, parece que España ha ido perdiendo ‘terreno’ en términos de la formación de la política latinoamericana de la UE. ¿Cuáles son las razones de ello?

A: Eso no es cierto. En la cumbre de Madrid de 2010, fue un impulso fundamental para la política regional. Se crea el plan de acción con diez puntos sectoriales, se da un impulso a los

acuerdos de asociación con América Latina. Es decir que se articula todo lo que ves la arquitectura actual de la Unión, y eso es de la presidencia española, cuando España en 2010 era un país que teóricamente no pintaba nada en el mundo. Justamente en el periodo de Zapatero, del 2004 al 2012, hubo una menor intensidad en la relación política, en buena medida porque Zapatero era un presidente poco interesado en la política exterior y sus ministros exteriores no conocían a América Latina, algo que considero un pecado original en un diplomático español. Nunca habían destinado allí, y nunca habían entendido a América Latina, con lo cual América Latina desapareció desde un punto de vista bilateral. Sin embargo, la política UE América Latina estuvo muy impulsada. Pero la relación política de España con América Latina falló y en cambio se mantuvo en buena medida porque la relación entre España y América Latina es tan densa que puede no hablarse los gobiernos y se mantiene igual, es impresionante.

Q: Ha decidido España seguir estas relaciones de vía bilateral en vez de a través de la UE?

A: Lo que busca este gobierno con buen criterio es recuperar la política bilateral con los países de América Latina. En 8 años de gobierno creo que Zapatero estuvo 5 o 6 veces en América Latina. Yo estuve 4 años de embajadora en Montevideo, y nunca vino. No ha venido nunca, Es impensable. Y luego ya cuando cambió el gobierno dio un salto. Yo creo que hay pocas regiones en el mundo con las que un país tenga una implicación tan intensa y tan densa como tiene España en América Latina. Realmente hay que conocerlo. Tú haces un recorte longitudinal, y partes en un día en un país América Latina, cualquiera, ¿cuantos españoles hay en este país, y cuantas personas de este país hay en España?

II: El impacto del Tratado de Lisboa en cuánto a la manera que España da forma a la política latinoamericana de la UE

A: Lo que tú dices es una gran verdad, pero que juega en doble sentido. Al crearse el Alto Representante, vicepresidente de la Comisión e integrar SEAE que pretende, no solamente incorporar a la cultura de trabajo europea, la de los estados, pues una serie de desajustes. Todavía no se ha producido el aprendizaje adecuado entre unos y otros. Por tanto no se ha maximizado los beneficios que Lisboa pueda aportar para la conducción de la política exterior de la UE. Primero porque la Alta Representante no ha ejercido su papel como vicepresidente de la Comisión y no ha conseguido asegurar la coherencia de las distintas

políticas de la unión. SEAE ni siquiera es una institución, lo cual la coloca a un nivel por debajo del resto a la hora de negociar. Están las personas y las personas han empezado a mirar a los que venían de la comisión. Se han encontrado con que la proyección de sus carreras se ve reducida porque entran lanzados como paracaidistas, que así los llaman, los de los estados miembros. Yo creo que todavía no hay esa cultura de trabajo.

Como tú dirías en la aspiración final, lógicamente con la nueva presidencia rotatoria el impulso político va a ser reducida. Yo creo que no. Yo creo que al revés, podemos ganar mucho más por lo siguiente: Primero por un error que yo creo que es de cálculo de España y de SEAE. La unidad que lleva Américas en SEAE, no hay ni un solo cargo que lo lleva un directivo español. Cuando era comisión y era RELEX, el director era español más tres jefes de unidad. Ahora nada, lo único que tenemos es un jefe de unidad adjunto.

Q: ¿Y por qué un error de España? ¿Puede España impulsar la colocación de gente en SEAE?

A: Si claro, puede impulsar perfectamente. Todo se negocia en este mundo. Pero España no ha hecho nada. No obstante, yo creo que por la propia inteligencia de la maquinaria administrativa de la UE consideran (en el SEAE) que no puede tomar ninguna decisión con respecto a América Latina sin tener en cuenta a España. Por lo tanto se te abre un espacio de interlocución más allá del grupo del trabajo que te permite de alguna manera tener un debate conjunto que al final acaba redundando en que se acerca a tus intereses. No por nada, pero porque posiblemente los únicos que pensamos en una política exterior de la UE hacia América Latina somos nosotros porque ya tenemos una bilateral. Los demás tienen que construir su propia política bilateral y piensan que en un juego zum-Zero, se aprecia que ya haya una política de la UE hacia América Latina. Lo que si también es cierto, es que por parte de SEAE y Alta Representante no ha habido el más mínimo interés hacia América Latina. La Alta Representante considera que Haití es una prioridad, apenas ha viajado a América Latina, no tiene interés en la región. Eso es un defecto de Lisboa.

SEAE se organiza como un gran aparato de gestión de crisis políticas. Podría ser estupendo, pero tampoco he visto yo tanto éxito hasta el momento en gestión de crisis. Pero las regiones del mundo que no plantean crisis, pero con las que hay que formular y gestionar una relación exterior, no ha sido capaz de hacerlo. Y el caso típico es América Latina, porque claro crisis ha habido muy pocas, pero la UE tiene que montar una relación de asociación y darlo

contenido. Y a eso no se le presta atención, pero es que el aparataje no está montado para ello y eso es lo que yo veo como el principal fallo del Tratado de Lisboa.

Q: Pero si la Alta Representante fuera un español, ¿podría entonces el nuevo papel del Alto Representante ser positivo para la proyección española?

A: Bueno sí, o si tuviésemos alguien importante en el equipo que tiene la Alta Representante, allí tendríamos que tener un español a mi juicio. Más que en la dirección, porque es allí donde se gesta la política. Yo creo que Ashton ha sido muy muy orientada hacia los intereses anglo-sajones. La UE no puede pretender ser un actor global sin tener una relación sólida con América Latina, que es el único socio que le puede anclar en este mundo. La UE tiene más diferencias con EEUU que con América Latina. Si haces un análisis objetivo de cuáles son los áreas con las que se puede conformar un verdadero socio, la única es América Latina. Porque son las mismas que los EEUU, pero no pretenden ser imperio. Pero también está Brasil, que pretende ser imperio y con quien más dificultades hay.

Q: También hay dificultades con otros países como Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia...

A: Con Bolivia hay una relación muy respetuosa. Bolivia es un país con que UE tiene una cooperación muy intensa. Bolivia ha mostrado su interés en sumarse al acuerdo multi-partes y ahora últimamente pretende acercarse a la UE por la vía Mercosur. Con Venezuela hay una gran diferencia.

Q: ¿Y qué me dice del nuevo papel de la presidencia?

A: Es un papel reducido, pero en cierta manera funciona. Yo creo que la presidencia rotatoria va a jugar un papel, no en la representación hacia fuera, pero sí un cierto papel de impulso interno con contribución a la fijación de la agenda. Pero ha perdido bastante poder comparado con antes.

Q: El objetivo del Tratado de Lisboa es mover poder desde las capitales hacia Bruselas o hacer que la política exterior de la UE sea menos intergubernamental, ¿está usted de acuerdo?

A: A mi manera de ver con Lisboa, los países que tienen una política exterior bien definida con intereses definidos multiplican su capacidad de influencia. Los que no lo tienen, o a la

tienen dubitativa, desaparecen. En el caso de España, tenemos que tener un esfuerzo por identificar nuestros intereses en el exterior y hacerlos más vocales.

Q: ¿Cómo se está adaptando España a los cambios de Lisboa?

A: Yo creo que lentamente. La entrada de Lisboa ha coincidido con la crisis, que ha tenido un impacto tremendo sobre la administración que al final es el aparato que empuja estas cosas. La secretaría de la UE nuestra se ha quedado reducida a la mitad, y es una unidad de coordinación inter-ministerial. Si reduces a la mitad a la coordinación, si se reduce la mitad de la gente, impulsas a la mitad, no hay otra manera. La coordinación no es solamente recibir, es impulsar. No hay conciencia de la importancia que tiene Lisboa y de las exigencias que debe plantear en una reestructuración de la administración española. Si España se adapta bien, este tratado podría ser muy positivo para la proyección de nuestros intereses latinoamericanos hacia la UE. Si nosotros consiguiéramos dos cosas; Primero definir una política exterior con claridad y tener la conciencia de que no es un juego sum-cero. Es que nosotros tenemos una tendencia en América Latina a pensar que nosotros en América Latina vamos fenomenales, ¿para qué necesitamos a esta gente? Hay una cultura dentro de mi ministerio que es esa. Conocemos muy bien a América Latina, tenemos una presencia muy fuerte allí, pero no es cierto que no ganemos nada con impulsar nuestra política allí a través de la unión. Luego, por otro lado, hay que modificar el propio entramado del ministerio, el organigrama del ministerio no encaja con Lisboa. Eso es una desventaja. También tenemos que tener una política clara de colocar gente en SEAE, Headquarters, en los lugares estratégicos para nosotros. Ha habido mucho interés en colocar a personas en embajadas de la UE, sin embargo no se ha tenido el mismo interés en situar a la gente donde se decide la política, que es aquí. Allí en SEAE no tenemos ni un solo director. Es impensable para un país como España. Y digo un país como España primero por España, segundo por España y América Latina y tercero porque el servicio exterior español tiende aquí estar inconsiderado. Hay pocos diplomáticos españoles en Bruselas.

Q: ¿Entonces como ves a Lisboa, como un obstáculo?

A: En absoluto, al revés. Toda vez que Lisboa potencia la presencia exterior de la UE, si nosotros somos capaces de trasladar el interés por América Latina mediante una política inteligente latinoamericana en el seno de la UE, podemos potenciar las relaciones UE América Latina. A pesar de los cambios introducidos por Lisboa, el trabajo se hace mediante

diálogos, mediante lobbying y mediante un trabajo interno en las instituciones desde el grupo América Latina al consejo hasta los distintos grupos. Mira, este año, te voy a contar dos casos, dos ventajas, en las que he participado yo. España se propuso a principio de este año dos cosas. Uno, que el nuevo instrumento de desarrollo no dejase fuera a Colombia, Ecuador y Perú. Inicio de negociaciones, Comisión en contra, ningún estado miembro nos apoya. Dos, España propuso la eliminación de visado de corta estancia para Colombia y Perú. Posición de salida, España contra 27, mas contra la Comisión. Éste último se resolvió en tan solo 5 meses. Es que es de no creer. Cuando se planteó en el consejo nos miraban así como diciendo ¿ustedes pero de que van? Hasta se enojaron algunos. Resultado los 3 países andinos están en el instrumento de cooperación y Perú y Colombia se van a beneficiar de un waiver de visados. ¿Cómo se consigue? Con trabajo interno duro y coordinado, trabajando con el parlamento, haciendo lobby, manejando alianzas, eso es lo que se llama la diplomacia. Es fundamental tener intereses definidos y claros, un trabajo diplomático inteligente estratégicamente dirigido, y luego tener un apoyo importante en el parlamento, que lo tenemos, porque tenemos unos parlamentarios muy bien conocedores de América Latina que ayuda mucho en el parlamento europeo. Tenemos un interés por parte de los estados miembros individualmente, pero no como UE en colectivo de estar presentes en la región y nos falta colocar gente estratégicamente en el núcleo central en la oficina de la Alta Representante. Sin el nuevo poder de codecisión del parlamento no hubiéramos logrado las dos cosas que propusimos este año, y eso es Lisboa. Nosotros tenemos ahora más herramientas y potencialmente más de poder potenciar nuestros intereses en las instituciones. Lo que tenemos que hacer es articularlo bien y fijarnos intereses de forma estratégica, teniendo una agenda clara. Este tratado lo que te fuerza por toda la cantidad de diálogos que se fijan, con los famosos trilogías con la Comisión. Es todo un gran mecanismo de negociación. Entonces si tú mejoras tu capacidad negociadora, te irá muy bien.

Q: ¿Cómo son los contactos entre el ministerio de asuntos exteriores y los expertos nacionales en comisión de servicios? ¿Con qué frecuencia se hablan entre ellos y en qué medida se relacionan?

A: Con diplomáticos españoles se habla poco. Con la gente de SEAE, la gente de Madrid una vez cada tres meses a lo mejor, pero yo con los de SEAE hablo todas las semanas.

Q: ¿Desde Madrid intentan hacer que los de SEAE o ustedes impulsen distintas políticas en la UE?

A: No, todos respetamos que si un SNE español está en SEAE, su lealtad es con SEAE. Pero haría algo que va en contra de los intereses españoles tampoco. Para nosotros tener a gente en la división de las Américas, es importantísimo, porque es gente que vamos a formar conociendo la forma de trabajar en SEAE y luego ellos aporten en su trabajo diario. Son muy bien valorados, me lo dicen los de SEAE. Ellos aportan todo una forma de trabajo y de pensar y de ver las relaciones con la región que para nosotros es básico. Los de abajo ya los tenemos situados, pero necesitamos más gente arriba, que es lo que tenemos que resolver. Tenemos gente en DG Home con América Latina, DG Educación con América Latina, en DEFCO, las 3 vías principales de trabajo con América Latina, tenemos 3 españoles trabajando allí.

Q: España tiene una presencia importante de diplomáticos en las divisiones latinoamericanas del SEAE. Por ejemplo, de los países de habla hispana en América Latina y el Caribe, cerca de la mitad de las delegaciones de la UE tiene embajadores españoles. ¿Cómo se explica esta presencia importante por parte de España?

A: No es un impulso desde España. Se debe a que uno, muchos españoles se han postulado ellos mismos para trabajar en las delegaciones porque les gustan, dos, los diplomáticos españoles son buenos, y luego conocen muy bien a la región. Yo cambiaba 8 en las delegaciones por un director aquí.

Interview 2:

Q: ¿Cuál es su puesto actual, y cuánto tiempo lleva en él?

A: Soy la subdirectora general de política de la seguridad común, lo que me convierte en corresponsal europea. Soy la European Correspondent de España. Eso implica que de alguna forma coordino la posición española frente a Europa de toda la política exterior y de seguridad común. No específicamente América Latina, sino más bien en general. O sea América Latina estaría también cubierta por mi puesto.

Q: ¿Le puedo preguntar cuál es su experiencia profesional?

A: Soy diplomática de carrera, llevo 12 años con esto. Estuve destinada en la embajada de España de Viena. Después fui a Bruselas donde estuve como SNE en la comisión europea, entonces RELEX llevando América Latina. Después ya, volví a la diplomacia nacional y me ocupe de Balcanes occidentales y después vine aquí (a Madrid). Como te digo no trato cuestiones de América Latina y la UE directamente, porque en el sistema que tenemos nosotros esos son más temas que se llevan desde la otra secretaria de estado.

Q: ¿Qué ha supuesto el Tratado de Lisboa?

A: Yo creo que Lisboa, en general, ha sido bueno para España en política exterior. España ha sido grande defensora de Europa desde nuestro ingreso a las Comunidades, y de hecho durante nuestra última presidencia en 2010 fue la primera bajo nuevo sombrero. Allí yo me acuerdo, estaba en Bruselas y la consigna que teníamos de Madrid era; en caso de dudas, mas Europa. Eso yo creo que en términos generales se ha seguido manteniendo. No hay duda en política exterior de España que la UE es uno de los principales anclajes que tenemos, Mediterráneo siendo uno, América Latina otro y también América del Norte. La creación de SEAE ha supuesto un avance. Mi trabajo respecto a los antecesores en el puesto, cuando no existía Lisboa ha supuesto un cambio muy importante en la medida en la que ahora dependemos mucho de los tiempos y de las agendas que marca SEAE y PSC, pues significa que se le da prioridad a determinados ámbitos geográficos. Eso es lo que a mí me lleva a decir, que quizás América Latina en el ámbito de Lisboa ha quedado un poco relegada. ¿Por qué? Porque cuando había presidencia rotatoria, tirábamos mucho del ámbito América Latina, es decir poníamos América Latina en la mesa o en la agenda. Impulsábamos muchísimo en las relaciones UE América Latina. Ahora no es así, ahora no controlamos las agendas, de forma

que el único esfuerzo que podemos hacer en ámbito de política exterior es en los COLACs, o hablando con unos y con otros, pero en última instancia es SEAE y Alto Representante quien decide impulsar o no políticamente determinadas agendas. Antes no era así, antes era la presidencia rotatoria la que decidía. De hecho, gran parte del éxito de nuestra última presidencia fue precisamente la cumbre UE América Latina aquí en Madrid.

Q: ¿Siendo una presidencia bajo Lisboa, como fue posible este éxito?

A: Porque el propio SEAE, como estaba empezando, nos dejó la organización de las cumbres. Entonces, ten en cuenta que una cumbre requiere muchísimos meses de preparación, se cierran las agendas, se pone el programa. El propio EEAS, Van Rompuy y la Alta Representante, de alguna forma, dijeron; en estos primeros meses donde estamos aun aprendiendo a andar como nuevo sistema dejamos en manos de la presidencia actual que sigan con la preparación. Desde entonces ya las cumbres han cambiado. Aun teniendo “chapeau” institucional de Lisboa, en ese semestre en caso de América Latina, España sí que tiro aun de la agenda. Pero yo creo que ya a partir de entonces la situación se ha estancado, el interés de la UE hacia América Latina. Precisamente un poco por eso, porque hay otras regiones del mundo que demandan más interés, porque son las regiones del mundo en crisis, y América Latina no lo está.

Q: ¿Y cómo lo hace entonces España para perseguir sus intereses en América Latina?

A: Tenemos una relación bilateral muy rica con América Latina, que de alguna forma sigue su camino independientemente de si la relación UE América Latina avanza o no. Lógicamente seguimos impulsando aquellos dossiers que creemos que tienen que avanzar, por ejemplo el acuerdo de asociación con Cuba, Mercosur, Ecuador, Perú, en fin desde luego creemos que el impulso a las relaciones estratégicas con Brasil y México es fundamental. Entonces intentamos desde dentro llamar la atención de estas políticas de la UE. Intentamos influenciarlas en la medida en la que creemos que pueden ser influenciados, contribuir a que avancen. Pero sabemos que no es como antes. Es decir que ya esa relación tan activa que había antes de Lisboa, pues ahora no es tanto.

Q: ¿Entonces qué mecanismos hay en el ámbito Lisboa para que España pueda influenciar?

A: Mira, utilizamos todo lo que está a nuestra alcance, por ejemplo pedir a la comisión y SEAE la elaboración de estrategias, pedir debates en el COLAC sobre este tipo de estrategias. En todos los ámbitos en los que podemos nuestras consultas políticas a nivel bilateral con otros países o consultas políticas a nivel de los 28 estados miembros, siempre sacamos a colación la importancia de América Latina. Entonces poco a poco vamos generando una percepción que América Latina no puede ser un continente olvidado, que está allí, que hemos invertido muchísimo dinero, capital político como para ahora olvidarlo. No podemos además dejar de lado que de los 11 socios estratégicos, dos son americanos (Brasil y México), con lo cual intentamos ser proactivos en las agendas del COLAC hablando mucho con SEAE y su equipo, intentando sacar documentos. También en las delegaciones, muchos de los embajadores de la UE en América Latina son diplomáticos españoles, de forma que también tienen una sensibilidad especial respecto a estas relaciones, pues son más activos. Hay más colaboración también con las embajadas bilaterales, en fin intentamos no suplir al SEAE, porque Lisboa tiene sus mecanismos y todos los hemos firmado. Pero si por lo menos España es activa defensora de los intereses de América Latina en Bruselas. Por ejemplo hemos estado detrás de los debates y al final adopción de la supresión de Visados a Perú y a Colombia, entonces si eso no llega a ser por España, pues no se avanza. Utilizamos todos los resortes que Lisboa nos brinda, ya sea en comisión, como un estado miembro defendiendo los intereses, no solo de España, pero también de la UE en América Latina.

Q: ¿Puede ser SEAE una ventaja para España?

A: SEAE como tal mecanismo sí. Lo que si tenemos que tener en cuenta es que SEAE sigue una estructura. La Alta Representante ha adoptado una agenda muy clara y América Latina no está entre sus prioridades, eso es una realidad. Ella ha viajado muy poco. SEAE en abstracto es una ventaja sí porque tiene todo unos mecanismos, unos instrumentos, que no tenemos los estados miembros, pero es cierto que SEAE responde a un liderazgo político que a día de hoy, vamos a ver qué pasa con la nueva comisión y con la nueva Alta Representante, que no tiene a América Latina entre sus prioridades.

Q: ¿Si la Alta Representante fuera una española, podría entonces ser una ventaja?

A: Si claro, no solo un español, también un italiano, francés, alemán, portugués. Depende mucho de la personalidad de la Alta Representante. Hay que pensar que Ashton es la primera, pues ha tenido también en su agenda el poner en marcha todo el proceso. Pero de alguna forma es unos ciertos argumentos a su descargo, pero es cierto que América Latina no ha estado en su agenda. La agenda de América Latina tampoco debe ser únicamente defendida por España en Bruselas. Hemos tenido contactos con los holandeses, franceses, portugueses, alemanes, belgas que también tienen interés en América Latina. Los ingleses por ejemplo tienen una visión más comercial, pero también es importante. Entonces yo creo que también tenemos que luchar contra esa imagen que los únicos interesados en América Latina en Bruselas sea España, porque no es así.

Q: ¿Cómo son los contactos entre el ministerio de asuntos exteriores y los expertos nacionales en comisión de servicios? ¿Con qué frecuencia se hablan entre ellos y en qué medida se relacionan? ¿Tratáis de marcarles su agenda?

A: Vamos a ver, son los contratados por SEAE y son europeos. También están las figuras de los SNEs. No es tanto darles instrucciones, porque ellos están trabajando para otra organización. Pero sí que es cierto, y todos los estados miembros lo hacen, que de alguna forma intentamos colocar, y de ahí que hayan muchos españoles en América Latina, aquellos nuestros nacionales allí donde creemos que podemos ser más útiles y donde podemos también recibir más información. No se trata de darle instrucciones a esta gente para que cumplan nuestros mandatos. Pero si estamos en constante contactos con ellos, ya sea en Bruselas o en las delegaciones. Hay una relación normal de compañerismo, entonces la gente alerta, tipo oye que sepáis que esto se está moviendo, u oye porque no intentas tú también convencer a tus jefes que nos interesan este tema. Pero es una relación normal, profesional, que no pone en peligro ni el trabajo que están haciendo allí.

Q: ¿Dirías que Lisboa ha limitado o habilitado las capacidades españolas a la hora de impulsar sus intereses América Latina en la UE?

A: Vamos a ver, desde luego el hecho de que no haya presidencias rotatorias significa, siendo menos los países que creemos que América Latina es una región fundamental, ha supuesto un descenso en el interés político europeo en América Latina. Eso puede ser considerado como una desventaja. Pero al mismo tiempo Lisboa da un marco muy sólido, institucional, económico y diplomático, para poder expandir allá donde queramos las relaciones con

América Latina. Yo creo que a día de hoy aún no hemos utilizado todo este potencial, porque no ha habido hasta ahora el interés político para hacerlo. Yo creo que allí es una imagen doble, un poco oscura, porque hemos visto que ha bajado. Yo considero que por alguna forma se ha perdido bastante el interés a nivel UE, pero al mismo tiempo tenemos todo el potencial para desarrollar, con lo cual a lo mejor con la siguiente comisión y Alto Representante tenemos más éxito en este esfuerzo nuestro de hacer de nuevo hacer América Latina una prioridad.

Q: ¿Significa Lisboa en sí que poder se mueve desde las capitales hacia Bruselas?

A: Sí.

Interview 3:

Q: ¿Le puedo preguntar cuál es su experiencia profesional y cuánto tiempo lleva tratando cuestiones relativas a América Latina y la UE?

A: Mi puesto actual es vocal asesora en la dirección general para Iberoamérica. Esta dirección general está estructurada por un lado en tres subdirecciones geográficas. Yo sigo las relaciones con la UE y los temas horizontales de la dirección general. Llevo 2 años en este puesto.

Q: ¿En qué medida diría usted que América Latina es una prioridad para España en la UE? ¿Ha cambiado esto con el tiempo?

A: Yo diría que es una prioridad para España, entonces lo es en todos los ámbitos, también en la UE. Más señaladamente porque es cierto que esto va cambiando con el tiempo y va evolucionando, pero hay muchos países de la UE que no tienen o han tenido particular contacto con América Latina, como los escandinavos, bálticos, Europa central, históricamente son países que no son tan conscientes con la realidad de América Latina. Efectivamente es una prioridad para España dentro de la UE.

Q: ¿Desde mediados de la década 2000 en adelante, parece que España ha ido perdiendo ‘terreno’ en términos de la formación de la política latinoamericana de la UE. ¿Cuáles son las razones de ello?

A: No estoy de acuerdo, porque lo comparto. Desde luego la agenda actual de las relaciones birregionales está constituida en un altísimo porcentaje por lo que se acordó en la cumbre de Madrid en 2010. Una de las prioridades de esta presidencia fue esta cumbre. Estamos viviendo de esta agenda que se estableció en la cumbre. Solo nos queda como incógnita un tema muy anterior que es el acuerdo de asociación con Mercosur. Recientemente ha habido dos ejemplos muy significativos que prueban como España todavía consigue tratando reencauzar la acción de la UE cuando pensamos que se está desviando un poco de lo que nosotros pensamos que debe ser en relación con AL. Por ejemplo con la negociación de las nuevas perspectivas financieras, las que van a regir los presupuestos en el sexteto hasta 2020, algunos países de América Latina salían claramente perjudicados en el reparto global de fondos. En concreto, en lo que se refiere al capítulo de cooperación bilateral, los países andinos. El punto de partida de la UE era que estos países habían alcanzado ya un nivel de

renta que justificada que hubiera una gran merma de fondos. Después de una acción en muchos niveles, con colegas en Bruselas y otros agentes, se ha conseguido reorientar esta estimación inicial y mantener las cifras de cooperación para los países andinos. Es un ejemplo de una acción que ha llevado muchísimo esfuerzo y que ha estado motivada por el convencimiento de si no somos nosotros los que giramos un poco la atención de la UE hacia América Latina, con otros países como Portugal, Francia e Italia, pues la agenda de la UE va a estar mucho más centrada en ENP o en zonas problemáticas. Otra cosa es que ya no seamos los únicos que abogamos por América Latina, como América Latina ha tenido una evolución tan positiva los últimos 20 años, pues ya hay países como UK, Alemania y Holanda, que están muy interesados en un continente en el que no tenían interés hace 20 años. A nosotros nos encantaría que España no tuviera que hacer nada por América Latina y que fuese la propia UE y las propias instituciones de Bruselas las que lo hiciesen de manera automática. No ha sido el caso de la actual Alta Representante y esperamos que lo sea para el próximo Alto Representante.

Q: ¿Cómo se mueve España para lograr impulsar intereses en la UE?

A: En el ejemplo que te mencione, ha habido dos instituciones muy relevantes; en los grupos competentes del Consejo, pues defendiendo siempre esta posición. En la comisión es más difícil por el funcionamiento de él. Pero hay una institución que en este caso ha sido muy determinante que ha sido el parlamento. Con Lisboa y los nuevos poderes que confiere al parlamento la toma de decisiones, pues es importante que los asuntos que son política de estado puedan ser defendidos por varios escenarios. Pues aquí en el caso de cooperación y mantenimiento del instrumento del DCI para los andinos, la acción conjunta de la diplomacia española en los grupos competentes del Consejo y de los parlamentarios españoles en el parlamento ha sido muy determinante. Otro ejemplo muy reciente que va en la misma dirección es la decisión contra el criterio de la comisión inicial de levantar la exigencia Schengen a Perú y a Colombia. Esto se consiguió de la misma forma, pues defendiendo la convivencia de adoptar esta medida en el seno del grupo competente del Consejo, que es el de visados, apoyándolo en otros grupos como el grupo de América Latina, los grupos que tratan cuestiones de seguridad, y por otro lado defendiéndolo también en el parlamento, que es una caja de resonancia muchísimo mayor de lo que son los grupos de trabajo en el Consejo.

Q: ¿Crees que si el Alto Representante fuera un español que el nuevo papel del Alto Representante podría ser una ventaja para España?

A: Yo creo que muchas veces es cierto que las nacionalidades condicionan un poco porque uno es más sensible hacia su país. Pero también es una cuestión de personalidades. En el caso de América Latina tiene una desventaja para traer la atención de los altos cargos y Alto Representante, es que normalmente la Alta Representante está mucho más centrada en ENP donde es inevitable pensar que hay una consecuencia más directa a la UE y luego el hecho de que América Latina, al ser un continente que está en paz, que no plantea problemas en la escena internacional, pues inevitablemente corre el riesgo de que se le preste menos atención. Yo creo que esto se va a ir corrigiendo, y se ha ido paulatinamente corrigiendo con el tiempo entre otras cosas como consecuencia de la crisis. Ahora Europa ya no mira a América Latina como un continente al que se tiene que prestar asistencia sino como parte de la solución a nuestra crisis. Con lo cual, ¿qué duda cabe que si el próximo Alto Representante es una persona que por nacionalidad, o por inclinación personal es más sensible hacia este parte del mundo, pues muchísimo mejor, no?

Q: ¿Qué me dice del nuevo papel de la presidencia?

A: Yo creo que en general evidentemente Lisboa es un avance en muchísimas cosas. Es un paso hacia una integración más profunda de la UE. Pero es verdad que las presidencias rotatorias tenían una ventaja muy grande. Los países echaban el resto durante 6 meses, sabiendo que eran 6 meses y que luego ya no se tenía la misma oportunidad. SEAE, que ahora lleva lo que hacían antes los países en las presidencias, pues los países tienen que mantener un ritmo constante durante años y años, y eso inevitablemente no puede compararse al esfuerzo que hacía los países cuando les tocaba la presidencia. Se jugaba la imagen, el prestigio internacional, el poder mover los temas, que desde el punto de vista nacional más les interesaban, entonces el esfuerzo y la intensidad de las presidencias era mucho mayor y eso ya no existe. Entonces es difícil que las instituciones europeas mantengan ese nivel de entusiasmo durante años y años.

Q: ¿Cómo se adapta España a Lisboa?

A: Normalmente el primer peldaño del escalón es el grupo de trabajo en el Consejo, el nivel más bajo al que van delegados de los distintos ministerios y que se reúne en formación capitales y formación Bruselas, pues varias veces al mes. Es el nivel más bajo de discusión.

De ahí, de abajo a arriba hasta el Consejo. Un ejemplo reciente de tema que haya pasado toda esa tramitación hasta acabar en el Consejo, pues la autorización para que la UE inicie negociaciones con Cuba para concluir un acuerdo de dialogo político y cooperación. Allí, todos los países tenemos las herramientas y los foros adecuados para tratar de que el lenguaje refleje nuestros intereses, recoja nuestras prioridades, nuestras inquietudes. Seguir los temas es fácil, pero influir en aquellos temas que son comunitarias, como política comercial, evidentemente ahí tenemos, como todos, una margen de maniobra más estrecho para tratar de orientar las negociaciones. Ahora está la UE negociando con Ecuador, si se suma o no al acuerdo multi-partes, y ahí los estados miembros tenemos menos maniobra, porque lo lleva la comisión. En el parlamento, es conveniente que las relaciones de diplomáticos con los europarlamentarios sean fluidas, porque el parlamento funciona dividido en grupos políticos, pero también hay muchos temas de agenda que no obedecen las consideraciones ideológicas, sino más bien objetivos de países.

Q: ¿Es EEAS una ventaja o una desventaja para España a la hora de dar forma a la política latinoamericana de la UE?

A: Es un instrumento al servicio de los 28. Tampoco tiene que ser una desventaja porque realmente SEAE, por lo menos temas América Latina, agradece mucho que los estados contribuyan a la agenda, dinamicen los grupos y su acción, y supongo que pasará en las distintas áreas geográficas, que luego los países que realmente trabajan y colaboran con SEAE de manera mas estrecha. Los países que tienen intereses en América Latina, no son los 28. Entonces SEAE al final acaba trabajando de una manera más estrecha con los países que tienen interés en los dossiers en cuestión.

Q: ¿Piensas que España lo ve como un mecanismo a usar?

A: Está rodando, ha sido una creación muy compleja, también desde el punto de vista interna, desde las cuotas de poder de las instituciones de Bruselas. Yo creo que con el paso del tiempo se irá rodando y limando las disfunciones que puedan existir. Es un funcionamiento complejo. Creo que con temas de América Latina, las cosas funcionan razonablemente bien desde el punto de vista del funcionamiento. Es cierto que nosotros pensamos que la UE debería dedicar proporcionalmente más tiempo y más recursos y más atención a América Latina. No se explica que a fecha de hoy siga sin haber una delegación de la UE en Panamá, que es un país que está creciendo a un ritmo de crecimiento de dos

dígitos anuales. Pero no creo que sea un problema de funcionamiento de SEAE, sino un problema de una realidad que tiene que ver con la lejanía de América Latina en comparación con zonas vecinas, no se suele dedicar la atención urgente, como crisis etc.

Q: ¿Cómo persigue España sus intereses en América Latina ahora, más fuera de la UE y más a nivel bilateral?

A: No, no son incompatibles. Tenemos una relación bilateral con América Latina, que lógicamente los países de la UE, salvo Portugal, no pueden tener por razones históricas. Pero estamos conscientes de que a América Latina le interesa mucho Europa. No pensamos que esto sea un juego de zum-cero. Hay temas que se pueden perseguir mucho mejor en el ámbito Europeo, porque se hace más fuerza. Uno de los temas al que estamos dando mucha importancia en la UE, precisamente por relaciones económicas y sobre todo inversión, es el tema de la seguridad jurídica. Lógicamente es un asunto que se aborda mucho mejor desde la perspectiva de los 28 que de país a país.

Q: ¿Con Lisboa, se han limitado o habilitado las capacidades españolas a la hora de dar forma a la política latinoamericana de la UE?

A: No creo que haya supuesto una limitación. Es pronto aun. Hemos tenido solo una Alta Representante. Es pronto para hacer un balance sobre si Lisboa ha contribuido a hacer la UE más fuerte.

Q: ¿Cómo son los contactos entre el ministerio de asuntos exteriores y los expertos nacionales en comisión de servicios? ¿Con qué frecuencia se hablan entre ellos y en qué medida se relacionan?

A: Hablamos con ellos. Hay una relación más de pasarnos información de manera bastante abierta sobre temas que ellos nos pueden interesar en el ministerio, siempre sin vulnerar sus obligaciones de confidencialidad. Te pueden dar un “hint”. Pero si saben que nosotros estamos persiguiendo temas de en los que te he dicho antes, en los que el seguimiento es más difícil, como temas comerciales. Te pueden pasar documentos de información de antemano. Te pueden informar con mayor conocimiento de causa, porque están más cerca de la realidad. Pero si yo quiero poner un tema en la agenda, hablo con el presidente del grupo. No puedo hablar con un colega español, porque la petición tiene que ver venir de un estado miembro, no de mí. Es evidente que si un presidente de grupo fuera español, tendría más

sensibilidad hacia intereses españoles, están los lazos de las nacionalidades. Por ejemplo el presidente del grupo de trabajo de América Latina, es un funcionario español. Lógicamente la relación es muy fluida, le hablo a él con una familiaridad que no he usado con otros presidentes de grupos de trabajo.

Q: ¿España tiene una presencia importante de diplomáticos en las divisiones latinoamericanas del Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior. Por ejemplo, de los países de habla hispana en América Latina y el Caribe, cerca de la mitad de las delegaciones de la UE tiene embajadores españoles. ¿Cómo se explica esta presencia importante por parte de España?

A: Yo creo que esto es una ventaja para el servicio. Creo que es una razón de idioma. Cuando SEAE entrevistan a un señor para un puesto, claro el dominio perfecto del idioma local hace mucho. La UE sabe que mandando a América Latina a un español, va a tener capacidades para ponerse a trabajar allí desde el día uno, que a lo mejor otro delegado más lejano de la realidad allí tal vez no podría. Probablemente la UE nos considera más idóneos para América Latina. No creo que España obtenga particulares réditos o beneficios de eso, porque nuestros embajadores y nuestras embajadas ya tienen buenísima cobertura en América Latina. En otras partes del mundo sería estupendo tener jefe de delegación español, en Myanmar por ejemplo es una zona que conocemos peor. En América Latina no creo que sea una particular ganancia para nosotros.

Interview 4:

Q: ¿Cuál es su puesto actual, y cuánto tiempo lleva en él?

A: Soy embajador en Misión Especial para Relaciones con Instituciones de la UE en la Secretaría de Estado para la UE. Llevo 4 años en este puesto.

Q: ¿Le puedo preguntar cuál es su antecedente profesional?

A: Llevo desde siempre trabajando con temas relativas a la UE. Pasé 23 años en Bruselas, de los cuales 18 años como funcionario de la secretaria general del Consejo Europeo.

Q: ¿Cómo es la situación post-Lisboa de la UE?

A: La situación no ha cambiado mucho, aunque formalmente sí. Cuando un estado miembro ejerce Presidencia, deja bastante al lado los intereses nacionales. El éxito de la Presidencia se consigue a través de obtener acuerdos en el Consejo en todo caso. El puesto del Alto Representante es una figura que ya existía, pero ahora con más poderes, y la Presidencia se ve afectada por esto.

Q: El objetivo de Lisboa es mover poder desde las capitales hacia Bruselas. ¿Ha sido realmente así?

A: Realmente, la influencia de los estados miembros sigue enorme y la influencia de los “grandes” es mayor. Los cambios han trasladado competencia a la UE. Por ejemplo, tratando con la crisis, el rol la Presidencia del Consejo de Europa y de Ashton ha sido discreto. Sobre la Presidencia, tiene menos que decir ahora, pero es probable que para la próxima Presidencia española, independientemente de los cambios formales de Lisboa, se haya desarrollado una nueva cultura en el ámbito de la política exterior. La presidencia española seguirá igual, tratando de mantener sus intereses. No habrá grandes cambios; la influencia o el lobby de los estados miembros sucede igual. Pues, los cambios introducidos por Lisboa tienen una importancia limitada. España puede seguir impulsando sus intereses. Para ello, el nuevo papel del Alto Representante puede resultar positivo porque tiene un papel más neutro. Antes, cuando la Presidencia tenía mayor poder, era por ejemplo más difícil convencer a los ingleses o alemanes que al Alto Representante. Entonces, el Alto Representante es positivo para impulsar intereses nacionales ya que es neutro, pero siempre

dependiendo de su personalidad. Si el Alto Representante fuera español, aún más. Sería una relación “especial”.

Q: ¿Cómo ha reaccionado España ante los cambios introducidos a la política externa de la UE por Lisboa?

A: España se ha tomado muy en serio los cambios, especialmente el SEAE. Por ejemplo, durante la última Presidencia española, España jugó un papel clave en la negociación para la propuesta para la creación del SEAE. Una vez creado el SEAE, España da importancia a su funcionamiento. Muchos españoles presentaron sus asignaturas para las delegaciones y 5 españoles fueron asignados en jefaturas. Hay un número considerable de españoles, procedentes del servicio exterior español, en el SEAE. Una iniciativa española ha sido la co-ubicación de las embajadas de los estados miembros con las de la UE. Es decir que se clausuran embajadas para trasladarse a las de la UE. Ésta iniciativa fue vista de manera muy positiva. España ha hecho bastante para adaptarse.

Q: ¿Qué ventajas/desventajas le presentan estos cambios al poder de España para impulsar la política exterior de la UE?

A: Lisboa es positivo para las capacidades de España. Para los estados miembros, la creación de delegaciones de la UE en el mundo impulsa su influencia, en especial para los “medianos o pequeños”. Con esto, la influencia internacional de España se crece.

Q: ¿Qué mecanismos de proyección ofrece el actual ámbito post-Lisboa de la política exterior de la UE para España?

A: Los instrumentos de actuación siguen bastante iguales. Que haya representación de la UE en áreas de interés español, refuerza influencia y prioridad de la política externa de España. Ahora que solo una voz se pronuncia sobre temas externos, tiene más peso de que si solo un estado miembro se pronuncie.

Q: ¿Ha limitado o habilitado Lisboa a las capacidades de España para impulsar a la política exterior de la UE?

A: España sigue ejerciendo su influencia a relación con terceros países. Desde la punta de vista de la influencia que estados miembros pueden ejercer, los cambios de Lisboa tiene un efecto mínimo.

Q: Como son los contactos entre el MAEC y SNEs?

A: España ha impulsado la incorporación de funcionarios españoles. Además de aumentar influencia, es interesante tener funcionarios en el SEAE por su bajo coste económico. Evidentemente, en caso de los SNEs, su actuación es independiente de los estados miembros. Pero en todo caso, entre MAEC, los SNEs y españoles en otras instituciones, hay una “relación especial” en la que hay contactos regulares. España ha creado una unidad de apoyo, que es una oficina informal en el seno del REPER, para fomentar la integración de funcionarios. Allí se reúnen diplomáticos españoles del SEAE con los de las otras instituciones. Esto se puede llamar una estrategia española para fomentar presencia española en las instituciones. Yo he mantenido conversaciones con ellos sobre empleos en instituciones.

Q: ¿En qué se diferencia el contacto entre el MAEC y los SNEs durante el tiempo de Solana como AR con el de ahora con Ashton?

A: No hay mucha diferencia.

Q: Teniendo una presencia importante en delegaciones latinoamericanas del SEAE, ¿cómo afecta eso a la influencia española en la política latinoamericana de la UE?

A: Es en la sede central, en Bruselas, donde se dirige la política exterior. Pero sí que tiene importancia tener Embajadores españoles en las delegaciones de la UE en AL. Los diplomáticos españoles, por sus conocimientos a América Latina, tienden a tener más facilidades para trabajar fuera que en la sede central.

Q: ¿A qué se debe la presencia española en las divisiones americanas del SEAE?

A: Es resultado de una situación factual. Hay más españoles en las delegaciones que en la sede central. El MAEC da más prioridad a la sede central, ya que es allí donde se toman las decisiones, aunque parece que hay más atracción para estar en el exterior. El proceso de reclutamiento lo lleva el SEAE. Allí se presentan candidatos y los que son mejor dotados son elegidos. El caso de los españoles es que tiene mucho peso la experiencia en AL, el idioma etc, cosas que favorecen a los españoles.

Q: Considerando los cambios de Lisboa, ¿es más complicado o más fácil ahora impulsar sus intereses a través de la UE?

A: Todo es ahora más complicado con 28 estados miembros, ponerse de acuerdo es difícil. Los cambios de Lisboa, el papel del Parlamento es mayor y hay que tenerlo en cuenta. Ahora hay regla de codecisión en varios sectores, en especial con comercio, y antes el Consejo casi ni se leía la opinión del parlamento. Cuando se trata de dinero, el Parlamento ejerce influencia. Ahora los actores son más numerosos y por eso más complicado, ONG's etc. Hay más elementos a tener en cuenta, pero si los estados miembros se adaptan, pueden seguir ejerciendo influencia. España se adapta bien a los cambios, y así se encuentra bastante a gusto defendiendo sus intereses. Para concluir, el tratado limita modernamente las capacidades para impulsar la política exterior, pero a su vez también las refuerza.

Interview 5:

Q: ¿Desde mediados de la década 2000 en adelante, parece que España ha ido perdiendo ‘terreno’ en términos de la formación de la política latinoamericana de la UE. ¿Cuáles son las razones de ello?

A: Bueno, a nivel personal y basado en mi experiencia de trabajo, he trabajado casi 10 años con temas América Latina UE. Yo diría que no es tanto que haya perdido terreno en la política europea, sino quizás la política de Europa hacia América Latina se ha hecho más europea. Entonces es claro que España, y Portugal, con su entrada a la UE tuvieron un papel absolutamente clave en el hecho de interesar a los otros socios europeos en establecer un marco de relaciones estables con los países de América Latina que no existía prácticamente antes, y que se fue desarrollando progresivamente. Parte también bajo un impulso fuerte de políticos españoles, pero ocupando puestos de responsabilidad aquí en la comisión europea. Básicamente en los años, la comisión europea, tenía un máximo de 2 o 3 delegaciones en toda la zona de América Latina, sin contar el Caribe. Los países del Caribe estaban cubiertos por los acuerdos de Cotonou. Pero para el resto de América Latina, prácticamente no había nada. Ocurre que España en un marco bilateral había puesto todo en marcha sobre esas fechas también. España ha contribuido muy decisivamente a que Europa desarrolle una política hacia América Latina. Una vez que esta política ha estado más consolidada, aquí somos 28 países, entonces también a nivel de rotación, incluso para España dentro de las dinámicas europeas, puede que no tienes tantos españoles en puestos en el área de América Latina. Pero digamos que es un resultado querido también por España, y actualmente creo que España puede beneficiarse también del marco de relaciones entre Europa y América Latina, como también otros países.

Q: ¿El objetivo del Tratado de Lisboa es mover poder desde las capitales hacia Bruselas o hacer que la política exterior de la UE sea menos intergubernamental, ¿está usted de acuerdo?

A: Sí, creo que sí que es un objetivo, aunque a nivel de los tratados todavía se reservan muchas limitaciones como es fundamentalmente la necesidad de unanimidad para la adopción de decisiones importantes todavía en materia de política exterior. Pero es cierto que la dinámica que se buscaba yo pienso, se reforzó en el sentido de que el tratado traspasa

competencia hacia instituciones cada vez más europeas, porque todos los estados miembros aprobaron el tratado, guardando muy importante reservas sí.

Q: ¿Y qué me dices de los cambios de Lisboa?

A: Son cambios a un nivel fundamentalmente práctico, pero también con referencias a los aspectos constitucionales ligados a los tratados y repercusiones institucionales, la creación de SEAE, nuevo régimen de trabajo en los grupos del Consejo Europeo. Ha sido cambios importantes. Indudablemente, con la presidencia se ve reducida, se asume de forma permanente por la Alta Representante, y en su delegación por SEAE. Entonces, la próxima vez que le toque a España, será más difícil marcar la agenda. El cambio institucional ha sido muy fuerte, con la creación de SEAE, el nuevo cargo de la Alta Representante. Pero en general, mi impresión es que en todos los campos de acción de la UE cada vez el margen de innovación o de autonomía de cada nueva presidencia es más limitado. Los dossiers son tremendamente complejos y duran mucho más tiempo que un periodo de 6 meses, por mucho que alguna presidencia rotatoria quisiera ahora cuestionar todo lo que se lleva haciendo en materia de defensa, política monetaria, pues no podría. Puede dar más o menos facilidades, pero un cambio brusco en la agenda europea no está al alcance de una presidencia rotatoria, ni siquiera si fuera una presidencia de un país clave como Alemania. Mucho más en temas de política exterior, donde es un proceso lento en muchas áreas, no se llegan a materializar posiciones comunes porque no hay unanimidad en el Consejo. Entonces las presidencias rotatorias siguen teniendo un peso, pero cada vez limitado, y en este terreno cada vez menos, porque formalmente ya no existe rotación en la presidencia en el área de relaciones exteriores, esa fue la aplicación de Lisboa. También ha habido cambios importantes en las delegaciones y yo lo he vivido. Desde 2011, todas las reuniones de las misiones europeas en un país tercero, normalmente las preside y las organiza la delegación de la UE. El embajador europeo establece la agenda, y te puedo asegurar que esas reuniones son constantes, se discute todo, se produce por lo menos una vez al mes, 3 veces por semana si es necesario. Con lo cual, en términos prácticos, la creación de Lisboa está teniendo un impacto en la armonización para siempre buscar soluciones comunes para que ningún país salga con una posición completamente divergente de los otros. Y eso genera una dinámica de trabajo que va haciendo que haya cada vez más un elemento común de política exterior.

Q: ¿Qué hace el nuevo papel del Alto Representante con los poderes de un país como España a la hora de dar forma a la política latinoamericana?

A: El nuevo papel del Alto Representante limita los poderes de un país como España, pero también a Alemania. A parte de cuestiones coyunturales, porque Ashton dejara su cargo este año, vendrá luego otro Alto Representante, no sabemos de qué nacionalidad será, pero evidentemente dará otra perspectiva, quizás por su figura, por su persona, por el contexto, y puede por su nacionalidad. A pesar de ser español, alemán, sueco, tampoco cambiaría substancialmente la dinámica de creación progresiva de una política exterior común en la que se lleva trabajando ya varias décadas con resultados no tan exitosos. Pero no es una cosa que depende tampoco de una personalidad. Si me dices como funcionario nacido en España, guardando grandes vínculos con su país y tal, pues para mí ha podido ser un poco dramático el paso de Lisboa con la creación de SEAE. Esta creación se acuerda ya definitivamente en una cumbre de Madrid bajo la presidencia española en un momento en el que España tenía cargos el de Javier Solana, que era Mr. PECS, realizaba una tarea importantísima de coordinación intergubernamental y trabajo con el Consejo. También teníamos a un director general de relaciones exteriores también de nacionalidad española, pues un número importante de funcionarios a nivel de directores. Con la creación de SEAE, esto ha cambiado drásticamente. La presencia en términos de nacionalidad española en puestos de responsabilidad dentro de SEAE ha disminuido de una forma notable y sensible. Creo que es un tema que puede ser de preocupación para la administración española.

Q: ¿A qué se debe esto?

A: Pues se debe a un conjunto de factores. Pudo ser por un cambio de interés o prioridades dentro de SEAE de la administración española, a una falta de cálculo suficiente sobre el interés de ocupar puestos de alta responsabilidad en SEAE, que se estaba creando. Ya te digo que España como presidenta del Consejo tuvo un rol muy importante, definitivo, en la creación de SEAE, que se aprueba bajo presidencia española. Quizás también porque había mucha gente que quería irse a delegaciones.

Q: ¿Ha limitado o habilitado Lisboa las capacidades españolas a la hora de dar forma a la política latinoamericana de la UE?

A: Bueno, como ya te he dicho, España ha tenido un rol muy importante y en el establecimiento del marco de relaciones estratégicas hacia América Latina también. Lo básico de este diseño, que se diseñó con una fuerte influencia de la experiencia española y la participación de funcionarios españoles aquí, no ha sido modificado. Incluso áreas

innovadoras como en las que yo trabajo que es en las relaciones bilaterales intensificadas con un país importante como Brasil, que se considera, junto a México, un socio estratégico de la UE, donde la UE está invirtiendo mucho en potenciar estas relaciones. La asociación estratégica con Brasil se decidió ya en 2007, es decir bastante antes que Lisboa. El marco bilateral de relaciones de España con los países América Latina sigue en vigor y es perfectamente compatible con Europa. Que la actual estructuración de una institucionalidad de una doctrina Europa vaya a hacer más difícil para el futuro que una presidencia que venga con prioridades pueda revolucionar el contexto, yo lo creo. Sería el caso también para España. Si España en algún momento se sintiera incomoda con la política Europea hacia América Latina, pues ahora tendría más dificultades que en el pasado en cambiarlo todo, porque se ha ido desarrollando ya una tradición, una doctrina, una institucionalidad que no se modifica para un día al otro. Además con el Alto Representante, que al nivel institucional, asume la presidencia permanente, de los grupos de trabajo del Consejo y de los consejos de asuntos exteriores. La presidencia rotativa, ya no tiene una influencia inmediata en áreas de relaciones exterior, pues ya la asume la Alta Representante o SEAE.

Q: ¿Qué mecanismos tiene España ahora bajo la nueva estructura para proyectar sus intereses?

A: Han cambiado cosas. Ahora con la estructura nueva ya no está la presidencia rotatoria, pues hay que proponer cosas en el Consejo, a través de contactos bilaterales con otros estados miembros. Pero para que propuestas se traduzcan en decisiones concretas, hay que seguir los procedimientos europeos, que son cada vez más rígidos. El margen de innovación que hubo en pasadas décadas es probablemente mucho menor. En temas claves de soberanía, como son las relaciones exteriores, hasta hace no tanto tiempo no había una institucionalidad ni una política clara común europea, ahora ya la hay. En el área de política exterior hay una aproximación creciente, hay una creación de estructuras, de doctrinas y de procedimientos a nivel puramente europeo, lo cual no impide que España, Alemania, Francia sigan teniendo su propia política individual que podrá sentirse más o menos satisfecha con lo que se hace a nivel europeo, pero es cierto que a nivel europeo no se puede introducir grandes modificaciones si no es por consenso. El deseo que motivó a Lisboa fue hacer a la UE cada vez más supranacional. Todos estados miembros aceptaron esto, pero también introdujeron salvaguardes importantes como la unanimidad.

Q: ¿Con cuánta frecuencia habla usted con compañeros del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación (MAEC)?

A: En este periodo con limitada frecuencia. Pero cuando voy a reuniones del COLAC o de la AMLAT o si me llaman por alguna cuestión o si yo tengo alguna pregunta. Depende un poco del cargo que ocupes. En mi caso concreto, si alguna vez me necesitan, dentro de mis funciones y mis deberes y les puedo ayudar, pues estoy a su disposición. Cuando he estado, y he pasado casi 15 años en delegaciones, pues también he estado generalmente en países donde habían misiones españolas y es inevitable que tienes una mayor afinidad, social y otro seguramente, con tus compatriotas. Pero eso tampoco se ha traducido de una forma sistemática en cosas que tuvieran efecto en mi trabajo. Es una relación más natural. No sé si se podría encuadrar mejor o favorecer el flujo de información.

Interview 6:

Q: ¿Cuál es su puesto actual, y cuánto tiempo lleva en él?

A: Pues estoy aquí en la división de las américas que es una división horizontal dentro de SEAE. Concretamente me estoy encargando ahora del COLAC, que es el grupo de trabajo del Consejo de temas de América Latina. Llevo carpetas específicas como la de inmigración y la de educación.

Q: ¿Le puedo preguntar cuál es su experiencia profesional?

A: Llevo 4 años como diplomático español, dentro de SEAE 4 meses. En España estuve unos 5 meses en departamento de América Latina.

Q: El objetivo del Tratado de Lisboa es mover poder desde las capitales hacia Bruselas o hacer que la política exterior de la UE sea menos intergubernamental, ¿está usted de acuerdo?

A: Sí, pero con matices. Dentro de Lisboa se crean las delegaciones de la UE, es decir que por ahí también se fragmenta el poder de Bruselas. No es todo una lucha entre Bruselas y los estados miembros. Ellos también se benefician mucho de que toda la política exterior de la UE tenga una cara, que es la de Alta Representante. Lo puedes ver como que las capitales han perdido poder o que las capitales se pueden sentir más representadas con una persona. Pero sigue el tema de la unanimidad en todo caso. En la práctica, yo que estoy viendo la COLAC, donde las decisiones se toman por consenso, es muy duro oponerte al resto de los estados, es muy duro vetar. Hay muy pocos estados que, muy pocas veces, se atrevan a vetar. Que haya unanimidad es un signo de que es una política donde los estados todavía tienen mucho que decir. Pero también hay que hacer ese pequeño matiz que las dinámicas de grupo, cuando asistes a una negociación colectiva, ser el único que te opones a una medida, decir que no a 27 personas, al Reino Unido se le da muy bien, pero es difícil.

Q: ¿Cómo ha reaccionado España ante los cambios de Lisboa?

A: Con Lisboa uno de símbolos es que yo estoy aquí, ¿no? Se le da mucha más importancia a Bruselas, se conoce mucho más a Bruselas. Ha habido un esfuerzo muy grande por parte de España por mandar a expertos nacionales, porque haya gente español en la UE. Yo hoy por ejemplo hacemos una pequeña reunión con la representación española aquí de todos los

expertos nacionales. Así que hay un intento por parte de España de entrar y formar parte de este proceso de Lisboa.

Q: ¿En qué medida diría usted que América Latina es una prioridad para España en la UE?

A: Es absoluto. España tiene sus prioridades, que son Europa, América Latina y el Mediterráneo. América Latina es su prioridad como política bilateral, pero también dentro de la UE. Es incontestable.

Q: ¿Qué ventajas o desventajas le presentan a España los cambios de Lisboa?

A: Sobre el nuevo papel de la presidencia es verdad que ha significado una pérdida de peso. Antes se alternaba y marcabas la agenda, y España siempre la marcaba hacia América Latina, y ahora no la puedes marcar. Dicho esto creo que el papel de España sigue siendo el mismo, España dentro de la UE lo que intenta es siempre hacer una labor de pedagogía de decirle al resto de los estados miembros de que América Latina existe. Tú hablas con otros estados miembros y es verdad que muchos estados no conocen América Latina. No se estudia en historia América Latina, en geografía en muchos países en Europa no se da a América Latina. Es que hay muchos países de Europa que no conocen América Latina. Objetivamente América Latina es un valor muy importante en la UE. Compartimos valores democráticos, historia, cultura, y a la hora de negociaciones puede ser un socio muy importante. Ahora es un socio económico muy importante. Estamos viendo los crecimientos de Brasil, Argentina, de toda la parte de la Alianza del Pacífico. Entonces asombra mucho que para los españoles que consideramos tan evidente la importancia de América Latina tengas que ir por Europa diciendo “oye, América Latina también existe”. Eso es así, supongo que irá a menos que antes, porque ahora más europeos están conociendo a América Latina. Pero te sigue sorprendiendo que hay muchos países que tienen su razón de ser, el otro día hable con un checo y es que no ven a América Latina en geografía, historia, y claro contra eso es un poco la batalla siempre de España. Pues antes España antes fijaba la agenda con la presidencia, ahora tienes a Leffler, tienes tu departamento dentro de SEAE. Supongo que también dependerá del papel que lo quiere dar el Alto Representante. Lady Ashton parece que no se ha fijado tanto en América Latina, ¿pero a lo mejor el que viene sí, no? Entonces creo que dependerá más bien de la persona que esté al frente, más que del sistema en sí. La personalidad del Alto Representante es importante. El papel de España no es tanto de poner

cosas encima de la mesa, sino convencer a los otros miembros de que América Latina es importante, y allí ya las cosas a la mesa se pondrán solas. En la COLAC por ejemplo, España es una voz más, pero se la respeta, porque al final España tiene más información e interés que los demás países miembros. Entonces sí que es una voz muy escuchada, se le escucha como voz importante. España tiene una cierta relevancia en el grupo por ser España.

Q: ¿Los españoles usáis SEAE como mecanismo para impulsar intereses en América Latina?

A: Yo es que estoy en el departamento de las Américas, o sea yo tengo que decir que América Latina es importante, como español, pero también como parte de mi trabajo. Yo creo que es más bien al revés. Creo que a España le interesa mucho a América Latina y entonces quiere tener a gente dentro de SEAE en la parte América Latina, para ver un poco como funciona, y sí, ¿por qué no para influir? Pero hay influencia en dos sentidos, porque SEAE aprovecha haya que diplomáticos españoles aquí para luego tener buenas relaciones con España con estos temas. Creo que es un proceso muy beneficioso para ambas partes.

Q: ¿Dirías que Lisboa ha limitado o habilitado las capacidades españolas a la hora de dar forma a la política latinoamericana de la UE?

A: Yo creo que esto dependerá del Alto Representante, la persona que la dirige. Ahora el managing director es un sueco, Christian Leffler y creo que influye muy positivamente. Creo que la estructura en sí, o sea Lisboa, ni perjudica ni beneficia a los intereses de España. Luego dependerá mucho de las personas que están allí. España lo que busca es concienciar a la UE de que América Latina es importante. No es que utilice a Europa para promover sus intereses, sino que España, su labor fundamental es concienciar a la UE de que hay un socio importante en América Latina. Esto lo hace España a través de la UE tanto como a través de su política bilateral.

Q: ¿Qué mecanismos de proyección le ofrece el actual ámbito post-Lisboa para España?

A: Lisboa lo que ofrece es mayor unidad y mayor coherencia. Ofrece SEAE, que al final es una cosa muy interesante. Creo que funciona, pero hay que darle tiempo.

Q: ¿Cómo son los contactos entre el ministerio de asuntos exteriores y los expertos nacionales en comisión de servicios? ¿Con qué frecuencia se hablan entre ellos y en qué medida se relacionan?

A: Hay contacto porque en mi régimen de SNE es que el ministerio me paga todo, entonces es que tiene que haber contacto. Luego hay iniciativas por parte del REPER española de intentar poner en contacto a todos los SNEs españoles. Pero esto es algo nuevo. Tengo bastante relación con mi ministerio, pero desde un punto de vista de interés profesional. España se preocupa mucho por América Latina y me llaman mucho para preguntarme cosas, pues hablamos semanalmente. Pero son cosas que también responderían otros estados miembros, o sea no son cosas confidenciales. Son mas tipo cual va a ser la agenda, que nos interesa, cuál va a ser el próximo viaje de, o sea aprovechan que estoy aquí.

Q: España tiene una presencia importante de diplomáticos en las divisiones latinoamericanas del Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior. Por ejemplo, de los países de habla hispana en América Latina y el Caribe, cerca de la mitad de las delegaciones de la UE tiene embajadores españoles. ¿Cómo se explica esta presencia importante por parte de España? (EEAS 2014)

A: Se debe a que España tiene mucho interés en América Latina y que hay desinterés de otros países en América Latina. Los jefes de delegaciones se eligen por concurso. En el ministerio no hay ningún procedimiento encausador para eso. Es decir que cualquier persona que se quiera presentar se presenta, envía curriculum a Bruselas. No hay direcciones por parte del ministerio. Lo que si tienes es en España muchos diplomáticos especializados en América Latina. Entonces en normal que en un concurso cuando llegas a panel, el diplomático español tenga un curriculum muy bien orientado y un gran conocimiento de la zona y le acaban de coger a él. Pero no es porque el ministerio este detrás por los puestos de América Latina, es porque los diplomáticos españoles están muy capacitados para esta zona geográfica.

Q: Teniendo una presencia así de importante, ¿cómo afecta eso a la influencia española en la política latinoamericana de la UE?

A: Es verdad que ahora la UE está un poco en horas bajas con todo el tema de la crisis ya no somos el referente, luego esta China por otra parte y Asia con una influencia importante. España influye en la política latinoamericana, está muy consciente de que es importante.

Q: ¿Cómo persigue España a sus intereses en América Latina ahora? Sigue haciéndolo a través de la UE?

A: Es que no son incompatibles. España hace las dos cosas. Te pongo un ejemplo. En el ICD, que se ha negociado ahora con las nuevas perspectivas financieras que son 28 mil millones de euros. El interés de España dentro de este instrumento ha sido que se mantuvieran a los países de América Latina. Se ha logrado en cierta manera. Había un intento por la UE de reducir los países a los que se da ese dinero y muchos países de América Latina salían fuera de esto por su renta media. España ha conseguido asegurar un sobre bastante importante para América Latina, que todavía no está aprobado. Pero en principio, esto ha sido una pelea española.

Q: España celebró la primera Presidencia del Consejo Europeo ‘a la Lisboa’. Sin embargo, algunos periódicos europeos la denominaron la Presidencia ‘invisible’. ¿A qué se debe eso? España jugó un papel importante en el relanzamiento de las negociaciones UE-Mercosur en 2010. Teniendo en cuenta las disposiciones y prácticas de ‘Lisboa’, en las que se le otorga un papel menos importante a la Presidencia del Consejo Europeo, entre otras cosas, ¿cómo logró España proyectar exitosamente sus preferencias latinoamericanas?

A: España puso mucho esfuerzo en esta presidencia. No era una presidencia fácil porque era justo la presidencia de cambio, había muchos cambios. España se quedó con una sensación muy positiva con su presidencia. En cuanto a las negociaciones con Mercosur, desde España este proceso se ve bien. El problema está en Mercosur, las negociaciones no avanzan porque no quiere, concretamente porque Argentina no quiere. Los argentinos son difíciles. Y la UE lo que no quiere es entrar en procesos de integración interna, la UE no va a opinar si Brasil debería separarse de Mercosur o si deberían hacer ofertas separadas. En la última cumbre UE Brasil, los brasileños no quisieron que hubiera un lenguaje fuerte en el tema de Mercosur, pues es un tema interno de ellos.

Q: En 2013, según la embajada española en Lima, se esperaba que España solicitara la eliminación de los requisitos de visado de la UE para los colombianos y los peruanos, algo que España logró poner en la agenda de la UE. Teniendo en cuenta las disposiciones y prácticas de ‘Lisboa’, que, en teoría, reducen el alcance de influencia de los estados miembros en la agenda de la UE, ¿cómo logró España ponerlo en la agenda?

A: Fue un gran esfuerzo diplomático y se ve como un éxito desde España. España lo propuso, y a través de nuestras embajadas hubo un convencimiento dentro de la UE para buscar apoyos en otros estados miembros para que esto saliera adelante. Ha habido un impulso político a nivel alto. Todo lo que sea positivo para Iberoamérica, España lo va a apoyar dentro de la UE.

Q: ¿Piensas que la proyección de intereses de los estados miembros a través de la UE es más complicada ahora después de Lisboa?

A: Yo creo que con la creación de EEAS lo que se tiende es que la UE tenga voz propia en política exterior. Yo creo que es positivo para los estados miembros, no hay que ver la UE como un conflicto siempre entre estados miembros y las instituciones. La UE está formada por estados miembros, y en muchos casos, lo que es bueno para los estados miembros, es bueno para la UE.

Interview 7:

Q: ¿Cuál es su puesto actual, y cuánto tiempo lleva en él?

A: Soy profesor de relaciones internacionales de la Complutense, investigador del instituto Complutense estudios internaciones y he trabajado como consultor del parlamento europeo y la comisión. En estos momentos estoy colaborando con una instancia creada por los estados miembros de la UE y las instituciones europeas y los estados que son partes del CELAC, que se llama la fundación EULAC en Hamburgo.

Q: ¿Le puedo preguntar cuál es su experiencia profesional?

A: Llevo desde el año 95 como profesor de la complutense, esa experiencia de consultor que he tenido con esas instituciones y otras muchas, también he trabajado en cooperación al desarrollo en América Latina; 1,5 años en Costa Rica, 1,5 años en Guatemala, he transcurrido buena parte de la región. Antes trabajaba en la Comunidad de Madrid.

Q: ¿Cuánto tiempo lleva tratando cuestiones relativas a América Latina y la UE?

A: América Latina mi primer trabajo de cooperación fue en 1987, estudios sobre UE América Latina fue en 1991. Llevo ya un poquito de tiempo.

Q: ¿En qué medida diría usted que América Latina es una prioridad para España en la UE? ¿Ha cambiado esto con el tiempo?

A: América Latina no ha dejado de ser prioridad para la política exterior de España en ningún momento. Otra cosa es como se ha abordado esa prioridad. En realidad la política exterior española hacia América Latina tiene tres canales que deberían estar bien encajados y no siempre lo están. Uno es bilateral, otro es en el ámbito de la comunidad iberoamericana y el tercero es la actuación que España hace a través de la UE. En cierta manera, lo que España hace es aplaudiendo esas preferencias hacia la región a través de las instituciones europeas. Y esto afecta tanto a política que son comunitarizadas como a otras en las que se pretende una acción conjunta de la UE, y no de alcance bilateral. Eso ha ido variando significadamente con el tiempo. En realidad, desde que nos incorporamos, e incluso antes, España ha privilegiado tradicionalmente una actuación a través de la UE, porque ha sido país europeísta. Ha preferido una unión fuerte en una relación significativa, estratégica, con América Latina que no una actuación bilateral. Pero desde el periodo de Zapatero esto se ha

debilitado profundamente. España ha optado más por el ámbito iberoamericana, y en este momento pues una bilateralización o renacionalización de la política hacia América Latina. España está poca activa en una UE, para la que además América Latina no es una prioridad.

Q: La década de los años 1990 y principios de 2000 se denominan a menudo la ‘época dorada’ de influencia española en la política latinoamericana de la UE. ¿Cómo proyectaba España exitosamente sus preferencias al ámbito de la UE durante ese tiempo? ¿Qué plataformas del ámbito de la UE manipulaba España para lograr sus metas?

A: En primer lugar privilegiando esa dimensión antes que la bilateral. Segundo teniendo un enfoque de la política hacia América Latina regional o inter-regional antes que bilateralista. Y tercero pues una España muy activa, fortaleciendo la dimensión latinoamericana de la política exterior y seguridad común, que contó con la alianza de funcionarios europeos comprometidos con América Latina. Ahí también un contexto internacional que favorecía esa orientación latinoamericana hacia la región. Un último elemento, que quizás no se destaca tanto, es la alianza con otros estados miembros, en ese momento hubo dos estados miembros, particularmente Alemania y Francia, interesados en desarrollar esa relación con América Latina en los años 90. Ahora ninguno de esos elementos está presente. Una España más débil, una España que ha optado por un enfoque bilateral evidentemente, porque la política bilateral permite al gobierno diferenciar los países que nos gustan y los que no nos gustan. Y optar más claramente por algunos, cosa que encaja mal con la política de más amplio aspecto de la UE. Tercero no existe esa red de funcionarios, se ha debilitado profundamente, no contamos con ella. Cuarto, el contexto internacional no es favorable. Finalmente ninguno de los estados miembros está particularmente interesado en América Latina en estos momentos. No se da ninguna de las circunstancias que ayudó en esos momentos.

Q: Entonces usted dice además que ahora mismo España ya no privilegia tanto a América Latina a través de la UE?

A: No, nuestra política es esencialmente bilateral. Y más aún, no tenemos bien articulada la política iberoamericana, la bilateral y la que se hace a través de la UE. Y quizás, lo que te comentaba antes del contexto internacional, entre ellos encontraría que la propia región ha cambiado, la región no es la misma que en los años 90. Primero ha tenido un proceso de ascenso y diferenciación. Segundo, en el que han cambiado significativamente, las

cartografías de la integración regional y las estrategias de inserción internacional. Y tercero, es una región en la que el panorama social y política ha variado significativamente.

Q: ¿Me puede dar algunos ejemplos de iniciativas o ‘proyectos’ respecto a asuntos latinoamericanos de la UE que han sido puestas en marcha por España?

A: Hay algunos que iniciamos y que no les hemos dado continuidad. Uno de ellos en la primera legislatura de Zapatero en la que España incrementa su ayuda al desarrollo y promueve una agenda de cooperación de desarrollo con países de renta media. España se encuentra en 2004 con su plan director, que tiene una opción del gobierno hacia los objetivos del milenio. Pero esto orientaría la ayuda hacia los países más pobres y América Latina es de renta media. Entonces, en el plan director hasta 2008 ocurre una contradicción. Al principio dicen: Nuestra prioridad son los objetivos del milenio, y de repente dicen: nuestra prioridad es América Latina. Pero, a mediados de esa legislatura, España desarrolla una doctrina de renta intermedia y se trata de posicionar a América Latina como región de renta intermedia en la UE. Pero ya en la segunda legislatura de los socialistas esto se abandona completamente, pues nos orientamos hacia África. No hemos hecho ningún esfuerzo para promover esto. Resultado, ahora viene unos ciclos presupuestarios, ahora viene la redefinición de los objetivos globales de desarrollo. Coincide también con la agenda multilateral de redefinición de los objetivos de desarrollo mundial. Entonces la UE toma una decisión, adopta el programa llamado el programa por el cambio, y aquí están 11 países de América Latina de renta media. Esto le pilló a España con el pie cambiado. No estuvo activa defendiendo a América Latina como receptor de cooperación europea. Otro ejemplo es la fundación EULAC. España propone esta fundación. Es un proyecto español. España convence a los estados miembros, los latinoamericanos, a la comisión, y la fundación se establece. Ya incluso antes de que se cambiara gobierno, España pierde interés, la fundación no está en España, está en Hamburgo, no hay ni un solo español trabajando en ella y España no ha tenido ni siquiera ni un acercamiento institucional, no ha puesto ni un duro. Para mí es una cosa como mínimo llamativa. España ha tenido cierto éxito en poner algo de América Latina en la agenda de las políticas comunitarias, pero no en la agenda de la política exterior de los estados miembros.

Q: Con el papel ‘reducido’ de la Presidencia del Consejo Europeo, se piensa que el estado miembro que la preside tendría menos posibilidades de influenciar la agenda de la UE y de proyectar intereses nacionales. Además, el nuevo papel del Alto Representante le otorga poderes significativos en cuanto a la agenda de la UE, coordinación e implementación de la política Europea. ¿Está usted de acuerdo?

A: El mecanismo de la presidencia evidentemente perderíamos peso cuando nos toque nueva presidencia, pero queda bastante. No lo daría mucha importancia. De hecho, solamente aprovechamos una de las presidencias, la de 2002 y la de 2010, que fue muy buena. Reabrimos la negociación con Mercosur, desatascamos acuerdos con Perú, Colombia y Centroamérica. Hubo un retorno a esas prácticas españolas, porque hubo una buena política de alianza con los otros estados miembros, con países latinoamericanos y tuvimos un magnífico secretario de estado que impulsó esto, que se llama Juan Pablo de la Iglesia, muy comprometido con América Latina. Todos los factores se dieron. Allí la presidencia fue relevante, en estos dos casos. Yo creo que tiene más que ver con un diseño de política nuestra, tiene que ver con las alianzas. Pero insisto, España en este momento está en una lógica bilateral. Incluso, el ámbito iberoamericana lo tenemos abandonado, no hay interés Español. Yo pienso que Lisboa nos ha situado en una situación muy paradójica. A mí no me cabe duda de que Lisboa refuerza esto que llamamos la condición de actor o “actorness” de la UE en todas las variables que han propuesto; la figura de la Alta Representante, SEAE, clarifica asuntos tan complejos como los de acuerdos de asociación, comunitarizando la regla de protección de las inversiones. Refuerza los mecanismos de legitimación de la acción exterior con un papel mayor del parlamento. Todo esto Lisboa lo refuerza. Al mismo tiempo observamos un proceso de renacionalización de políticas exteriores, o lo que dice Torreblanca, una fragmentación del poder europeo. Es cierto que en algunos ámbitos en la actuación comunitaria se ha demostrado que si vamos juntos se pueden hacer muchas cosas. Por ejemplo, el liderazgo de Ashton en Irán, pero en muchos casos no ha sido así, como en el caso de Siria.

Q: El objetivo del Tratado de Lisboa es mover poder desde las capitales hacia Bruselas o hacer que la política exterior de la UE sea menos intergubernamental, ¿está usted de acuerdo?

A: Yo lo que digo es que hay una paradoja, entre un marco institucional más fuerte, que no es más intergubernamental, que refuerza el “actorness” desde el punto de vista jurídica. Que

Lisboa refuerce el “actorness” no quiere decir que los estados miembros coordinen sus políticas. En política exterior, en muchos asuntos de la agenda internacional, hemos visto que se ha dejado a las instituciones europeas en un papel puramente declarativo. ¿Cómo se gestiona la crisis de Libia? Francia e Inglaterra, Alemania se quitó del medio, y las instituciones europeas mirando al techo. Formalmente, Lisboa refuerza el “actorness”. Pero al mismo tiempo, creamos una nueva figura, el Alto Representante. Muy bien, ¿y a quien ponemos? A una figura que no haga sombra a los estados miembros, a una tal Ashton. Lo que me resulta paradójico, es que adoptamos las decisiones políticas institucionales para reforzar nuestra condición de actor, pero luego ponemos a líderes débiles y rehuimos la toma de decisiones en ese marco que nos hemos dado. Lisboa no hace el proceso más intergubernamental, lo que lo hace más intergubernamental es que nos vamos fuera de Lisboa, la renacionalización. Para mi es una situación contradictoria.

Q: ¿Qué consecuencias presentan estos cambios para la proyección de las preferencias latinoamericanas de España?

A: Lisboa es un importante cambio en la construcción europea. Pero a mí me parece más importante es que lógicas políticas están dando en los estados miembros. Ya antes de la crisis ha habido rupturas de ese contrato implícito entre la ciudadanía y las instituciones europeas. Lisboa es el hijo de la constitución europea al que finalmente no se optó. Ya antes de la crisis se llevaba tiempo explicándole a la ciudadanía que lo que viene de Bruselas no son cosas buenas y esto con la crisis se agrava. Lo que une a los europeos ahora es el euroescepticismo. Lo que más votos dan en este momento es, menos Europa, mejor solos. Lisboa está ahí para que los países lo “usen” cuando más les convengan, y cuando no, van por fuera. Uno puede ser muy neo funcionalista y decir que las cosas funcionan solas. O a lo mejor lo que hay que hacer es combinar un poquito de neo funcionalismo con intergubernamentalismo, ese viejo debate de cómo se construye Europa. A mí no me cabe duda de que Lisboa sea necesario, porque en muchos ámbitos, ya no tenemos intereses nacionales. Nuestra ciudadanía es mucho más integrada, nuestro espacio político más integrado, nuestra creciente debilidad ante los países emergentes, nos lleva a que necesitemos y tengamos que optar por una actuación más unificada en asuntos internacionales.

Q: Como resultado de la proyección de la política exterior española hacia la UE, España ha gozado de más influencia internacional. Entonces ¿por qué ahora se elige optar más por la vía bilateral?

A: Hay razones ideológicas, y una actuación comunitaria de la UE nos obliga a un enfoque más regional, y este gobierno quiere premiar a unos países y castigar a otros. En materia política hacia América Latina, este gobierno tiene una marcadísima preferencia por los países de la Alianza del Pacífico. Luego tiene una manifiesta falta de prioridad con los países del bloque del Alba y luego está el caso, al que no parece que hay cambio de gobierno, que nadie se atreve a tocar, que es Brasil. El otro factor tiene que ver con política doméstica. Cuando se produce la expropiación de Repsol por parte de Argentina, el gobierno actúa en un enclave bilateral a sabiendas de que la mayor parte de nuestras relaciones es tan profundamente europeizada, pero optamos por una vía bilateral. ¿Por qué? La respuesta a la expropiación, que se hace de la Moncloa, está mucho más relacionada con las encuestas electorales, que cualquier otra consideración de política exterior. En todo caso nunca abandonaremos la vía europea, aunque sí se irá modificando. España va a seguir diciendo que la UE tiene que dar más prioridad a América Latina en temas de desarrollo, comercio. Otra cosa son los equilibrios entre la política bilateral, la iberoamericana y la europea. Entonces eso sí que cambia en el tiempo. Lo que no va a cambiar es que América Latina sea una prioridad para España. Yo siempre digo que la política exterior siempre responde a tres variables: Los intereses, los valores y las identidades. El hecho de que España ahora opte por la vía bilateral, mientras que antes ha optado por una acción más a través de la UE responde a muchos factores. Uno de ellos es la renacionalización de la política exterior. Pero también hay una cuestión importante, estamos en una UE de 28, estamos en una UE en un contexto internacional que ha cambiado. En el periodo de Marín como vicepresidente, cuando lanza la nueva estrategia hacia América Latina, es factible porque hay oportunidades en los asuntos internacionales, la ampliación de la UE queda lejos, sabíamos que quedaba lejos y por lo tanto había opción de colocar a otras regiones en la agenda. También estamos en una escena internacional dominada por una agenda económica relacionada con la globalización y una escena política relacionada con la consolidación democrática, que posiciona muy bien a América Latina. Primero tenemos un contexto internacional completamente securitizado, por 9/11. Segundo tenemos en ese momento la ampliación de la

UE, prioridad enorme que bascula en centro de gravedad hacia el este y una agenda de energía más importante, pues no está América Latina. Pues ya no tenemos negociaciones regionales y con Zapatero se pierde el interés en optar por la vía europea. Es mucho más difícil para España impulsar la agenda ahora. Luego cambia el gobierno, y lo que tenemos a partir de ahora es un gobierno que explícitamente quiere rebajar el perfil y quiere salir del legado de compromiso y de responsabilidad que tenía en la comunidad iberoamericana. Ya no queremos cumbres cada año. ¿Y por qué no? Porque un sistema de cumbres encaja muy bien con una visión regional, pero no con una política selectiva desde un punto de vista bilateral. El problema con la lógica de cumbres es lo siguiente: Cambia gobierno, un gobierno que tiene un diseño político hacia América Latina más ideológico. Pues el PP prepara un papel en el que se premia a algunos y se castiga a otros. ¿Pues qué ocurre? Después de haber empezado, se encuentra con la crisis de Repsol, y quiere reaccionar con energía contra esto. Pero no podían hacer casi nada, porque la mayor parte de las cosas que se podían hacer respecto a Argentina estaban en Bruselas. Y el resto de los estados miembros dicen: Mire usted, tienen ustedes razón y les vamos a ayudar. Pero lo de Repsol no es para que yo me vaya a hacerles la guerra a los latinoamericanos. Cuando decimos que hay que castigar a América Latina, Europa nos dice que tampoco es para tanto. España en esa crisis exagera. Pero cuando en el plano bilateral les queremos castigar, los argentinos nos dicen: Como te pongas tonto, voy a ir a la cumbre Cádiz con el ALBA y te voy a montar un número. Te voy a reventar la cumbre. ¿Qué hace España? Primero, a corto plazo rebaja la tensión con Argentina para que no nos monten el pollo, y al final lo que pasa es que Cristina Fernández de Kirchner dice que está enferma y que no viene. Segundo, ¿para qué nos sirve la cumbre de Cádiz? ¿Para exponernos y ponernos en una situación de debilidad? ¿Para ser rehenes de las voluntades de los países latinoamericanos? ¿Para condicionar a nuestra política selectiva bilateral? Pues España dice, menos cumbres, hacemos cumbre cada dos años. El gobierno de España está menos comprometido. El marco europeo y el marco iberoamericano les condicionan a la política bilateral que el gobierno español quiere hacer. Yo lo que creo es básicamente eso. Eso es lo que explicaría la menor atención hacia el marco europeo.

Q: ¿Qué significa para España el tratado de Lisboa?

A: Creo que hay oportunidades para España que haya una política exterior fuerte de la UE en la que América Latina tenga una posición fuerte ahí, es un objetivo deseable. Pero con

este gobierno no tiene la importancia que debería tener. Hablando del tratado en sí, yo no creo que modifique esencialmente el panorama anterior, salvo en lo que se refiere a las presidencias del Consejo. Las presidencias se van a poder utilizarse en mucha menor medida que en el pasado para proyectar, para hacer ese aplaudín de preferencias nacionales. Sobre las cuestiones de proyección a través de la UE te pongo un ejemplo. Una de las cuestiones más polémicas, que es Cuba, la posición del gobierno actual hacia Cuba es negativa. ¿Qué ha ocurrido? El gobierno de Zapatero quería cambiar la posición común de la UE hacia Cuba y no pudo. Aznar en su tiempo europeizó la política de España sobre Cuba, y eso limitó al gobierno de Zapatero y sus posibilidades de cambiarlo. Ahora la situación es la contraria. La mayoría de los estados miembros quieren cambiar la posición común y España no quiere, y ahora vamos hacia un acuerdo de asociación con Cuba, estamos premiando el gobierno de Cuba.

Q: ¿Qué significa el SEAE para España?

A: Te voy a hacer una citación para que entiendas por dónde anda el Ministerio. García-Margallo dijo hace unos meses que quería participar en el proyecto de los países de la alianza del pacífico. Un periódico salió después diciendo que este señor no sabe que está en Europa, de que es estado miembro de la UE, y que por lo tanto participa del proceso de conformación de SEAE que hipotéticamente podría llevar a ese tipo de trabajo diplomático. A mí no me cabe duda de que el SEAE es parte del “actorness” de la UE. Puede mejorar la relación entre UE América Latina al situar dentro de este servicio buenos diplomáticos, como los españoles que son buenos conocedores de esta región, en un marco europeo. Podría ser una buena ventaja para España, pero en términos de nombramientos del SEAE hemos conseguido pocos puestos, incluso para América Latina. De nuevo vuelvo al gran argumento, por una parte Lisboa refuerza la condición de actor de la UE y puede hacerlo hacia América Latina, pero hay un proceso de renacionalización y de fragmentación de la UE. A pesar de que la fortalecemos desde el punto de vista institucional, luego a la hora de tomar las decisiones, se está haciendo fuera de esos marcos. En particular España, está primando su política bilateral respecto a ese marco europeo, estamos hablando de deseuropeización de la política exterior española. No creo que Lisboa sea una causa de esto.

Q: Háblame de los contactos entre el Ministerio y los diplomáticos españoles en Bruselas.

A: En un proceso que sí he seguido cerca, porque tuve que apoyar al parlamento europeo en el proceso legislativo del nuevo instrumento al desarrollo, el que gradúa a 19 países, 11 de ellos de América Latina, el trabajo que hemos hecho fundamentalmente para salvar a esos 3 países que te dije antes, lo hemos hecho el gobierno español con REPER. De hecho la posición europea de la comisión, con o sin funcionarios españoles, ya estaba tomada. Eso no cambia con respecto a Lisboa. Nuestro trabajo ha sido fundamentalmente con funcionarios del parlamento y REPER.

Interview 8:

Q: ¿Me puede hacer un resumen histórico del papel de España en la política latinoamericana de la UE?

A: Yo le voy a contar un poco sobre las relaciones UE LA, y bueno para hablar de esto indudablemente hay que hablar de España. Para enfocar el tema de Lisboa, habría que hacer una consideración histórica, para analizar el presente hay que tener una visión de cómo llegamos aquí. Lisboa ha tenido un impacto en las relaciones exteriores de la UE con carácter general por la creación de SEAE, la apertura de delegaciones de UE en un número importante de países. Pero yo me ocupo de LA y quiero centrarme en eso, sin entrar en un análisis jurídico.

Yo creo que hay un punto de partida, desde el punto de vista histórico, que es la propia integración europea. De ese proceso tenía, por diferentes razones, una extensión más reducida, ya que ahora somos 28. En ese momento inicial y hasta los años 80, España no participaba en ese proceso de integración. En mi opinión si vemos el tema con una perspectiva temporal o histórica de 50 años, es indudable que Iberoamérica está más cerca de la UE de lo que estaba en los años 60. ¿Qué explica este acercamiento?

Una de las explicaciones, el primer factor, sería la entrada de España a la UE en los años 80. Antes del ingreso de España, y también Portugal, pero que tiene una proyección de política exterior más diversificada que nosotros que está concentrada en AL. Esto quiere decir que el ingreso de España en la UE es un factor que ha influido decisivamente en el proceso de acercamiento de AL con la UE, porque esto ha estado dentro de las prioridades de España en la política exterior de la UE, pero además España es un país iberoamericano, que también es un concepto. Entonces el hecho de que España se incorpora al proceso de integración europea ha hecho que la balanza de las relaciones exteriores que antes estaba centrada en países que hayan tenido especiales vínculos con países que hasta entonces estaban en lo que hoy se llama la UE, pues hizo que esa relación exterior se proyectase más hacia esos países, los ACP, norte de África. No olvidemos que en los años 80, todavía estaba la guerra fría. Por lo tanto, un factor decisivo ha sido el ingreso de España. Además España ha asumido un papel de interlocutor y ha ayudado a los países europeos a entender Iberoamérica y a Iberoamérica a entender Europa. Es indudable que eso ha sido un factor esencial.

El otro factor esencial es la evolución política que ha vivido Iberoamérica en la última parte del siglo 20, porque solamente se puede producir el acercamiento que condujo a la primera cumbre UE LA, que tuvo lugar en Rio de Janeiro en 1999, en un contexto en el que ambas partes comparten unos valores y unos principios. En términos generales podemos decir que ahora hoy en día la situación política en Iberoamérica es diferente a lo que fue en los años 90. El tercer factor es la integración europea. El proceso de integración en los años iniciales, no tenía entre sus prioridades la política exterior. Pero se ha puesto de manifiesto que los grandes problemas que tienen los países y también la UE encima de la mesa, no se pueden abordar con una perspectiva puramente interna. Cualquier asunto de política exterior que tiene los gobiernos sobre la mesa que necesariamente exige un enfoque internacional no se puede abordar si no tiene una visión global. Lisboa lo que hace es potenciar esa internacionalización de la UE y el desarrollo institucional al servicio, pues de estas consideraciones una dimensión exterior de la UE. Bueno, estos son 3 elementos que usted tiene que desarrollar. Esto es el punto de partida, la perspectiva histórica. AL ha pasado de ser algo marginal a ser algo más importante dentro de la UE.

En los años posteriores a nuestra incorporación y en los años 90 se produce un avance importante en las relaciones de la UE con AL. Los años 90 son especialmente importantes. En la primera cumbre UE LA en 1999 es cuando se establece el trabajo estratégico, que vaya a haber cumbre cada dos años. Las cumbres son en elemento institucional de máximo nivel. Ahora es la CELAC que es la organización que aglutina a los países de ALC y la UE que aglutina a los países de Europa con un diseño de las relaciones exterior en el que está el SEAE en el que se persigue es ser un elemento unificador de las políticas exteriores y de la proyección de la UE, todo salvo la competencia que tiene la comisión fundamentalmente en comercio. Yo le voy a dar a usted otra pista sobre la que usted debería de alguna manera bucear. Estamos aquí hablando de un acercamiento de la UE con AL y de las razones de ello. Una de ellas ha sido la política europea de cooperación al desarrollo que ha sido un elemento importante en Iberoamérica, entre otros lugares en Centroamérica. En segundo lugar, mediante la creación de un tejido institucional está constituido por una red de acuerdos entre la UE y los distintos estados que configuran Iberoamérica o las distintas subregiones de Iberoamérica. Porque por ejemplo hay un acuerdo con México y con Chile, pero lo relevante al margen de otros acuerdos que puede haber con América Central es el acuerdo de asociación.

Interview 9:

Q: What is your current position, and how long have you been in it?

A: I am professor of Latin American history at the UNED since 2005 and here in Real Instituto Elcano senior analyst since the creation of the institute in 2002.

Q: May I ask what your professional background is?

A: I am historian.

Q: For how long have you been dealing with issues regarding Latin America?

A: Well, since the beginning of my academic career in the 1970s.

Q: To what degree would you say Latin America is a priority for Spain in the EU? Has this changed over time?

A: Well, I think that Latin America is one of the first priorities for Spain, not only in the EU, but mainly for its foreign policy as a whole, and Spain projects this priority to the EU institutions. That was like that from the beginning since the incorporation of Spain to the EU and that idea never changed over time.

Q: The 1990s and early 2000s have often been called the ‘golden age’ of Spanish influence on the EU’s Latin America policy. How did Spain manage to successfully project its preferences onto the EU level during this time? What were the reasons for this? Which channels did Spain use to achieve its goals at the EU level?

A: Well that is a direct consequence of that priority that we talked about before. Spain permanently boosts Latin American questions inside the EU institutions and it is something that is important and makes Spanish foreign policy stronger in the EU because of its strong Latin American ties and Spanish foreign policy is also stronger in Latin America because of its European ties. For this reason the triangle Spain-EU-Latin America is a very important priority. Spain used all the levels to achieve its goals at the EU level. When Spain had the opportunity to use the Presidency, of course Spain intended to put Latin American questions on the table. For example in 2010, the last time Spain held Presidency, in fact the EU-LAC summit in Madrid was a big success due to the Spanish goals of signing the agreements between the EU-Colombia/Peru on one hand, on the other hand the agreement with Central

America, the re-launch of the EU-Mercosur negotiations, which were all questions that were put on the agenda by Spain. There were other channels which Spain used to put issues on the table, such as the EEAS. Also when Spain was in the front of some key posts of the EU in the beginning, such as with Marin, is part of showing Spain's big concern regarding Latin American questions.

Q: From the mid-2000s onwards it seems that Spain has been losing some 'terrain' in terms of shaping the EU's Latin America policy. What are the reasons for this?

A: I don't agree to this. I suppose that from the mid-2000s, especially from 2007 to the economic crisis of Spain with the reduction of fiscal governmental expenditures and adjustments in the Spanish administration that affect Spanish diplomacy. But generally speaking, I don't agree that Spain lose 'terrain' in this specific area. For example, we have two recent issues where the implication of Spanish diplomacy in Europe that relates to Latin America is very strong. On the one hand the elimination of Visa to Colombians and Peruvians, and on the other the implication of Spain in the re-launch of the EU-Mercosur negotiations.

Q: With the new role of the Council Presidency, it is thought that the member state that preside the presidency of the EU Council would have less scope to influence the EU's agenda and promote national interests. In addition, the new position of the High Representative gives it significant powers regarding agenda-setting, coordination, consensus-building and implementation. Do you agree?

A: Yes, generally speaking, yes.

Q: What advantages/disadvantages do the Council Presidency and the High Representative hold for Spain's power to shape EU Latin America policy?

A: Well that is part of a new reality inside the Union, so Spain needs to re-adapt its position as the rest of the countries to this. It's the same, not only for Spain, but also for the UK, Germany and France. I think there is a diminishing presence of Latin America inside the EU institutions, but the role of Spain is the same. The problem is not Spain; the problem is with the EU institutions and the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty inside these institutions. The question is not whether the new role of the Council Presidency has made projection of Latin America more challenging. The questions are Latin American questions a priority for EU

institutions or not. The question is not what happened to Spain. Yes, Spain is very important in all the EU Latin American policy. But Spain is only a part of this. For instance you spoke of the role of the High Representative. In this point for example, Spain had an active role in the past year regarding the Cuba problems. 3 years ago, the High Representative meant the failure of Spain to abolish the Common Position towards Cuba, the High Representative assumed a very active role, while Spain played a very secondary role there. But in the end, changes happened in the EU policy towards Cuba, which were in line with the changes that Spain proposed. So there you can see a combination between less or more active presence in some issues and the goals that Spain could obtain or not. When Spain had leadership of this policy, there were a lot of resistance mainly from countries like Germany, Poland, Czech Republic and Sweden. But now this resistance was reduced.

Q: Was the reduction of resistance due to Spanish efforts?

A: No, on the one hand yes, but on the other because the Spanish visibility was a bit reduced, and that also facilitated these changes inside the EU.

Q: What consequences do these changes trigger for Spain as a shaper of the EU's Latin America policy?

A: In some way power is being moved from the capitals and towards Brussels. But this is not only for Spain; the same applies to all the member states. The goal of 'Lisbon' is to make EU foreign policy less intergovernmental, but it is too early to evaluate the results.

Q: What has changed compared to the way Spain shaped the EU's Latin America policy prior to 'Lisbon'? Which current EU foreign policy mechanisms provide Spain with the opportunity to project its Latin America preferences?

A: Well, after and before 'Lisbon' Spain has done well to reinforce the Latin American presence in the EU institutions. That is what I wanted to say. It is the same for all, such as France with Africa, the UK with its former colonies.

Q: To what degree have provisions and practices of the Treaty of Lisbon constrained or enabled Spain's capabilities of shaping EU foreign policy?

A: *The introduction of Lisbon changed the rules of the game. But for Spain it is the same, you need to adapt and that's all. Spain had to adapt to the new mechanisms, and they did so well. The power of the member state remains and that is impossible to avoid for the moment.*

Q: What advantages/disadvantages does the EEAS hold for Spain's power to shape EU Latin America policy?

A: *I don't like to qualify it in this way. It is part of the reality and Spain needs to manage with it, the same as for all other countries. There are no difference regarding advantages and disadvantages for Spain and the other countries. You have Spanish ambassadors inside Latin American countries that are part of the EEAS or other officials in the same post. There are no differences from the other countries. The EEAS is a good thing for all Europe, not only for Spain. I think you are focusing too much on Spain. But you can't isolate Spain from the rest of the EU. The rules of the game are the same for all, Spain could benefit or not from the changes, but that is part of the change and the reality. Spain needs to adapt, and that is what is happening. You can't say that Spain could influence more or less now and before, because institutions are not the same.*

Q: The presence of Spanish diplomats in the Latin American divisions of the EEAS is significant. For instance, of the Spanish speaking countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, approximately half of the EU delegations have Spanish ambassadors. How can you explain the significant Spanish presence in the Latin American divisions of the EEAS? (EEAS 2014)

A: *This is a part of the strategy that the EEAS has developed, not only a consequence of Spanish strategies. It is also a more important part of the strategy of the EU institutions that think that Spanish diplomats could manage better in these positions than others who are less concerned in Latin American questions and also could understand lesser of Latin American problems. Not only this, Spain has embassies in all Latin American countries. It is the only case in Europe that a single country has embassies in all Latin America countries.*

Q: Does having significant presence of Spanish diplomats in EU delegations in Latin America affect Spanish influence in the EU's Latin America policy?

A: *Yes, of course.*

Q: How are the connections between Spain's foreign ministry and its seconded diplomats? How closely are they related?

A: Not too much. There are some cases for personal reasons not institutional reasons. There are no official links. Diplomats that are part of the EEAS are independent from the Spanish ministry. It is not a formal co-operation, it is very informal.

Q: Both the EU and Latin America are central to Spain. From the 1990s onwards Spain has pursued a 'two track strategy' regarding the EU and Latin America. However, while Spain's relations with Latin America are currently undergoing substantial changes, the EU is increasingly looking away. In the wake of the provisions and practices introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, how does Spain currently pursue its Latin America preferences?

A: As I told you previously, for Spanish EU policy, Latin America is important because that it reinforces its position in the EU institutions and vice versa as it also happens for Latin American relations the European component of Spanish foreign policy is also important. The introduction of 'Lisbon' does not change anything in the Spain-Latin American relations. Spain will pursue Latin America through the EU as before. For Spain the significance of Latin America is the same with or without 'Lisbon'.

Q: Spain held the first Council Presidency a la 'Lisbon'. The Presidency was called an 'invisible' one. Why is this? Spain played a key role in re-launching the EU-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations in 2010. Taking into account the provisions and practices introduced by 'Lisbon', how did Spain succeed in doing this?

A: No I do not agree that the Presidency was 'invisible'. As I told you the re-launch of the EU-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations, the agreement with Colombia and Peru, the agreement with Central America are very important goals. Regarding the projection of these goals, Spain did not experience any constrain regarding the changes by 'Lisbon'.

Q: According to Real Instituto Elcano, Spain has failed to advance negotiations between the EU and Mercosur. Similarly, Spain has not been particularly active in promoting the EU's strategic partnerships with individual Latin American countries such as Brazil and Mexico. Is this true, if so why?

A: *Spain did and is also doing a good job in these negotiations. If the negotiations do not advance, it is not part of Spanish responsibility. It is part of, on the one hand the responsibility of the EU negotiators, and on the other hand on the reluctance of the Mercosur countries to arrive to an end of these negotiations. Spain is very concerned in promoting EU strategic partnership with Brazil and Mexico.*

Q: According to the Real Instituto Elcano Spain will devote less time and energy to EU-Latin America relations in order to concentrate on its strictly bilateral links with a handful of political and economic partners, most notably Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru. How can this be explained?

A: *This is a wrong interpretation. The question is not to devote less time to EU Latin American relations. The question is; on the one hand you have the EU Latin America relations, and Spain is very concerned with these relations and tries to promote and develop more and more these relations. But on the other hand it is part of the national foreign policy, not the EU foreign policy, to concentrate on bilateral relations with some Latin American countries. It is an absolutely different thing. You need to differentiate EU Latin America relations from the strictly Spain Latin American relations.*

Q: In 2013, according to the Spanish embassy in Lima, Spain was expected to request for an elimination of EU Visa requirements for Colombians and Peruvians. Spain managed to put this on the EU's agenda. Taking into account the provisions and practices introduced by 'Lisbon', which, in theory, would reduce the member states' scope to influence the EU's agenda, how was this done?

A: *Spain did very well because these were Spanish initiatives and at the end Spain obtained this goal.*

Q: Why did Spain fail to change the EU's common position on Cuba in 2010? This has again been brought back on the EU's agenda, how come?

A: *Because of the policy of the HR on the one hand, but also the need of Cuban authorities to reach an agreement to break the isolation of the country. Also the lesser resistance of some EU countries like the Czech Republic, Germany, Poland and Sweden. Spain backed the position of the EU diplomatic service.*

Q: José Manuel García-Margallo guaranteed in 2012 that Spain would support Ecuador in the EU so that a commercial agreement could be signed. How has Spain worked for this agreement in the EU?

A: Well, Spain, as Garcia-Margallo said, support Ecuadorian interests in reaching an agreement with the Union, but with some distance because the European position is different from on the Colombian and Peruvian ones. Spain supports this position, but with some distances because Ecuador position tries to protect some parts of their economic system. This protection is different from the one Colombia and Peru has, so Spain is close to their positions than the one of Ecuador.

Q: If you compare Spain shaping the EU's Latin America policy pre- and post-Lisbon, has projection of national foreign policy preferences to the EU level become more challenging? If so, please illustrate using some cases regarding Spanish projection of Latin America preferences pre- and post-Lisbon.

A: As I said previously, the introduction of 'Lisbon' has changed the rules of the game, but that's all. Now Spain also has to deal with their economic crisis, but Spanish foreign policy with regards to Latin America is the same pre and –post Lisbon. So in the EU, Spain intends to maintain their goals pre and –post Lisbon. One thing was to deal with 15 member states regarding Latin American questions and now deal with 27 or 28 member states. That will be the main difficulty for Spain, not the EU institutions, but the size of the EU. You, sometimes, put too much emphasis on Spain, as if all depends on Spain. Of course 'Lisbon' presents important challenges, but not only for Spain. I think Spanish diplomacy is adapting well to these changes.